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Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to set the context of this thesis and to introduce its motivation,
goals and contributions. This thesis is framed along the intersection of two important
research areas: Secure System Engineering (SSE) and trust management. Therefore,
in Section 1.1 we provide some background knowledge on these areas, stressing the
difference between trust and other related concepts like security, risk and trustworthi-
ness. After setting the context of the thesis, we present the goals that it pursuits in
Section 1.2, which also summarizes the main contributions and explains how they fit
in the context of the thesis. Finally, Section 1.3 provides the list of publications that
underpins the thesis, and the funding that allowed its realization.
1.1 Research Scope
This section introduces the scope of the thesis, which moves along the intersection of two
research areas: SSE and trust management. The former is introduced in Section 1.1.1
and concerns with building secure systems from the ground-up. The latter, presented
in Section 1.1.2, aims to translate the concept of trust into the computing domain.
The concept of trust is closely related to and has been traditionally mixed up with
other concepts such as security, risk and trustworthiness. Therefore, Section 1.1.3 clar-
ifies the intuitive relationships between these concepts, stressing their differences.
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1.1.1 Secure System Engineering
The domain under which this thesis is framed is Secure System Engineering, which is
an evolving discipline that unifies two important areas: system engineering and security
(131) (4). The discipline takes a holistic view of security across all phases of the System
Development Life Cycle (SDLC), from the initial planning and specification of security
requirements to the runtime verification of security properties, as depicted in Figure 1.1.
The growing importance of this discipline is reflected by industry initiatives like the
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle1, by the creation of working groups in the
area2, and by EU-funded projects3.
Figure 1.1: Secure System Development Life Cycle
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The discipline takes a proactive side in securing systems (and in turn, the services
that constitute them) as opposed to the traditional reactive approach that has been the
standard in the security field (42)(131). This reactive approach has been proven to be
problematic because security breaches are tackled once the harm is already done, with
the subsequent loss of large amount of money and reputation (130). On the contrary,
SSE proposes building the system secure from the ground-up, limiting the attack surface
of the system from the very beginning, and ensuring that the enforcement of security
mechanisms matches their initial specifications (35).
1http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/
2http://www.ifip.org/bulletin/bulltcs/tc11_aim.htm
3http://www.nessos-project.eu
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The first phase of the SDLC, namely planning and visualization, studies the fea-
sibility of the system and makes some early decisions in relation to its development.
During security analysis, threats to the system, as well as security goals and concerns
for the different stakeholders, are elicited. Next, design artifacts and an architecture are
built in order to provide the security services that prevent the threats and that cover
the security needs identified in the previous stage. This architecture is implemented in
the next phase, where best practices in secure coding and secure execution platforms
are used. In service-oriented environments, where systems are built by composing ser-
vices, there is the need to consider secure composition platforms and approaches. The
last phase of the cycle includes the runtime monitoring of the system in order to verify
the enforcement of the security requirements and policies defined in previous phases.
Transversally to the cycle and controlling the flow of the different activities, risk man-
agement and assurance operations are executed. The former identifies and quantifies
risks that may endanger the successful achievement of the system, whereas the latter is
concerned with guaranteeing that the security goals and requirements are preserved all
along the cycle4.
As further discussed in Section 1.2, this thesis focuses on engineering trust in several
phases of this SDLC. Therefore, the next section provides some background knowledge
on the area of trust management.
1.1.2 Trust Management
The term trust management dates back to the mid 90s and was coined by Blaze, Feigen-
baum and Lacy (18) to denote new mechanisms for decoupling the identity from the
authorization problem. In particular, these mechanisms simplify the two-step access
control process, namely an authentication step and an authorization step, into a one-
step trust decision.
Another approach to introducing trust in the computing domain was formerly pro-
posed by Marsh (75). In this approach, namely computational trust, the idea is to
study how trust is characterized in other disciplines, like psychology, game theory or
economics, and replicate this trust knowledge in the computing domain for collaborative
scenarios. The main difference with the traditional view of trust management is that
4There are different life cycles models, and some of them include phases like maintenance. Nonethe-
less, we abstract from concrete models and represent the crucial phases that most of them share.
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trust is not longer a binary value (i.e. I trust or I do not trust), but it consists of a
continuous or discrete spectrum of values that represents more accurately the level of
trust in an entity.
Both approaches, namely trust management and computational trust, are encom-
passed nowadays under the common term trust management. The way that trust is
replicated in the computing domain is through the so-called trust models. Depend-
ing on the context and the goal of the model, the tasks that it must perform may be
different.
In the traditional trust management field, the model is responsible for verifying
credentials and policies and for granting access to resources if the requester or provider
is trusted. The model may support a negotiation protocol between the two entities in
order to reveal gradually the credentials and policies, thus meeting privacy concerns.
In the branch of computational trust, the first task of the model is initializing a
trust relationship between entities. Initially, as there is no local information about a
partner’s behaviour, external reputation information may be more weighted to make
a trust decision. In addition, several types of authentication and credential systems
may assist in determining an initial level of trust. Other trust models rely on the
system’s general tendency to trust, or trust propensity, defining a default trust value for
newcomers considering how, in general, the entities behave in the system.
The next task of this type of model is observation and assessment, that is, monitoring
the behaviour of entities and assigning trust values that depend on this behaviour. The
observation can be done as an active participant of the collaboration or as a silent third
party. Research in intrusion detection can be useful for this purpose (113). Suspicious
activity could be misbehaviour such as breaking a system policy, or simply a high
deviation from usual actions performed by the observed entity. Detection of these
misbehaviours could be achieved by means of specification-based anomaly detection, in
which the normal behaviour is specified using some formalization technique or language.
When an observation system has detected suspicious activity (or if it has just been
witness of normal behaviour), a decision must be made on what to do, leading to the
update of the trust or reputation value. Trust and reputation metrics are used in order
to update trust and reputation values, respectively. They consist of a set of factors,
that is, the variables that are used by the metrics, and of an engine, which determines
how the factors are combined to yield a final value.
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As a conclusion, there are several dimensions to describe trust in the computing
domain through trust models (5), which are summarized next:
• Target: entities under trust evaluation are different, ranging from users in access
control systems to peers in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks.
• Representation: trust can be encoded by means of credentials (e.g. digital signa-
tures), records of past interactions or ontologies in the semantic web.
• Method: hard-security approaches use authentication to decide complete trust in
a user. Entities opinions, i.e. reputation, and histories of past interactions can be
used to determine trust. Exchange of credentials are also used to establish trust
before engaging in an Internet transaction.
• Management: the entities that determine trust can vary, from single trusted third
parties to individual peers able to reason about trust in others.
• Computation: trust may be computed in many ways, using discrete values or a
continuous numerical range, probabilities or confidence intervals, and considering
static or dynamic time. Moreover, different algorithms exist to transfer trust
values among entities.
• Purpose: trust can be used for multiple purposes, including protecting data,
finding accurate information, selecting the most appropriate service, or decid-
ing whether to provide access to resources. In the very end, the purpose of trust
is supporting decision-making processes.
1.1.3 Trust, Security, Risk and Trustworthiness
Trust is an unsteady concept, because we intuitively know what it is but it is hard
to put its definition down in words. Chapter 2 performs a throughout analysis of the
definition of trust and all its related concepts. In this section though, we are interested
in exploring the intuitive relationship between trust and other properties that are closely
related to it.
As discussed in the previous section, trust in the computing domain has its origin in
computer security, and in particular, in the authentication and authorization domains
(43). Resources owners implicitly trust users if the latter prove their identity and this
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identity is associated to access rights for these resources. As environments are more
open and distributed, the reliance on identity as a trust validator becomes questionable
(18). As we can intuitively guess, the ultimate goal of trust is about making a decision,
for example, whether granting access to resources or not. In particular, trust is recog-
nized to be a useful tool to empower decision-making processes under the presence of
uncertainty (75).
It is again intuitive that the deployment of traditional security mechanisms on a
system can help building trust in such system. If users know that a system is secure,
they will most likely prefer it over another system that performs the same work and it
is not secure. However, how can users know that a system is secure? There are two
possibilities: either they have previous experience with the system, or a reputable entity
(e.g. certification authority or security expert) tells them to believe that it is secure. In
any case, it is important to notice the following subtlety: users do not trust a system
because it is secure, but because they know (or they think they know) that it is secure.
This is a consequence of trust being subjective.
Security is often considered one dimension or factor of trust (138). This means that
even if users know that a system is secure, they still may not trust it if the system fails
in other categories, such as usability, reliability, robustness or competence. If a system
does not perform as users expect, or if users do not feel attracted to its interfaces, users
may not trust the system (124). Therefore, security may not be enough in order to
build trust. This is back up by the observation that even when companies are investing
increasingly more in security (101), users do not trust them to keep their personal
information safe online5.
We can also state that under certain circumstances, security may not even be neces-
sary at all in order to achieve trust. In particular, if users do not worry about security
and they have favorable previous experiences with a system, they gain trust in the sys-
tem even if the system does not implement any security measures. It is not a lack of
security that may lead users not to trust, but the security incidents of past experiences
or the fear that such incidents eventually occur. However, the premise that users do
not worry about security is unrealistic nowadays, because the growth of incidents is
5http://www.itproportal.com/2013/09/14/a-question-of-trust-vs-security-do-people-
actually-trust-companies-they-do-business-with-online/
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raising concerns and users are more aware and fearful about security, especially after
Snowden’s declarations (73).
As a conclusion, we can summarize the relationship between trust and security in
the following statements:
• The presence of security itself does not imply trust; however, the fact that users
think that the system is secure will, in most cases, increase their trust in the
system.
• The presence of trust does not imply security; users could trust the system due
to other properties.
• Security is an objective property, whereas trust is a subjective property. This
means that two systems can be the same secure and still being trusted differently
by a group of users, due to other factors beyond security, including personal
preferences.
In this thesis, we are concerned about engineering trust into software services through
trust and reputation models. For us, users are in many cases services, and the system
is another service or a group of services. Given that in most cases there is a positive
correlation between security and trust, we discuss security in several parts of the thesis,
especially when discussing factors that must be considered in order to evaluate trust.
However, even when we do not explicitly mention it, we assume that there are basic
security services underpinning the trust and reputation models.
Regarding risk, it is agreed that it has a strong relationship with trust (71)(57). The
first point in common is that both are tools that empower decision making. They also
deal with uncertainty; in the case of risk, uncertainty is represented by the probability
that something unpleasant happens, whereas the way of representing uncertainty in
trust depends on the model, and can range from probabilities to confidence intervals.
The relationship between risk and trust can be seen in either direction: risk as a
factor of trust, or trust as a factor of risk. The former indicates that risk is a factor that
can be taken into account prior to assessing trust. However, we should ask ourselves to
which extent and how each risk component, probability and impact, should be weighted.
The other direction of the relationships indicates that trust information can be a relevant
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factor when making risk assessments, where the level of trust represents the probability
used when measuring the opportunity level (71).
It seems intuitive that trust and risk have a positive correlation: the trust that an
entity places in another entity to perform an action must be high if the risk involved
in that action is high too; or put in other words, if there is no risk involved in an
action, no trust is required. High risk implies high values at stake or high chance for
deception, increasing the necessary trust to engage in the interaction. The absence of
risk may imply low values at stake, minimizing (even removing) the need for making a
trust decision. In this direction, Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (78) state that trust is
the willingness to take risk, and the level of trust is an indication of the amount of risk
that one is willing to take.
Trust and trustworthiness are two related concepts that are often used interchange-
ably and must be distinguished (127). Avižienis et al. (8) define trustworthiness as the
“assurance that a system will perform as expected”. Note that trustworthiness is a prop-
erty of the system, just like security, and therefore, it is not susceptible to subjective
judgement. The ideal situation is present when the trustor’s trust in a trustee matches
the trustworthiness of the latter (95). In that case, we say that trust is well-founded;
otherwise, it is ill-founded (71). As for the relationship with risk, we can consider that
the probability that measures the uncertainty partly represents the trustworthiness of
the trustee (57).
In this thesis, we focus on trust and take the vision that risk is embedded in both the
trust level and trust threshold of the model, following the positive correlation between
trust and risk. Therefore, setting a high threshold (value over which a trust decision
is positive) implies that trust must be high, and therefore, that the risk is also high.
Conversely, setting a low threshold implies that risk is low, therefore trust can be low
in order to proceed with the interaction. We do not consider trustworthiness.
1.2 Goals and Organization
The integration of trust into different phases of the SDLC can bring benefits to systems
and, consequently, can have a positive effect on the users of such systems, who will feel
more confident and willing to use them. However, there are two main stumbling blocks
that prevent trust engineering from becoming a reality.
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First, there is not a good understanding of trust in the computing domain. There
exists a large amount of authors proposing different trust and reputation models, but few
deal with systematizing the concepts behind trust and abstracting away from particular
assumptions or contexts where the models are applied. To add insult to injury, trust
and reputation are often mixed up, leading to still greater confusion. Therefore, one
goal of this thesis is to study the concept of trust and to build a conceptual framework
that studies trust-related concepts and the relationships between these concepts.
The second stumbling block is that there are barely tools, guidelines or approaches
that provide engineers and developers with the adequate know-how on engineering trust
along the SDLC. The current standard is to build trust and reputation models on top
of existing systems in an ad-hoc way in order to match their specific needs, limiting
the models re-usability on different systems and contexts. An approach typically used
in social applications and web markets is to hard-code the reputation process in the
application itself, which as stated by Farmer and Glass (34), might lead to poor, un-
manageable solutions. Fixing bugs or mitigating abuse become impossible unless repu-
tation remains an isolated module. We believe that these approaches are not adequate,
and that a holistic approach where trust and reputation requirements are considered
from the very beginning is required. Therefore, the other goal of this thesis is to provide
systems engineers and developers with methods and tools to manage trust and reputation
in different phases of the SDLC. Accomplishing this integration requires understand-
ing the concept of trust, and including trust reasoning in key activities of the different
phases of the life cycle.
The contributions of this thesis are summarized in Section 1.2.1, whereas its general
organization is discussed in Section 1.2.2.
1.2.1 Thesis Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are the following:
• A comprehensive literature review on the integration of trust in different phases
of the SDLC.
• Highlight of the constituent components of trust by the systematic analysis of
multiple definitions of trust.
9
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• A conceptual framework that analyses trust-related concepts and the relation-
ships among these concepts, which in turn provides a common basis that allows
comparing a wide range of trust and reputation models.
• A methodology to incorporate trust reasoning during Cloud sourcing decisions in
the early phases of the SDLC.
• A methodology and tool that support the identification of threats in systems and
organizations through the analysis of trust relationships.
• A methodology and notation that allows the elicitation of trust and reputation
requirements and their integration with other functional and non-functional (in-
cluding security) requirements.
• A notation that allows the specification of trust and reputation models into the
system.
• A framework that allows the implementation of a wide range of trust and reputa-
tion models.
• A framework that allows building systems that evolve at runtime according to
trust and reputation values.
Figure 1.2 shows how these contributions are aligned with the different phases of
the SDLC.
1.2.2 Thesis Outline
In this first chapter, we have contextualized this thesis in the scope of trust engineering,
and we have summarized its contributions in relation to this scope.
In Chapter 2, we first provide a comprehensive literature review that analyses trust
attending to different points of view. This analysis provides the required background
to elaborate a conceptual framework that conveys trust-related concepts and their re-
lationships. This framework serves as a basis for a systematic comparison of different
trust and reputation models, decoupling them from particular assumptions and low-
level details. The conceptual framework gathers three sets of concepts. The first set
corresponds to concepts that are common to all the trust models in the literature, and
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Figure 1.2: Main Contributions in relation to the SDLC
Planning	  and	  
Visualiza-on	  
Security	  
Analysis	  
Secure	  	  
Design	  
Secure	  
Implementa-on	  
Run-me	  
Veriﬁca-on	  
Risk	  
Management	  
Assurance	  
- Trust-based  
Threat Analysis 
- Trust Requirements 
Elicitation 
- UML Profile for Trust  
and Reputation Specification 
- Development Framework for 
Trust and Reputation Models 
- Trust@run.time  
framework 
- Trust-supported Cloud Sourcing 
Decision 
which include the factors that influence trust, the roles that entities may play, and the
purpose of trust, among others. The second and third sets of concepts refer to concepts
related to two classes of trust models that we consider, namely decision and evaluation
models, respectively. The former revolve around the concepts of policies and credentials,
whereas the latter put the stress on the assessment of trust, including trust metrics,
trust factors and the sources of information. The conceptual model is used to compare
a wide range of well-known trust and reputation models.
The knowledge elicited by the conceptual model is put into practice in the subsequent
chapters, where we discuss methodologies, notations and tools to integrate trust in
different phases of the SDLC. Thus, in Chapter 3, we focus on the early phases of the
cycle, spanning the planning, analysis and design phases. As for the former, we tackle an
important activity that is attracting the attention during the last years: the outsourcing
of the system, or part of it, to a cloud provider. We present a methodology that supports
the trust evaluation of different cloud providers according to several dimensions. This
information proves to be useful when there is lack of complete information (i.e. in the
presence of uncertainty) in order to minimize the probabilities of problems derived from
a wrong decision, such as security or privacy incidents. The methodology requires a
phase of knowledge gathering from different sources about the cloud provider. This
knowledge is represented by confidence intervals, which allows representing uncertainty
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explicitly. We also define an operator in order to aggregate intervals while maintaining
uncertainty in each operation. The methodology output consists of a set of confidence
intervals that reveals to what extent the trust in the provider differs from the initial
expectations. The methodology is applied to four well-known cloud vendors under an
eHealth case study.
We also integrate trust in two activities that are typically performed during the
security analysis phase. The first one involves the analysis and identification of insider
threats in socio-technical systems. In such systems, the organization is a key player and
as such, its components and relationships must be taken into account. Therefore, by
detecting implicitly assumed and misplaced trust relationships, we can infer potential
threats on resources in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. The second
contribution in this phase corresponds to an extension over the problem frames notation
in which trust and reputation concepts are integrated. Therefore, by using this extension
we are capable of eliciting trust and reputation requirements, integrating them with
other functional and non-functional requirements.
After the requirements analysis, we move to the design phase, where an initial
specification of the system with trust and reputation considerations is proposed. In
order to accomplish this task, a Unified Modeling Language (UML) profile that extends
several diagrams is presented. The concepts included in the profile allow designers to
specify trust and reputation solutions that can be easily implemented in later stages.
Not only do the profile support the description of how trust and reputation is computed,
but it also enables reasoning about the purpose of trust, and in particular, for which
use cases trust, reputation or both are required and why. The extended diagrams
include use case, class and deployment ones. Even when sequence diagrams are not
extended, we encourage their use in order to represent the interaction patterns between
the system and the trust models. The profile is validated with an eHealth scenario,
where physicians monitor patients through wearables that send vital signs information
to the hospital servers. In this setting, it becomes very important to consider trust
requirements that encompass trust relationships between patients, physicians and the
wearables, as well as reputation information about the physicians.
Despite the vast amount of trust models proposed in the literature, few effort has
been made on smoothing their implementation in more general contexts. Developers feel
unarmed when it comes to implement these models because there are no tools or clear
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guidelines on how to integrate trust models in their own systems. Therefore, Chapter 4
describes a framework that developers can use in order to implement a wide range of
trust and reputation models. The requirements of the framework and its high-level ar-
chitecture are discussed first, and as it is the case with the aforementioned contributions,
they build upon the concepts identified in Chapter 2. Then, a low-level architecture
and guidelines towards the implementation of its different aspects are introduced. The
framework is designed to act as a middle-tier server that mediates between the client
application and the database tiers, where the application can request trust information
or send updates of trust or reputation values. The framework empowers developers
to define their own metrics and the events in the application that trigger trust and
reputation updates. The validation is done in the context of a social market for cloud
providers, in which they can publish web services and consume services from other
providers.
The use of trust and reputation in order to evolve the system at runtime is dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. In particular, we describe a development framework for trust and
reputation models that is integrated in a models@run.time platform. Models@run.time
is a model-driven approach that allows reasoning about a running system by means
of abstractions. This approach is gaining traction among the model-driven community
because it helps tackling the complexity of distributed systems and due to its self-
adaptability capabilities: users can use the platform in order to reason about the state
of the system and can easily determine whether a reconfiguration is required given some
changing conditions. These platforms however do not usually consider security aspects,
which may be a stumbling block for its widespread adoption. Therefore, the framework
that we propose enables developers to include trust and reputation reasoning in the
system components, which yields trust-aware systems that self-adapt at runtime based
on trust and reputation values. We validate our framework in a distributed chat appli-
cation by implementing several well-known trust and reputation models. We also prove
that our framework entails negligible computational overhead and entails minimal effort
for developers.
Chapter 6 finalizes the thesis by presenting the conclusions as well as some open
research problems that require further attention from the research community.
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1.3 Publications and Funding
The contributions of this thesis have been presented in various journals and international
conferences. Next, we provide a list of the contributions organized by the type of
publication:
Journal article ISI-JCR
• F. Moyano, C. Fernandez-Gago, and J. Lopez. A Framework for Enabling Trust
Requirements in Social Cloud Applications. In Requirements Engineering, vol.
18, issue 4, Springer London, pp. 321-341, Nov 2013. ISI JCR Impact Factor:
1.675
International Conferences
• F. Moyano, K. Beckers, and C. Fernandez-Gago. Trust-Aware Decision-Making
Methodology for Cloud Sourcing. In 26th International Conference on Advanced
Information Systems Engineering (CAiSE 2014), M. Jarke, et al. Eds., LNCS
8484, Springer, pp. 136-149, Jun, 2014
• F. Moyano, C. Fernandez-Gago, and J. Lopez. Building Trust and Reputation
In: A Development Framework for Trust Models Implementation. In 8th Inter-
national Workshop on Security and Trust Management (STM 2012), A. Jøsang,
P. Samarati, and M. Petrocchi Eds., LNCS 7783, Springer, pp. 113-128, 2013
• F. Moyano, B. Baudry, and J. Lopez. Towards Trust-Aware and Self-Adaptive
Systems. In 7th IFIP WG 11.11 International Conference on Trust Management
(IFIPTM 2013), C. Fernandez-Gago, I. Agudo, F. Martinelli, and S. Pearson Eds.,
AICT 401, Springer, pp. 255-262, Jun 2013
• F. Moyano, C. Fernandez-Gago, and J. Lopez. A Conceptual Framework for Trust
Models. In 9th International Conference on Trust, Privacy & Security in Digital
Business (TrustBus 2012), S. Fischer-Hübner, S. Katsikas, and G. Quirchmayr
Eds., LNCS 7449, Springer Verlag, pp. 93-104, Sep 2012
• F. Moyano, C. Fernandez-Gago, and J. Lopez. Towards Engineering Trust-aware
Future Internet Systems. In 3rd International Workshop on Information Systems
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Security Engineering (WISSE 2013), X. Franch, and P. Soffer Eds., LNBIP 148,
Springer-Verlag, pp. 490-501, Jun 2013
• F. Moyano, C. Fernandez-Gago, K. Beckers, and M. Heisel. Enhancing Problem
Frames with Trust and Reputation for Analyzing Smart Grid Security Require-
ments. In Second International Workshop on Smart Grid Security, J. Cuellar Ed.,
LNCS 8448, Springer, pp. 166-180, Aug, 2014
Book Chapter
• F. Moyano, C. Fernandez-Gago, B. Baudry, and J. Lopez. Engineering Trust-
Awareness and Self-adaptability in Services and Systems. In Engineering Secure
Future Internet Services and Systems, vol. LNCS 8431, no. 8431, Springer, pp.
180-209, 03/2014
Additionally to these main contributions, there are other works that have been
carried out in parallel and which are listed next sorted by date:
• K. Beckers, M. Heisel, F. Moyano and C. Fernandez-Gago, Engineering Trust-
and Reputation-based Security Controls for Future Internet Systems. In The
30th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium On Applied Computing (SAC 2015), In Press
• F. Paci, C. Fernandez-Gago, and F. Moyano. Detecting Insider Threats: a Trust-
Aware Framework. In 8th International Conference on Availability, Reliability
and Security, IEEE, pp. 121-130, Nov 2013
• F. Moyano, C. Fernandez-Gago, and J. Lopez. A Trust and Reputation Frame-
work. In Doctoral Symposium of the International Symposium on Engineering Se-
cure Software and Systems (ESSoS-DS 2013), M. Heisel, and E. Marchetti Eds.,
CEUR-WS 965, CEUR-WS, pp. 7-12, 2013
• F. Moyano, C. Fernandez-Gago, and J. Lopez. Service-Oriented Trust and Rep-
utation Architecture. In Proceedings of the Doctoral Symposium of the Interna-
tional Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems (ESSoS-DS 2012),
J. Cuellar, and N. Koch Eds., CEUR-WS 834, CEUR-WS, pp. 41-46, 2012
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Chapter 2
Understanding Trust: A Systematic
Analysis
The aim of this chapter is setting up some foundations onto which we can build the
rest of the chapters of this thesis. Prior to integrating trust and reputation in the
different phases of the SDLC, it is necessary to systematize the knowledge around these
notions. Gaining insight on trust and trust-related concepts demands a wide study
of the concept of trust that spans different angles, which include revising the origins
of trust management and computational trust, reviewing existing taxonomies and trust
and reputation surveys, and analyzing how the concept of trust has being approximated
to each phase of the SDLC.
Once we gather this knowledge, we proceed by creating a conceptual model where the
most relevant trust-related concepts are stressed and related among them. This model
serves us as a framework to compare different trust models under the same lens, and at
the same time, it provides the basis and the core knowledge that can be integrated in
different phases of the SDLC, from the early phases (Chapter 3) to runtime (Chapter 5).
The chapter consists of two main sections. Section 2.1 reviews existing works that
consider trust in different contexts and phases, whereas Section 2.2 presents the con-
ceptual model and applies it in order to compare a wide variety of trust and reputation
models.
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2.1 Literature Review
This section summarizes existing works on trust from three different perspectives:
• Taxonomy perspective: these works provide a classification or taxonomy of trust
and reputation concepts and models.
• Computing domain perspective: here we tackle the origins of trust management
and computational trust through a revision of the two main classes of trust models.
• Development life cycle perspective: we deal with works that aim to integrate trust
in different phases of the SDLC.
Each of the following sub-sections deal with these perspectives in further detail.
2.1.1 Trust Taxonomies
Grandison and Sloman (43) provide a classification of trust based on its purpose. The
first purpose is trusting a trustee to access the resources of a trustor. The second
purpose is trusting a trustee to provide a resource to a trustor. Certification of trustees
is the next purpose; in this case, trustee’s identity or capabilities are certified by a
third party. The next purpose is delegation, in which a trustor trusts a trustee to
make decisions on its behalf. Finally, the authors discuss infrastructure trust, where
trustors trust themselves (implicit trust) and the infrastructure that they use, including
firmware, operating systems, local network and servers.
Trust is relevant in multi-agent systems, since agents must trust other agents in order
to engage in collaborations. In this context, Ramchurn, Huynh and Jennings (104), and
Sabater and Sierra (115) have provided their own conceptualisation of trust models.
The former categorize trust in individual-level trust, which refers to beliefs on the
honesty of other agents, and system-level trust, which involves trust as a consequence of
adjusting to the rules of encounter or protocols. The latter proposes several classification
dimensions for trust and reputation models. The first dimension is the conceptual
model, which can be cognitive (trust as a set of beliefs) or game-theoretical (trust
as an outcome of an interaction). The second dimension comprises the information
sources used to gather knowledge and to make a trust decision; these sources include
direct experience, witness information, sociological information and prejudice. The next
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dimension is visibility types, which refers to whether trust is seen as a global property
shared by all observers or is observed as a subjective property assessed particularly
by each individual. Another criteria is the granularity of the model, which determines
whether the model serves for a single context or allows multiple context at a time. The
assumptions about agent behaviour is the next criteria; some models assume that agents
may behave badly, whereas others assume that cheating behaviour will not happen.
The type of information received from witness is another criteria, and the authors
consider those models that use boolean information and continuous measures. Finally,
the authors consider whether the model uses a reliability measure of the trust value.
In relation to multi-agent systems, Pinyol and Sabater-Mir (98) present a survey on
classification dimensions by other authors under this context, and they provide their own
classification dimensions. The first one is the trust dimension, where they distinguish
between trust and reputation model. Essentially, the authors state that trust implies
a decision, and only when the decision-making process is part of the model (e.g. the
model provides a threshold computation), the model is actually a trust model. The
second one is the cognitive dimension, and it refers to whether the model explicitly
model the reasons behind a trust disposition, that is, if it is possible to reason about
a trust decision in terms of beliefs. The next dimension is procedural, and evaluates
whether the model explains the bootstrapping phase. Finally, the generality dimension
states whether a model is designed for a very particular scenario or can be adapted to
a variety of scenarios.
The life cycle of a trust management system is discussed by Ruohomaa and Kutvo-
nen (113). According to the authors, this life cycle starts with the initialization of
a trust relationship, where an entity uses a discovery service to find a partner. The
second phase is observation, where an the behaviour and interactions of an entity are
observed. In this context, intrusion detection and prevention systems may be used
as a source of information for updating trust and reputation values. The next phase
consists of evolving trust and reputation. As part of this phase, it is necessary to trans-
late experiences into updates in reputation. The same authors also compare several
reputation systems under a credibility taxonomy (112). They advocate that in open
reputation system environments, different types of misbehaviour can occur, making it
important to separate accurate from inaccurate information. This credibility taxonomy
comprises three criteria: the creation and content of a recommendation, the selection
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and use of recommenders and the interpretation and reasoning applied to the gathered
information.
An explicit classification of trust models is performed by Artz and Gil (5). The
authors divide trust models into policy-based trust, reputation-based trust and general
models of trust. Policy-based trust refers to trust models in which trust is established by
credentials exchange. Reputation-based trust comprises trust models that use personal
experiences or others’ experience to make a trust decision. General models of trust
provide a broader view on trust, taking game-theoretic and psychological approaches
into consideration. The relationship between trust and reputation is further discussed
by Jøsang, Ismail and Boyd (56), and the authors provide a classification of reputa-
tion models centred around the semantics of ratings, the architecture (centralized or
distributed) and the computation engine they use. Hendrikx, Bubendorfer and Chard
(50) presents a conceptual model for reputation, which they call a reference model,
where they depict relevant concepts and relationships among them. They also provide
a comprehensive taxonomy of reputation systems, consisting of fourteen dimensions that
encompass most features of current commercial and research models. However, they do
not discuss trust concepts or relationships.
Yan and Holtmanns (138) consider that trustors’ and trustees’ properties are fun-
damental for understanding which factors affect trust. In particular, they remark that
trustors and trustees possess objective and subjective properties that influence a trust
relationship. The same authors then provide a taxonomy of trust models, which are
categorized according to the following criteria: modelling method, that is, linguistic,
graphic or mathematic description; single-property modelling or multi-property mod-
elling; expression of trust, that is, whether trust is expressed with binary or numeral
ratings; and dimension of trust expression, which refers to whether the trust value is a
single value or a vector of values.
Another taxonomy for trust models is suggested by Noorian and Ulieru (89). The
authors propose several dimensions scoped within two broad categories, namely hard
features and soft features. As part of hard features, they classify the systems according
to their rating approaches, witness locating approaches, reputation engine and informa-
tion sources. As for the soft features, the dimensions considered are context and criteria
similarity, adaptability to newcomers and scalability, reliability, including the accuracy
20
2.1 Literature Review
and honesty of witnesses, and reputation management parameters such as transitivity
rate and time.
Other fields of study where trust is relevant are Service-Oriented Architectures
(SOA) and social applications. In the former field, Wang and Vassileva (134) focus
on trust and reputation as a means to leverage service selection in Service-Oriented
Architectures (SOAs), and classify models according to three hierarchical criteria. The
first criteria is whether the model is centralized or decentralized. The second classifies
models in those that evaluate persons/agents, or resources like services. The last criteria
considers whether reputation is derived from the opinions of the global population, or
from a selected set of individuals. On the other hand, Zhang, Durresi and Barolli (142)
state that trust research in social applications can be divided into four parts: forming
initial trust, trust metrics, operations of propagating and aggregating trust, and trust
management architecture. In the first category, they distinguish between trust formed
by human cognition and by artificial intelligence. Trust metrics are divided into binary,
scaled, multi-metric, probability, and according to whether their values are discrete or
can be negative. Propagation and aggregation of trust, also referred by the authors as
trust transitivity, is discussed in terms of its two basic operations: concatenation and
aggregation. Trust management architecture can be centralized and distributed. Ac-
cording to the authors, centralized and distributed trust management lead to reputation
systems, where trust is a consensus of all participants.
Note that even when several works have identified relevant concepts regarding trust
models, they do not usually identify relationships among these concepts. Our conceptual
framework is also built upon our own review of some of the most representative trust
models in the literature, which are presented in the next section.
2.1.2 Trust in the Computing Domain
The notion of trust is brought to the computing domain through the so-called trust
models. A trust model defines the way to specify and evaluate trust relationships
among entities for calculating trust, being the technical approach to represent trust for
the purpose of digital processing (140).
There is a huge amount of trust and reputation models in the literature, and each
of them might lead to a different way of measuring trust in a system. The reason
is a consequence of the inherent complexity of trust, for which no agreed definition
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exists. However, several works have stated some properties of trust, including that it is
a multidimensional, multidisciplinar, multifaceted, and subjective concept (138)(5).
The following sections discuss the two main approaches to modelling trust in the
digital world. In either case, the final goal is using trust for empowering decision making,
but each approach considers trust from a different viewpoint.
2.1.2.1 Trust as Authorization
The term trust management is coined by Blaze, Feigenbaum and Lacy in their seminal
work (18), where they present the policy language PolicyMaker. By that time, the
purpose of trust is to unify authentication and access control in distributed settings,
simplifying the authorisation problem into a single step.
PolicyMaker constitutes the first approach towards using credentials that directly
authorize actions instead of dividing the authorization task into authentication and ac-
cess control. The system suggests using a query-based language (although it does not
provide one) that allows determining whether a particular public key (entity) is permit-
ted to perform a particular action according to a local policy. PolicyMaker accepts, as
input, a set of policy statements, a collection of credentials, and a proposed trusted ac-
tion. Depending on the credentials, the action is granted permission or not. Additional
constraints might be imposed by means of annotations filters, leading to a process of
simple negotiation instead of a simple yes/no answer. To sum up, PolicyMaker answers
the following question: does the set C of credentials prove that the request r complies
with the local security policy P?
The overall process would be as follows: first, an application sends a request to
PolicyMaker. This request contains a (set of) public key(s), and an action to be per-
formed on behalf of these key(s). PolicyMaker checks its list of assertions. If one of
the assertions match the request, it grants permission. If the assertion requires more
information, it annotates the missing information and sends it back to the application,
which might fill this missing information and send it again. Otherwise, permission is
denied.
PolicyMaker assertions can be written in any interpreted programming language,
whereas in an effort towards standardization, KeyNote (17) proposes a standard as-
sertion language. Another difference is that PolicyMaker delegates the verification of
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signatures to external programs, but this verification is done by the trust management
system itself in Keynote.
REFEREE (28) (Rule-controlled Environment for Evaluation of Rules, and Every-
thing Else) provides an environment for evaluating compliance with policies, and unlike
PolicyMaker, it also provides control of the evaluation process itself, since this might
entail dangerous actions (e.g. network access). It also differs from PolicyMaker in that
the latter does not permit policies to control credential fetching or signature verifica-
tion, although KeyNote does. REFEREE also supports a more complex inter-assertion
communication than PolicyMaker, since it allows assertion programs to call each other
as subroutines and to pass different arguments to different subroutines, whereas Policy-
Maker requires each assertion program to write anything it wants to communicate on a
global blackboard that can be seen by all other assertions. REFEREE has three prim-
itive data types, namely programs, statement lists, and tri-values, which can be true,
false, or unknown. It also presents the notions of policy and credential. The former
is a program that returns true, false or unknown, depending on whether the available
statements are sufficient to infer compliance or non-compliance, or nothing. The latter
is a program that given some initial statements as inputs, derives additional statements.
Unlike KeyNote, REFEREE does not provide a standard language.
As an evolution of policy languages, we find trust negotiation models, where privacy
and trust are balanced. The first example found in the literature is TrustBuilder (136),
which focuses on disclosing credentials gradually to find a tradeoff between privacy and
trust: an entity needs to provide a credential only if it is actually required by the policy
of the other entity. The architecture relies on security agents that act on behalf of the
entities. Important components of the architecture include the Negotiation Strategy
Module, which decides the next message that should be sent given the current status
of the negotiation, the Policy Compliance Checker, which determines the credential
or policy to use given the other partner’s disclosed credentials and policies, and the
Credential Verification Module that verifies received credentials. TrustBuilder is a Java
implementation that supports the use of X.509 certificates to encode attributes and
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) to represent policies written using the IBM Trust
Policy Language.
Other relevant policy languages include Cassandra (10), the family of RT languages
(88), Sultan (44) and PROTUNE (19). The latter defines a metalanguage so that it can
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be extended with application-specific predicates and annotations for confidential parts
of policies. Most of these trust models incorporate the notion of delegation, according
to which subjects may allow other subjects to make decisions on their behalf.
Whereas most previous existing approaches focused on client-server scenarios, Trust−X
(15) is an XML-based framework for trust negotiations specifically conceived for a peer-
to-peer environment. This is because both negotiating parties are equally responsible
for negotiation management and can act as a requester or resource controller during
different negotiations. In order to specify certificates (credentials) and policies, the au-
thors suggest an XML-based language called X−TNL. One of the novel ideas proposed
by the approach is the use of trust tickets, issued upon the successful completion of a
negotiation and which can be used to speed up subsequent negotiations for the same
resource. Improving the efficiency of the negotiation and allowing multiple negotiations
at a time is the goal of Orkphol and Jianli (93). For this purpose, they propose an
extension over TrustBuilder2 (62) that introduces the Common Disclosure, a repository
that accumulates every unique credential disclosed in every negotiation step from local
and remote parties.
2.1.2.2 Trust as Computational Mapping of Human Trust
There is a corpus of research that focuses on modelling factors that have a direct in-
fluence on trust determination. The idea behind this vision of trust is to map the
foundations of human trust into a computational setting. The purpose of trust becomes
wider than authorisation and is not solely based on the possession of credentials any
more.
Marsh proposes one of the first computational models of trust in his doctoral dis-
sertation (75), where he integrates aspects of trust from several disciplines, including
economics, psychology, philosophy, and sociology. By aggregating different factors, he
obtains a scalar value for trust. Marsh also identifies time as being relevant to each of
the variables used to compute trust. He states that X trusts Y if and only if ’X expects
that Y will behave according to X’s best interest, and will not attempt to harm X ’.
A cognitive approach to trust is first proposed by Castelfranchi and Falcone (24).
The authors state that trust must be modelled as a set of beliefs that entities hold on
each other, and as a set of goals that these entities are pursuing. They advocate that
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trust goes beyond pure expectation, as Marsh suggests, as trust also involves a decision
and act, and reliance and being willing to count on other parties.
Reputation models aim to represent the concept of reputation in a computational
setting. In the context of the trust models we are discussing in this section, we assume
that reputation is another factor, based on an aggregation of personal opinions, that
can be modelled, quantified, and aggregated to help computing a trust score.
2.1.3 Trust in the Software Development Life Cycle
This section summarizes the most relevant contributions towards integrating trust in
the SDLC activities, from early analysis to runtime.
2.1.3.1 Trust in Early Phases
There is a solid ground of works that consider hard security requirements at early stages
of the SDLC. Some of these works focus on detecting possible attacks on the system.
Sindre and Opdahl (119), and McDermott and Fox (79) propose using misuse cases
and abuse cases, respectively. These methods aim to capture use cases that may be
initiated by attackers or even stakeholders in order to harm the system. In a similar
direction, Schneier (116) presents a formal and methodical way of capturing different
types of attacks that can be performed in a system by means of attack trees.
In the realm of traditional hard security solutions, such as confidentiality or autho-
rization, well-known approaches exist that bridge a gap between security requirements
specification and security design. Jürjens (58) presents UMLsec, a UML profile for
secure system development that allows designers to annotate diagrams with security in-
formation. On the other hand, Lodderstedt, Basin and Doser (68) present SecureUML,
which uses the Object Constraint Language (OCL) to specify authorization constraints
onto application models. Also, security patterns1 systematize expert security knowl-
edge into reusable artifacts, providing a toolset for non-expert designers that want to
integrate security solutions during system design.
These works, however, do not address trust concerns or help designers during the
specification of trust models. In this direction, Uddin and Zulkernine (125) present
a UML profile for trust called UMLtrust. They provide extensions over some UML
1http://www.securitypatterns.org.
25
2. UNDERSTANDING TRUST: A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS
diagrams in order to represent trust information. We also propose a UML profile for
trust, which is described in Chapter 3. However, their approach and focus are different
than ours. For example, we consider reputation information and put the stress on how
trust and reputation is to be updated and represented, which is laid aside by UMLtrust.
Other works aim to integrate the notion of risk into the requirement analysis stage.
As an example, Lund, Solhaug and Stølen (70) present CORAS, a risk analysis method-
ology that analyses unwanted incidents for a defined asset model, and when the risk
level of those unwanted incidents is beyond an acceptable threshold, several treatments
are introduced to the system. Asnar, Giorgini and Mylopoulos (6) propose a concrete
methodology, namely the Goal-Risk framework, to analyse and model security prob-
lems. It captures the stakeholders’ goals, risks that might threaten the goals, and
countermeasures required to mitigate the unacceptable risks.
Even when the concepts of trust and risk are related (see Section 1.1.3), they present
several differences that justify a particular attention on trust. In this direction, the
former approaches towards trust in the early stages of the SDLC come from policy lan-
guages for distributed trust management. Three remarkable examples are PolicyMaker
(18), REFEREE (28) and SULTAN (44), which are further discussed in Section 2.1.2.1.
This is however a very limited scope of trust and does not take into account be-
havioural aspects, reputation and social relationships to determine trust. Some method-
ologies have aimed at a wider definition of trust, presenting methodologies to build
secure systems by taking relationships between actors and agents into account. In this
regard, some authors have based their work upon goal-driven methodologies to repre-
sent dependencies among actors and their views of the system. Some examples include
Secure Tropos (83), KAOS (129) and SI* (77).
The first one is a methodology that extends the Tropos methodology in order to
enable the design of secure systems. Actors in Tropos may depend on other actors
in order to achieve a goal. Tropos captures the social relationships in the system by
specifying the dependencies between actors using the notions of depender, dependum
and dependee, and by modeling the actors and agents in the organization. SI* is similar,
as it is based on analysing social dependencies among stakeholders, although it does
not constitute a methodology on its own. SI* allows specifying the goals and views of
all stakeholders of a system, considering relevant software artificats to these goals and
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modelling stakeholder relations based upon structured goal models. In Chapter 3, we
build a trust model upon SI* in order to detect insider threats.
As for KAOS, it is another goal-driven methodology, not so focused initially on
security aspects. However, some posterior extensions (128) introduce the concepts of
obstacle and anti-goal in order to analyse some trust concerns of a system. KAOS
obstacle captures an undesired state of affairs that might harm safety goals (i.e., hazard)
or threaten security goals (i.e.,threat), while KAOS anti-goal captures the intention of
an attacker.
The analysis of social relationships is taken one step further in the works by Li, Liu
and Bryant (65), Elahi, Yu and Zannone (32) and Liu, Yu and Mylopoulos (67), where
actor dependency links are used as a way to identify and analyse system vulnerabilities.
The aforementioned contributions put forward the idea of capturing social aspects,
but they usually fail in capturing and making all the trust relationships explicit, and
above all, how trust and reputation can be used by the system-to-be. Pavlidis, Moura-
tidis and Islam (84) extend the Secure Tropos modelling language in order to include
some trust-related concepts. In particular, they support the analysis of dependencies
between actors and between actors and resources. By analysing the level of trust of
these dependencies, they can determine whether an actor can be trusted to fulfil a de-
pendency. Trust is also integrated in Role-Base Access Control model (25) by means
of trust levels and a trust vector, where each component in the vector is a factor that
influences trust, such as knowledge or experience.
2.1.3.2 Trust in Implementation
Few works provide developers with methodologies or tools with which they can imple-
ment different types of trust and reputation models. Suryanarayana, Diallo and Taylor
(123) propose the 4C framework, where they describe a trust model as a composition
of four sub-models, namely the content sub-model, the communication sub-model, the
computation sub-model and the counteraction sub-model. For each sub-model, they
identify the main building blocks that are present in existing reputation models. In the
end, using an Java-based editor and following a personalized XML schema, they create
a XML document where a trust model is described according to these building blocks.
Then, they can use the PACE Support Generator to create software components that
integrate within the PACE architectural style, which is further described in the work
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by Suryanarayana et al. (122). In this latter work, the authors study the feasibility of
an event-based architectural style in order to provide architects with guidelines on how
to include trust models into decentralized applications.
While the application scope of the previous framework is general, the Pythia (135)
framework targets owners of blog sites who want to integrate reputation dynamics in
the latter. This framework follows a plug-in architecture, where plug-ins provide the
instantiation required for a concrete domain (i.e. a concrete web site). Therefore, a
user who wants to use a Pythia-based system should first download the plug-in for that
specific system. An important component of the framework is the rules engine, which
is edited by users to decide how reputation is to be evaluated.
The accommodation and integration of different trust or reputation models is also
addressed. For example, Lee and Winslett (62) propose an extensible framework that
supports the adoption of different negotiation-based trust models. The framework ab-
stracts away concrete implementation details of different negotiation models and pro-
vides generic building blocks that allow implementing new ones. In a similar direction,
although more focused on tackling the context dependency of trust, Huynh (53) pro-
poses the Personalized Trust Framework (PTF). This framework consists of a rule-based
system that uses semantic technologies (e.g. ontologies) to capture expert knowledge
about different contexts and to apply the most suitable trust model according to these
contexts. The idea is to replicate the trust evaluation process carried out by humans in
a computational setting, because humans are capable of determining the context under
which a trust evaluation is to be performed.
Customizable trust models are another design and implementation aid. Examples
of these are the SECURE platform (23) and SCOUT (48). They do not provide much
flexibility with regards to implementing new models, because they are bound to an
underlying model. However, they allow their customization by defining or changing
some of the inner components. The former relies on a cost-benefit analysis represented
by combined cost-PDFs (Probability Density Functions). The idea is, for every possible
outcome of an action, to consider all possible costs and benefits the user might incur in.
If the final combined cost-PDF shows that the benefits outweigh the other outcomes’
costs, then the action proceeds. Otherwise, further interaction is arranged. The latter
is made up of three services that implement the model: the evidence gathering service,
the belief formation service and the emotional trust service.
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Vinkovits, Reiners and Zimmermann (132) present a user-centered approach that
allows non-security experts to include trust and reputation into their applications. The
approach is a model-driven system that starts by allowing users to select several trust
requirements. From these requirements, the system proposes different trust frameworks,
which have been previously implemented by trust experts. After choosing one of these
frameworks, users can fill in the remaining code in order to adapt it to their particular
applications.
2.1.3.3 Trust at Runtime
There is a growing interest in how trust can assist evolving systems over their life-
time. Self-adaptive systems can take trust and reputation information in order to lever-
age runtime reconfiguration decisions, especially in the areas of multi-agent systems,
component-based systems and service-oriented systems. In some cases, trust is consid-
ered in its hard variant, where trust is seen as an aggregation of Quality of Service (QoS)
and security properties. In other works, the soft variant of trust is used (106), which
means that social aspects such as reputation or preferences are taken into account.
As mentioned earlier, trust is seen as a powerful tool to leverage decision-making
even with partial information. This fact is especially remarked in STRATUS (110), a
set of technologies that aim at predicting and responding to complex cyber attacks.
When it detects an attack, the platform switches to back-up components and finds
alternative pathways of communication. The trust model that supports this platform
(109) is based on conditional trust, that is, trust in certain capabilities of a system.
The authors argue that experience-based trust is not useful because configurations in
cyber attacks change frequently, laying statistical analysis useless. They propose ways
to make the most out of the little information available, and they introduce concepts
like contagion that allows formalizing trust in a host based on the distance from an
infected host.
A classical scenario of application of trust is multi-agent systems (104), where Vu et
al. (133) propose trust-based mechanisms as a way to self-organize the agents in case
of deceitful information. In particular, the trust value of an agent towards another one
is an aggregate of direct experiences and testimonies. The use of artificial intelligence,
and concretely, machine learning together with trust in order to adapt the behaviour
of agents is proposed in the work by Klejnowski, Bernard, Hähner and Müller-Schloer
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(60). They propose an architecture where there is an observer component that gathers
information about the agent and presents it to the controller in two views: a long-
term and a short-term one. The controller finds a suitable behaviour according to this
information. Given that new unexpected situations might arise, agents must be able to
try out new strategies and learn which ones provided the best results.
Given the highly open and distributed nature of service-oriented environments, the
traditional use of trust is for either protecting providers from potentially malicious
clients or for shielding clients against potentially malicious providers (e.g. providers
that publish a higher QoS than offered). As an example of the first situation, Conner
et al. (29) present a feedback-based reputation framework to help service providers
to determine trust in incoming requests from clients. As an example of the second
approach, Crapanzano et al. (31) propose a hierarchical architecture for SOA where
there is a so-called super node overlay that acts as a trusting authority when a service
consumer looks for a service provider.
In both, component- and service-oriented systems, an important research area is
determining the level of trust, or the trustworthiness, of the system as a whole, or of
individual subsystems (i.e. services or components). In case that the trust value is too
low, a reconfiguration takes place in order to try to improve it. In this direction, Haouas
and Bourcier (47) present a runtime architecture that allows a service-oriented system
to meet a dependability objective set up by an administrator. System dependability
is computed by aggregating ratings provided by service consumers regarding QoS at-
tributes. Then, a reconfiguration manager may look up other available services to meet
the dependability objective. Dependability of the system is computed by the aggrega-
tion of each service dependability. In turn, each service dependability is computed by
aggregating a weighted average of ratings provided by service consumers regarding QoS
attributes (e.g. response time) of service providers. The reconfiguration manager is in
charge of querying the service broker to find the available services that can meet the
dependability objective.
Following a similar line of work in component-based systems, Yan and Prehofer (139)
discuss an adaptive trust management system where several quality attributes can be
used to rate the trustee’s trustworthiness, such as availability, reliability, integrity or
confidentiality. Assessing these attributes requires defining metrics and placing monitors
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to measure their parameters. Finally, trust is assessed at runtime based on the trustor’s
criteria and is automatically maintained by changing among trust control modes.
These previous works are highly focused on QoS-based trust, where trust is an
aggregation of dependability and security attributes. Subjective factors affecting trust
and reputation concepts, with which we deal, are out of discussion. The social notion
of trust is used by Psaier et al. (100) in their self-adaptation framework. In particular,
their trust model uses the concept of trust mirroring and trust teleportation. The
former implies that actors (i.e. services) with similar interests and skills tend to trust
each other more than unknown actors, whether the latter denotes that the level of
trust in a member of a group is transferable to other members of the same group. The
adaptations consist of reconfiguring the network by opening channels to provide new
interactions and by closing channels to hinder misbehaving nodes to further degrade the
system function. The trust model is used to help choose among a set of new candidate
nodes with which to communicate.
Another way to measure the (mis)behaviour of components is by comparing its
interactions with the models in their contracts. In this direction, Herrmann and Krumm
(51) propose security wrappers that monitor the activity of the components. Depending
on the deviation of the components’ behaviour with respect to their contract, a positive
or negative report is issued and sent to the trust information system, which calculates a
trust value for the component. In turn, this trust value is used to determine the intensity
of the monitoring activity by the wrappers. This scheme was enhanced by Herrmann
(52) in order to take the reputation of components’ users into account so as to prevent
deliberate false feedbacks. In this regard, a common problem in any setting where
different entities rate each other is discerning fair from unfair ratings. Phoomvuthisarn,
Liu and Zhu (97) propose a reputation mechanism for SOAs environments that allows
services to retrieve other services’ reputation through auctions that ensure incentives
for truthful reporting.
Other works focus on the self-adaptation of trust models to match and reflect the
status of the system (69), and on considering the trust in the self-adaptation process
itself (40).
Finally, Kiefhaber et al. (59) present the Trust-Enabling Middleware, which provides
applications running on top of it with methods to save, interpret and query trust related
information. The middleware provides self-configuration and self-optimization and its
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goal is balancing the workload of nodes by relocating services. The middleware also
uses built-in functions to measure the reliability of nodes by considering packets losses.
2.2 Trust Conceptual Model
In this section, we introduce and discuss our trust conceptual model, which builds upon
the knowledge gathered in the previous sections. The goal of this model is to abstract
away the particularities of concrete trust models and to provide a consistent set of
concepts and relationships among these concepts that assist the comparison of different
classes of trust models, as well as the integration of trust concerns in different phases
of the SDLC.
In the following sub-sections, we elaborate on the definition of trust and depict some
of the most relevant concepts that are related to this notion. Then, the concept of trust
model is introduced and a classification of trust models is provided. This classification
is used as the basis to decompose the concepts that underlie in trust models, which
we describe next. Finally, we describe how we use these concepts as a yardstick for
comparing different well-known trust and reputation models.
2.2.1 Trust Definitions
Many definitions of trust have been provided over the years. This is due to the com-
plexity of this concept, which spans across several areas such as psychology, sociology,
economics, law, and more recently, computer science. The vagueness of this term is well
represented by the statement “trust is less confident than know, but also more confident
than hope” (82).
In this section, we revise the definitions that have been mostly considered in the
literature of computational trust and reputation models. We advocate that making an
effort to understand this term and its implications is crucial if we want to implement
meaningful models. On the other hand, understanding trust and reputation allows for
a better trust-related concepts identification as well as for building a more comprehen-
sive conceptual framework for trust models comparison. Definitions are presented in
chronological order.
Gambetta (37) defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability with
which an agent will perform a particular action [. . . ] in a context in which it affects our
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Table 2.1: Trust Definitions
1988 1991 1995 1996 2000 2002 2005 2011
(37) (20) (78) (80) (43) (85) (104) (91) (113) (142) (48)
own action”. Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (78) advocates that trust is a “willingness to
be vulnerable to another party”. McKnight and Chervany (80) explain that trust is “the
extent to which one party is willing to depend on the other party in a given situation
with a feeling of relative security, even though negative consequences are possible”. Mui,
Mohtashemi and Halberstadt (85) define trust as “a subjective expectation an agent has
about another’s future behavior based on the history of their encounters”. For Olmedilla
et al. (91), “trust of a party A to a party B for a service X is the measurable belief of A in
that B behaves dependably for a specified period within a specified context (in relation
to service X)”. Ruohomaa and Kutvonen (113) state that trust is “the extent to which
one party is willing to participate in a given action with a given partner, considering
the risks and incentives involved”. Finally, Har Yew (48) defines trust as “a particular
level of subjective assessment of whether a trustee will exhibit characteristics consistent
with the role of the trustee, both before the trustor can monitor such characteristics (or
independently of the trustor’s capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context
in which it affects the trustor’s own behavior”.
Table 2.1 summarizes all the definitions used as inputs to build the concepts cloud
depicted in Figure 2.1. Definitions were processed following several rules. A word that
appears several times in the same definition is counted just once. We only take into
consideration words that mean something by themselves and do not require surrounding
words to mean something (e.g. particular level does not make sense separately). If two
words with the same meaning appear either in plural and singular, it is expressed in
singular. Dependability is split into security and reliability. Party, agent, entity, trustor
and trustee are named as entity. Most words are adjectives and nouns, since they are
more meaningful without a context than verbs, but some relevant verbs are considered
as well. Assessment is used in place of quantifiable, measurable, describable and alike
terms. The resulting concepts were introduced in Wordle2.
2http://www.wordle.net/ is a free online tool to generate words clouds.
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Figure 2.1: Concepts Cloud for Trust Definitions
The figure reveals that entity is the core concept, which is obvious as trust makes
no sense if there are neither entities that trust nor entities in which to trust. Context
is another relevant concept since trust is highly context-dependent. Other important
concepts entail uncertainty such as subjective, belief, willingness or expectation. They
show that trust implies uncertainty about an entity’s behaviour. It is also important to
note that even though the concept of risk is not explicitly present in all the definitions,
a careful reading reveals that it is indeed implicitly considered in almost all of them.
For example, in his definition, McKnight (80) states that “. . . negative consequences are
possible”, and Mayer (78) claims that trust is willingness to be vulnerable.
As a wrap-up, the notion of trust is present when there is uncertainty and risk during
the interaction of two or more entities that need to collaborate in a particular context.
If the entity placing trust knows the outcome in advanced without any uncertainty,
trust is not necessary. If the entity placing trust knows that there is no risk involved in
the outcome of the interaction, trust is not necessary. If there is no interaction between
two entities, trust may still make sense, but it is not necessary either.
After our review and given that no definition covers all the concepts that we believe
are the most important, we propose the following definition: trust is the personal, unique
and temporal expectation that a trustor places on a trustee regarding the outcome of an
interaction between them that affects the trustor.
2.2.2 Trust Models: Definition and Classification
A trust model is an abstraction of the dynamics of trust and defines the way to specify
and evaluate trust relationships among entities for calculating trust. Another way of
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defining a trust model is as the technical approach to represent trust for the purpose of
digital processing (140).
Trust models are very heterogeneous due to many factors, including the trust defini-
tion on which they are built or their application domain. In order to provide a concep-
tual framework for trust models we first establish a high-level classification. Note that
this task is not straightforward and other classifications have been proposed (5). We
advocate that the following classification covers the two main branches that gave rise to
the adoption of trust in the computational world, as further described in Section 2.1.2.
• Decision Models. Trust management has its origins in these models (18). They
aim to make more flexible access control decisions, simplifying the two-step au-
thentication and authorization process into a one-step trust decision. Policy mod-
els and negotiation models fall into this category. They build on the notions of
policies and credentials, restricting the access to resources by means of policies
that specify which credentials are required to access these resources.
• Evaluation Models. These models have their origin in the work by Marsh (75).
Their intent is to evaluate the level of trust that an entity can place on another
entity by considering factors that have an influence on trust relationships. An
important sub-class of the former are propagation models, in which existing trust
relationships are exploited to generate new trust relationships. Another important
sub-class are reputation models, where a reputation scored is derived from the
aggregation of other entities opinions.
Making a classification is important as it eases the extraction of common features
between different classes of models. It is not useful to compare decision models such as
PolicyMaker (18) with evaluation models like eBay’s reputation system (107), because
their nature, workings and purposes are completely different. However, comparison
makes sense within each model class, because models in the same class exhibit similar
features that can be compared. The next section elaborates on the underlying concepts
of trust models.
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2.2.3 Trust Models Concepts
For the sake of simplicity, we divide our conceptual framework into three concepts
blocks. The first block contains concepts that are applicable to any trust model, in-
dependently from its class. They are concepts tightly coupled to the notion of trust.
The next two blocks gather concepts specific to the classes of models identified in Sec-
tion 2.2.2. The concepts are depicted following a UML-like notation, because it is widely
known language to represent concepts and relationships.
2.2.3.1 Common Features
Trust is computed by a trust model that must have, at least, two entities which have to
interact in some way. In any trust setting, an entity plays a role, or even several ones. In
the most general case, these roles are trustor, the entity which places trust, and trustee,
the entity on which trust is placed. However, depending on the context and complexity
of the model, other roles are possible. For example, an entity can be a witness if it
tells its opinion about an entity based on observations or its own experience. Also, an
entity may be a factor producer, which means that the entity is in charge of generating
a factor that has influence in the trust or reputation computation. Some specializations
of trustors and trustees include a requester of a service or resource, the provider of a
service or resource, or a trusted third party that issues credentials or gathers feedbacks
to compute a centralized reputation score. Once we have a trustor and a trustee, we
say that a trust relationship has been established.
In any trust model, establishing a trust relationship has a purpose. According to
Jøsang et al. (56), a trust purpose is an instantiation of any of the following trust
classes identified by Grandison and Sloman (43): access trust, provision trust, identity
trust, and infrastructure trust (considering delegation a sub-class of provision trust).
The instantiation is due to the fact that trust is context-dependent, one of the most
important properties of trust, since it influences all the other concepts, such as the
purpose, the type of entities and the role that they can play. Other factors, in addition
to the context, that have an influence on trust are trustee’s and trustor’s subjective
properties such as honesty, confidence, feelings, willingness or belief; and trustee’s and
trustor’s objective properties like observed behaviour, security, ability, a given set of
standards or reputation (138).
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Note that trust can also be conceived as a strong belief about a given property of the
trustee. From a theoretical perspective, there is no purpose under this trust conception.
Yet we are interested in trust models from a more pragmatic perspective. Thus, trust
in a given property can eventually assist in making a decision for some purpose. For
instance, if an entity believes that another entity is competent to encrypt files, it will
select the latter among other less qualified candidates (according to the entity’s belief).
In this example, the purpose will therefore be the provision of an encryption service
(i.e. provision trust).
A trust model may also make some assumptions, such as “entities will provide only
fair ratings” or “initial trust values are assumed to exist”, and might follow different
modelling methods, including mathematical, linguistic and graphical. The resulting
conceptual model that gathers these concepts is depicted in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Common Concepts for Trust Models
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2.2.3.2 Concepts for Trust Decision Models
Trust decision models use policies, which specify the conditions under which access to a
resource is granted. Policies are written in a policy language, which might consider pol-
icy conflicts resolution. The conditions under which accesses are granted are expressed
by means of credentials, signed logical statements that assert that an entity is which it
claims to be, or that it is member of a group. Credentials might have different formats,
including X.509 certificates3 and XML. The component that glues credentials and poli-
3https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459
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cies together is the compliance checker, in charge of checking whether the credentials
satisfy the policies. Likewise, the model might also support the search for a credential
through credential chains, as well as the verification of the validity of credentials.
Negotiation models, a specialization of decision models, add a protocol or negotiation
strategy, during which two entities perform a step-by-step, negotiation-driven exchange
of credentials and policies until they decide whether to trust each other or not. Negoti-
ation models can use evidence types, which represent information about the negotiation
process (e.g. some steps of the negotiation process have been recently performed) and
which have a purpose, in most cases, the optimization of the negotiation.
The conceptual model for decision models is depicted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Concepts for Decision Models
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2.2.3.3 Concepts for Trust Evaluation Models
Evaluation models often follow a life cycle with two stages. First, a bootstrapping phase
might be required to assign initial trust values to the entities of the system and to every
newcomer. Trust propensity is a concept related to the bootstrapping phase and it
refers to the propensity of the model towards high or low trust values in the beginning.
Second, a trust assessment process is performed in order to assign trust values to entities
according to certain factors. This process usually involves some monitoring in order to
feed these factors with accurate data.
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Trust relationships are tagged with a trust value that indicates to what extent the
trustor trusts the trustee. This value has a dimension, which indicates whether it is
a single value or a tuple of values. Also, trust values have semantics, which can be
represented by two dimensions: objectivity and scope. The former refers to whether
the measure comes from an entity’s subjective judgement or from assessing the trusted
party against some formal criteria. The latter specifies whether the measure is done
against one factor or against an average of factors.
In many cases, the model also includes the process to define a trust threshold,
embedding the trust decision in the model itself. If the trust value is above the threshold,
the trustor is assumed to trust the trustee and can proceed with the interaction. This
is common in traditional formal trust models, such as the one by Marsh (75), where the
trust decision is as important as the dynamics to update the trust values.
Trust values are assigned to relationships by a trust assessment process. The concept
of trust assessment, and all the concepts related to it, are the most important ones in
evaluation models, as they may become the model signature, what makes a model
different from others. In order to carry out the trust assessment process, trust metrics
are used. Trust metrics use factors, such as risk, utility, past experience or observed
behaviour, and combine them in order to yield a final score for the measured attributes.
The most general attributes that are measured are simply trust and reputation. Yet
depending on the application domain, more specialized attributes can be measured, such
as reliability of the seller in an e-Commerce scenario. Trust metrics use computation
engines, which determine the way factors are combined, and which range from simple
summations to more sophisticated ones like belief, Bayesian, fuzzy or flow engines.
Jøsang (56) provides an overview of trust and reputation engines.
Sources of information that may feed the metrics include direct experience (either
direct interaction or direct observation), sociological and psychological factors, and third
party referrals. Reputation models use public trust information from other entities to
yield a reputation score. Reputation models can be centralized, when there is an entity
in charge of collecting and distributing reputation information; or distributed, when
there is no such a role and each entity has to maintain a record of trust values for
any other entities, and send out this information to the rest of entities. Regardless of
which information sources are used to compute trust values, the model might consider
39
2. UNDERSTANDING TRUST: A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS
how certain or reliable this information is (e.g. credibility of witnesses), and might also
consider the concept of time (e.g. how fresh the trust information is).
Most evaluation models follow a game-theoretic approach, where the trustor deter-
mines trust in a trustee by examining the outcomes after each interaction. Trust is
usually defined in these models as a subjective expectation about the outcome of an
interaction with another entity. Fewer evaluation models follow a cognitive approach,
where trust is primarily determined by the mental state of the entities, which usually
comprises a set of beliefs on other entities.
Propagation models, a sub-class of evaluation models, assume that several trust re-
lationships have already been established and quantified. They aim to compute trust
among entities with no direct interaction, creating new trust relationships by dissemi-
nating the trust values information to other entities. Some models assume that trust is
transitive and exploit this property, although transitivity is not considered as a prop-
erty that holds for trust in many cases (27). New trust values are often computed by
means of operators, and in most models, we find two of them: a concatenator and an
aggregator. The former is used to compute trust along a trust chain, whereas the latter
aggregates trust values computed for each path into a final trust value. For example,
Agudo, Fernandez-Gago and Lopez (1) use a sequential and a parallel operator in or-
der to compute trust along a path. Subjective logic (55) uses a discounting operator
to compute opinions along different trust paths, and a consensus operator to combine
them into a final opinion.
All the concepts discussed are shown in Figure 2.4.
2.2.3.4 Concepts for Reputation Models
Whereas the boundaries between trust and reputation are often blurry in the literature,
it is agreed that reputation is a factor that may influence trust decisions (56). We
already mentioned that reputation models are a sub-class of evaluation models and
that reputation models can be centralized or distributed, but it remains unclear the
criteria under which we consider that a given model is a reputation model or a trust
model, beyond the fact that the authors refer to it as one or another.
According to Pinyol and Sabater-Mir (98), the difference between a trust model and
a reputation model is that the former embeds the trust decision itself, by means of a
well-defined trust threshold. Given that few models in practice include the threshold,
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we relax this condition and we consider that the difference lies in the subjective nature
of trust. In particular, if given the same context and target entity, the output of the
model does not depend on the entity that initiates the computation, it is a reputation
model. Otherwise, if given the same context and target entity, the output of the model
depends, among other factors, on the entity that initiates the computation (i.e. different
entities can obtain different values for the same entity and under the same context),
it is a trust model. The fact that the computation depends on the evaluating entity
reveals that there are subjective factors in play, such as preferences, beliefs, etc. that are
shaping a unique relationship between the evaluating entity and the evaluated entity,
who become the trustor and trustee, respectively, of such relationship. This reasoning
is also aligned with the intuitive understanding that reputation is more objective than
trust.
We consider that reputation models have their own concepts, and we base such
concepts on web reputation systems (34). The core concept is a reputation statement,
which is a tuple of a source, a claim and a target. A source is any entity in the system
capable of making claims about another entity of the same system, which is called
a target. Reputation models use reputation engines that take reputation statements
about a given target as inputs and yield a reputation score for that target.
Figure 2.4: Concepts for Evaluation Models
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2.2.4 Comparison Framework: A Case Study
Not only do the concepts identified in the previous sections provide insight on compu-
tational trust, but they also allow comparing trust models under the same lens. As a
way to validate our framework, we have chosen a set of relevant trust and reputation
models that represent the classes discussed earlier. The models are Marsh’s model (75),
PolicyMaker (18), Jøsang’s belief model (55), REGRET (114), TrustBuilder (136), eBay
reputation model (107), Falcone et al. (33), Trust−X (15), PeerTrust (137) and Agudo
et al. (1).
As depicted in Figure 2.5, the comparison framework allows comparing trust models
at two different layers. At a higher level, the framework compares different classes of
trust models with regard to the common concepts. Then, models belonging to the same
class are compared according to class-specific concepts. The classes are those discussed
in Section 2.2.2, and we incorporate pure propagation models because even when we
consider them a special class of evaluation model, they might lack some of the evaluation
models concepts.
Figure 2.5: General Framework for Trust Models Comparison
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Table 2.2 shows the comparison among these models under the lens of their common
features. In Table 2.3 we compare the trust decision models, whereas trust evaluation
models are compared in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. Note that the classification has been
made according to the features explicitly presented by the corresponding authors, and
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that due to the diversity of the models, in some circumstances the classification for some
concepts is subjective according to our own interpretation.
Table 2.2: Common Features Comparison
Model Role Purpose Class Method
PolicyMaker R/P AT, IT DM Linguistic
TrustBuilder R/P AT, IT DM Linguistic
Trust−X R/P AT, IT DM Linguistic
Marsh’s T AT, PT EM Mathematical
Falcone et al. T, W AT, PT EM Graphical, Mathematical
REGRET R/P, W AT, PT EM Mathematical
PeerTrust R/P PT EM Mathematical
eBay R/P, TTP PT EM Mathematical
Jøsang’s T AT, PT EM Mathematical
Agudo et al. T AT, PT EM Graphical, Mathematical
T=trustor/trustee, R/P=requester/provider, W=Witness, TTP = Trusted Third Party,
AT=Access Trust, IT=Identity Trust, PT=Provision Trust, DM=Decision Model,
EM=Evaluation Model
Table 2.3: Decision Models Comparison
Trust Negotiation
Model P. Language C. Format CC CV Strategy ET
PolicyMaker PolicyMaker PGP’s sig, X.509 cert - - - -
TrustBuilder XML, IBM’s TPL X.509 cert X X X -
Trust−X X-TNL X-TNL X X X X
CC=Credential Chaining support, CV=Credential Verification support, ET=Evidence Type, -
=undefined or not explicitly mentioned
By observing Table 2.2, we observe that the purpose of decision models is often
either access trust (a provider wants to protect a resource from malicious requesters) or
identity trust (determine trust in a requester based on its identity), whereas the purpose
of evaluation models is either protecting a requester from malicious providers (provision
trust), or protecting providers from malicious requesters (access trust).
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Table 2.4: Evaluation Models Comparison
Source of Information
Model Approach Dimension C.Engine DI SI PI R TPR
Marsh’s GT 1 Continuous X - X - -
Falcone et al. SC 1 Fuzzy X X X X X
REGRET GT 1 Continuous X X - - X
PeerTrust GT 1 Continuous X - - D X
eBay GT 1 Summation - - - C X
Jøsang’s - 3 Flow/Belief - - - - X
Agudo et al. - 1 Flow - - - - X
DI=Direct Interaction, SI=Sociological Information, PI=Psychological Information,
R=Reputation, TPR=Third Party Referral, C=Centralized, D=Distributed, GT=Game-
Theoretic, SC=Socio-Cognitive, -=undefined or not explicitly mentioned
Table 2.5: Evaluation Models Comparison (II)
Model Threshold Indirect Trust Calculation Uncertainty Time
Marsh’s X X - X
Falcone et al. - - X -
REGRET - - X X
PeerTrust - - X X
eBay - - - X
Jøsang’s - X X -
Agudo et al. - X - -
-=undefined or not explicitly mentioned
We also observe that decision models follow a linguistic modelling method, embod-
ied in the policy and credential languages. Regarding evaluation models, most use
mathematical methods. Additionally, Agudo et al. use graph theory and Falcone et
al. use Fuzzy Cognitive Maps, and therefore they both use graphical and mathematical
modelling methods.
Regarding the roles, decision models exhibit the requester/provider pair, as they
are usually intended for scenarios with Internet transactions. Evaluation models do
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not usually specify concrete roles beyond trustor and trustee, except for those that
include a witness that provides third-party referrals, or a trusted third party that stores
reputation information.
As for decision models, we see in Table 2.3 that PolicyMaker is a pure policy model,
whereas TrustBuilder and Trust−X include a negotiation strategy, as well as credential
chaining support and credential verification. The latter also includes evidence types in
order to prove that some steps of the negotiation protocol have succeeded.
Table 2.4 shows that evaluation models follow a game-theoretic approach, except for
Agudo et al. and Jøsang’s, which are pure propagation model, and Falcone et al., which
is a socio-cognitive evaluation model. Most models provide a single-dimension value,
except for Jøsang’s, which provides a vector of values that represent belief, disbelief and
uncertainty. Semantics have been omitted as all trust models consider trust under some
sort of subjective judgement (and not as formal measurements) and take into account
general properties (and not specific ones).
Regarding the sources of information, most of the models use third party referrals,
except for Marsh’s4. The most complete model in terms of sources of information is
Falcone et al.’s, because it considers also psychological information in terms of beliefs.
PeerTrust is a distributed reputation model, whereas eBay’s is centralized. Sociological
information, that is, the fact that an entity belongs to certain groups, is only used in
REGRET and Falcone et al.’s. The latter also uses reputation as a factor to determine
trust.
Regarding Table 2.5, Marsh’s model is the only one that incorporates the computa-
tion of a trust threshold. The main difference between the two pure propagation models,
namely Agudo et al.’s and Jøsang’s, is that the former does not consider uncertainty
(i.e. credibility), whereas the latter does. Note that the main purpose of propagation
models is trust dissemination, or in other words, the calculation of indirect trust rela-
tionships. However, Marsh’s model, even when it is not a propagation model itself, it
provides the means to disseminate trust information.
4Marsh’s model tackles trust dissemination, but it does not use third party referrals for computing
trust. Furthermore, we consider that the initial relationships on which the pure propagation models
work are a type of third party referral
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Chapter 3
Incorporating Trust Engineering in
Early Phases of the SDLC
This chapter addresses several key considerations when integrating trust in activities
that are part of the early phases of development, from planning to design.
During the planning phase, there is an ever-increasing need to decide whether the
system or a part of it should be moved to the Cloud, activity known as cloud sourcing.
This provides several benefits in terms of scalability and cost-effectiveness, but it raises
security concerns as to who can access the deployed data or services. Cloud sourcing has
a high impact on the design of the system outsourced, given that it entails a partial loss
of control and consequently, potential threats to security. The first important decision
that we must make is to which cloud vendor we are moving part of the system. This first
decision can be key to the rest of the design and we advocate that trust evaluation of
cloud vendors can help cushion the aforementioned loss of control and potential security
problems.
Along the second phase, namely security analysis, there are two important activities
to cover. First, in order to achieve trust-aware solutions, we need to capture trust
requirements. However, whereas the security community has traditionally focused on
providing tools and mechanisms to capture and express hard security requirements (e.g.
confidentiality), little attention has been paid to trust and reputation requirements. We
argue that these soft security requirements can leverage security in open, distributed,
heterogeneous systems and applications and that they must be included in early phases
of the development process.
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Another typical activity performed during this phase is threat analysis. Many
threats, and particularly the ones that result in the most harmful incidents, are due
to insiders. In most cases, these threats originate from false or implicit assumptions
about trust relationships in the organizational context of the system. Therefore, and in
order to guarantee the design of more secure systems, it is required that trust relation-
ships are explicitly identified, analysed and quantified. From these trust relationships
and modelling the criticality of the assets of the system, we can infer potential insider
threats.
During secure design we aim to refine the analysis artifacts into design elements that
make the implementation easier and more obvious. We need to provide further insight
about the rationale and the mechanics of the trust models and how they integrate into
and collaborate with the system. This information is useful to sketch the first version
of the system architecture and will assist developers during the implementation phase.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes a methodology that allows
decision-makers to assess the level of trust that can be placed on a cloud provider.
Section 3.2 presents a methodology to detect insider threats in a system through the
analysis of trust relationships, whereas a methodology and notation to represent trust
and reputation requirements is introduced in Section 3.3. Finally, in Section 3.4, we
describe a UML profile that allows the specification of trust and reputation models.
3.1 Trust-supported Cloud Sourcing Decision in the Plan-
ning Phase
There is an increasing trend to outsource IT services and infrastructures to the cloud
(86). This model, also called cloud sourcing1, is replacing traditional outsourcing en-
gagements due to its advantages (76). These include the provision of elastic IT resources
and cost savings as a result of reduced operational costs for complex IT processes (81).
Security and trust are significant barriers for the adoption of clouds in companies
(99). Lack of trust in cloud providers lies within the nature of clouds: storage and
management of critical data, and execution of sensitive IT processes are performed
1Techopedia: http://www.techopedia.com/definition/26551/cloudsourcing
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beyond the customers control. As a consequence, new security threats arise2,3, and
IT analysts and decision makers must balance the advantages and these threats before
making decisions. These decisions range from selecting a cloud provider to determining
how much data or which part of the infrastructure to move to the cloud.
It is generally accepted the fact that trust can help in decision-making processes
in the absence of complete information (45, 138). Given that information about cloud
providers, due to internal policy or strategic reasons, may be uncertain and incomplete,
trust can enhance the cloud sourcing decision-making process. This section presents
a methodology that evaluates trust in cloud providers and that can help IT analysts
to make more informed decisions prior to the sourcing process. The methodology pro-
vides a systematic way to gather knowledge about cloud providers and to exploit this
knowledge in order to yield trust values that can be used as inputs to the decision-
making process. The methodology pinpoints which aspects of the providers should be
analysed, indicators that decision makers can use to quantify these aspects, and how
these quantifications can be aggregated into trust values. We use trust intervals in or-
der to represent trust and we define a summation operator to aggregate trust intervals.
The methodology constitutes a guide that analysts and decision makers can follow to
evaluate their trust in cloud providers under several dimensions or viewpoints.
In the following sections, we examine how trust evaluation in the Cloud has been
approached in previous works and we describe the trust-aware methodology that we
propose. We also apply the methodology to an eHealth case study and summarize some
considerations about the methodology as well as lines for future research.
3.1.1 Trust Evaluation in the Cloud
Cloud providers evaluation is a necessary step for cloud sourcing decision-making, but
clouds can be evaluated under different angles, including performance (22), scalability
(38), accountability (90) and transparency (94).
Traditional evaluation has focused on performance and scalability. For example,
Bubak et al. (22) provides an evaluation of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud
2http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/gartner-seven-cloud-computing-
security-risks-853
3Top Threats to Cloud Computing V1.0,https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/topthreats/
csathreats.v1.0.pdf
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providers. Their focus is on the performance and ratio cost/performance of different
providers for scientific computing in the research. Gao et al. (38) define a set of metrics
based on calculating the area of polygons, the vertices of which represent measurable
performance and scalability indicators of a cloud service. Assessing accountability and
transparency is gaining increasing importance. As an example, Nuñez et al. (90)
present a metamodel for the assessment of accountability, whereas Pauly (94) proposes
a scorecard for evaluating transparency. In a similar direction, Rak and Aversano (103)
discuss a framework for building custom benchmark applications that can be used to
evaluate performance of different cloud providers.
The impact of trust for cloud adoption and some trust-related factors that influence
users when selecting cloud providers have been identified in previous works (105)(61).
In this direction, Sarwar et al. (9) review several works that elicit relevant trust aspects
in the cloud. Ahmad et al. (3) argue that trust in the cloud must be built upon a deep
knowledge about the cloud computing paradigm and the provider.
In many works, trust depends on the verification of Service Level Agreement (SLA)s
(26) or the measurement of QoS attributes (74). Song et al. (121) propose a QoS
evaluation model in which key attributes and parameters are defined and quantified.
Each attribute is weighted and averaged, yielding a score that can be aggregated with
others in the end. These works are usually focused on cloud services evaluation and
selection rather than on the cloud providers themselves.
Most existing contributions on trust-aware cloud providers evaluation focus on the
technical part of the providers. Only a few of them address social aspects, such as the
staff or stakeholders of the provider. For example, Pauley (94) creates a scorecard for
evaluating transparency of a cloud provider. Its scorecard includes questions that can
be answered by 1 (yes) or 0 (no). Transparency is defined as a combination of other
attributes, and the questions address these attributes. In the end, the author sums
all the scores and divides them by the total possible. Even when this work addresses
some security and privacy issues, it does not evaluate threats and does not consider
subjectivity or uncertainty during evaluation.
Pavlidis et al. (96) propose a process for trustworthy selection of cloud providers.
This selection is based on how well the cloud provider fulfils the customer’s security and
privacy requirements. It also aims to reduce uncertainty by justifying trust relationships
and by making trust assumptions explicit. Compared to our approach, we consider other
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aspects of the cloud providers and we use trust intervals instead of probabilities and
weights.
Supriya et al. (72) propose a fuzzy trust model to evaluate cloud service providers
that uses the attributes defined by the Service Measurement Index (SMI) (39). Ex-
amples of these attributes are assurance, performance and security. Even though un-
certainty is embedded in the fuzzy engine, the authors do not provide guidelines on
quantifying the attributes or on eliciting cloud knowledge. Qu et al. (102) introduce
customers’ feedback in the evaluation, although this evaluation is focused on cloud
service selection, rather than on cloud provider selection.
Risk as a notion to evaluate cloud services is used by Rödder, Knapper and Martin
(111), who propose a set of metrics rather than a methodology. The authors focus
on evaluating services offered by the cloud provider, whereas our attention is on the
provider as a whole. Metrics weight different attributes and do not include the notion
of uncertainty and they do not specify how to retrieve the information required by the
metrics, whereas we provide guidelines and a structured knowledge elicitation phase.
Habib, Varadharajan and Mühlhäuser (46) propose an evaluation framework that
include hard and soft trust concepts, such as direct interaction, indirect interaction
and uncertainty. However, they do not propose a concrete methodology, guidelines
for trust factors quantification or a systematic domain knowledge elicitation. In a
similar direction, Rehman et al. (126) propose a simple framework for monitoring cloud
performance based on user feedback, in which the performance of a cloud service is
monitored and predicted by these feedbacks. In this direction, Li et al.(66) propose
a taxonomy of performance evaluation concepts. The authors argue that performance
evaluation works are difficult to understand and compare because they lack consistency
and a common terminology. The taxonomy aims to clarify concepts and inaccurately-
used terminology that exist in evaluation works. The same authors suggest that a
rigorous methodology for implementing a Cloud evaluation is required, and they propose
the Cloud Evaluation Experiment Methodology (CEEM) (64).
As a conclusion from our literature review, trust has already been incorporated
in the evaluation of clouds. However, in most cases, the purpose of this evaluation
is service selection, rather than cloud provider selection. Most contributions are also
focused on the metrics rather than on a concrete methodology to gather and quantify
all the information. Uncertainty or subjectivity, which are intrinsic to the notion of
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trust, are usually laid aside. This section aims to fill these gaps. The existing literature
provides valuable information about the aspects of cloud providers that are usually
considered by cloud customers before moving to the cloud, and our approach, presented
in the next section, builds upon this knowledge.
3.1.2 Trust-Aware Methodology
A high-level overview of the methodology is presented in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Overview of the Methodology
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The first step consists of gathering knowledge about the cloud provider. Next, we
elicit and quantify a set of trust factors about the provider’s stakeholders and about the
cloud provider as a whole. In parallel, we specify trust thresholds that are based on the
scenario requirements. These thresholds are minimum trust values that we expect for a
given scenario. In the following step, the factors are aggregated into three dimensions
or viewpoints: a stakeholder dimension, a threat dimension, and a general dimension.
In order to perform the aggregation, we define a summation operator. Finally, the
information is graphically visualized.
Next we describe each of the steps in more detail.
3.1.2.1 Domain Knowledge Elicitation
The goal of this step is to gather knowledge about the cloud provider and the cloud
domain. We suggest context patterns for a structured domain knowledge elicitation
(12). These patterns contain a graphical pattern and templates with elements that
require consideration for a specific context. In addition, context patterns contain a
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method for eliciting domain knowledge using the graphical pattern and templates. For
this work we use a specific context pattern, the so-called cloud system analysis pattern
(11, 14). It describes stakeholders and other systems that interact with the Cloud, i.e.
they are connected to the cloud by associations. For example, the cloud provider offers
its resources to cloud customers as Services, i.e., IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS. However, our
methodology is not tied to a concrete methodology for structured domain knowledge
elicitation.
3.1.2.2 Trust Factors Quantification
As explained over Chapter 2, trust evaluation models depend on a set of factors that
influence trust relationships. These factors must be quantified and aggregated using a
trust engine to yield a trust value. This step tackles the identification and quantification
of trust factors, whereas Section 3.1.2.4 deals with the trust engine that aggregates these
trust factors.
For trust factors identification, we use two different trust templates according to
the context patterns methodology (12). The first one is the Stakeholder Trust Tem-
plate (STT) depicted in Table 3.1, which is a modification over the original stakeholder
template (12). This template identifies the trust factors that we consider for the cloud
stakeholders, and also in particular, for the staff members of the Cloud provider. The
other template is the Cloud Provider Trust Template (CPTT), shown in Table 3.2, which
identifies the trust factors that we consider for the cloud provider as a whole. In each
table, the first two columns show the name of the factor and its meaning respectively,
whereas the last column provides hints for quantifying the factors.
The quantification process in our methodology entails providing two values for each
factor: the factor value itself and a confidence value. The latter refers to the confidence
that the factor value is accurate. The role of this value is to make explicit the uncertainty
derived from having partial and subjective information. For the quantification of both
values we decide to use only integer numbers from 0 to 3. More justification on this
decision and on the trust engine in general is provided in Section 3.1.4.
In our methodology, threats are sub-factors of two trust factors: direct interaction
and 3rd party referrals. The former refers to information about threats derived from
previous direct experience with the cloud provider, whereas the latter requires asking
external organizations for this information. We use the threats identified by the Cloud
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Table 3.1: Stakeholder Trust Template
Direct Inter-
action
Evaluation of previous direct interaction
with the stakeholder.
Analyse the number of incidents and over-
all satisfaction with the stakeholder in the
past.
3rd Parties
referrals
Referrals from 3rd parties regarding inter-
actions with the stakeholder.
Ask other organisations about their gen-
eral satisfaction with the stakeholder.
Knowledge Stakeholder knowledge on its task. Check number of years of experience and
whether the stakeholder has any certifica-
tion.
Willingness Willingness of the stakeholder to perform
the task.
Take into account the aforementioned fac-
tors; research on the motivations of the
stakeholder (e.g. bonuses); check how long
it takes him to finish his task.
Security Alliance (CSA), as depicted in Table 3.3, which summarize the experience of
a large industrial consortium in the field of cloud computing.
Once we have a factor value and its corresponding confidence value, we calculate a
trust interval for each factor, as explained in the next definition.
Definition 1 (Trust Interval) Let v and c be a factor value and its corresponding
confidence value, respectively. These values are integer numbers between 0 and 3. We
form the trust interval as: TI = [
vc
3
,
vc
3
+ (3− c)].
This interval is in the domain of the real numbers. 0 and 3 are lower and upper
bounds of the interval, respectively. For the rationale of this definition we refer the
reader to the contribution by Shakeri et al. (117). Given that we use integer values,
there is a finite set of possible intervals during quantification. For example, when the
factor value is 2 and the confidence value is 1, the resulting trust interval is [
2
3
,
8
3
]. Note
that when c = 0, we have the maximum uncertainty, that is, the interval is [0, 3] and
has the maximum width. When c = 3, uncertainty is minimum, that is, the interval
width is zero because we know the trust value.
Before proceeding to the aggregation of the trust intervals, decision makers define
trust thresholds as explained in the next section.
3.1.2.3 Trust Thresholds Definition
This step, which is performed in parallel with the quantification step, defines trust
thresholds according to the scenario requirements. These thresholds represent the min-
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Table 3.2: Cloud Provider Trust Template
SLA and Contracts Quality of SLAs and signed contracts that
express the conditions and liabilities re-
garding the service offered by the cloud
provider.
Check if there was some abuse of the con-
tract. Do all the interesting services have
a well-defined SLA and appropriate for the
organization? Are they easy to find and
easy to understand?
Security Provider’s concern and actions on security. Check whether the cloud provider par-
ticipates in cloud standards bodies such
as CloudAudit, Open Cloud Computing
Interface, CSA and ENISA. Does the
cloud provider perform security assess-
ment? (E.g. COBIT, ISO 27000, NIST
SP800-53). Does it offer professional ser-
vices such as a security assessments of
customer environments? Does the cloud
provider provide a special email or forum
for security/privacy questions?
Long-term viability Business viability of the cloud provider. Is the cloud provider profitable? Did the
cloud provider have any financial difficul-
ties? How many years in the market? (Ac-
cording to the US Small Business Admin-
istration, 50% of businesses fail in the first
5 years). Does the cloud provider have a
clear back-up and recovery policy? Are
there compensations and are they good in
case of problems?
Transparency Transparency of the provider. How difficult is to retrieve data from the
cloud provider? Does it publish its privacy
and security policies? Are they easy to
access? Do I know where the data will be
located? Does the cloud provider have an
open ethical manifest?
Accountability and
auditing
How accountable and auditable the
provider is.
Does the cloud provider comply with the
SAS No.70 Type II, Payment Card In-
dustry Data Security Standard, HIPAA
or Sarbanes-Oxley? Is there a clear log-
ging policy? Are there logging systems in
place? Is logging information good enough
for accountability?
Human Resources
Security
Quality and security concern of the em-
ployment policies.
Does the provider have a clear, strict, ro-
bust hiring policy? (to minimize insider
threats; trust stakeholders) Are there pro-
cedures for monitoring employees effec-
tiveness? Is there any secure fade-out pro-
cedure once a guy leaves the company?
Quality of employment: salaries, health
insurance. Quality of security trading
(how well educated is the staff?).
Direct interaction Own experience in the interaction with
the cloud provider.
Evaluate direct experience against
threats.
3rd parties referrals Referrals from 3rd parties regarding inter-
actions with the cloud provider.
Evaluate 3rd parties referrals against
threats.
imum trust that decision makers expect for each trust factor. The goal is to have a
yardstick that can be used to check whether cloud providers meet our trust expecta-
55
3. INCORPORATING TRUST ENGINEERING IN EARLY PHASES OF
THE SDLC
Table 3.3: CSA Cloud Threats and their Evaluation
Description How to evaluate
Abuse of Cloud Computing
(Threat 1)
This threat describes the abuse of the scalable cloud re-
sources, e.g., network connections capacity. For example, the
resources can be used by spammers to scale up their opera-
tion.
Consider the type, number, and
frequency of anomaly checks for
cloud computing abuse.
Insecure Interfaces and APIs
(Threat 2)
Clouds provide interfaces for provisioning, management, or-
chestration, and management of services. Security functions,
e.g., authentication, and encryption rely upon these. An ex-
ample for the malicious usage of interfaces is the eavesdrop-
ping during clear-text transmission of content.
How often do developers report se-
curity issues? How long does it
take the cloud provider to fix the
problems?
Malicious Insiders
(Threat 3)
The cloud provider controls access to the cloud. A cloud
customer or end customer has very limited transparency con-
sidering data access permissions provided to cloud employees.
Hence, the threat of malicious insiders, which are employees
of the cloud provider, scales with the resources and offered
services in the cloud. An example for a specific problem is
policy compliance. Cloud customers or end customers have no
visibility into the hiring or monitoring of the cloud providers’
employees.
Does the cloud provider publish
compliance to laws? Does the
provider offer customized SLAs?
Does the provider conduct external
audits?
Shared Technology
(Threat 4)
The different stakeholders in the cloud use the same physi-
cal resources, e.g., CPUs and RAM. These are shared using
so-called Hypervisors, which provide isolation properties for
these physical resources. Side channel attacks on these Hy-
pervisors can provide a stakeholder with inappropriate levels
of control of the underlying cloud infrastructure.
Does the provider ensure best prac-
tices like penetration testing in pre-
venting successful attacks? Is this
documented in a contract?
Data Loss & Leakage
(Threat 5)
The threats to data in a cloud scales with the amount of
data stored in it. Deletion or alteration of data without a
backup is an example. Moreover, cloud databases store data
distributed. The links to records in these cloud databases can
be destroyed, which results in unrecoverable data.
Are data available about exist-
ing incidents of information loss
over time? Are information about
severity and time to fixing the issue
available?
Account or Service Hijacking
(Threat 6)
Clouds provide numerous services and credentials, and pass-
words are often reused. Thus, compromised credentials pro-
vide access to a large set of data about activities and trans-
actions of stakeholders. Thus, the attacker can exploit the
reputation of a cloud customer and launch a large-scale at-
tack on its end customers. The cloud customer’s reputation
can lead to directed phishing and farming attacks at its end
customers.
Were any identity theft incidents
reported or experienced? Is the
cloud provider taking responsibil-
ity for these incidents or the cloud
customers?
Unknown Risk Profile
(Threat 7)
Cloud customers and end customers do not own cloud re-
sources. Hence, cloud providers can apply the so-called secu-
rity by obscurity policy. Thus, the cloud customers and end
customers do not know the exact specifications of the security
mechanisms used in the cloud. This results in an unknown
exposure of assets and increases the difficulty of creating a
risk profile for a cloud scenario.
List all the data that is not avail-
able about the cloud provider?
Evaluate the situation based on
the number and significance of the
missing information.
Unknown Causes
(Threat 8)
A significant number of reported cloud problems like outages
did not reveal the causes of these problems. In these case
we know that incidents happened, but the provider does not
release information that allows an analysis. It remains unclear
if the problem is addressed properly or even investigated at
all.
List all incidents that happened,
but the cloud provider did not re-
lease enough information to track
the incident back to a threat.
Hence, this incident cannot be cat-
egorized into Threat 1 to 7 and is
part of this category. Look at the
amount of these incidents and eval-
uate based on this information.
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tions.
For each trust factor, the decision maker assigns an expected factor value and a
confidence value. In this case, the confidence value expresses how sure the decision maker
is about the need to expect the corresponding factor value. As in the quantification
step, for each factor, a trust interval is derived from these values by using Definition 1.
3.1.2.4 Trust Aggregation
During the previous steps we have calculated trust intervals for different factors of
stakeholders and cloud providers. This step reduces the number of trust intervals by
aggregating them.
Before defining the operator that performs the aggregations, we need another defi-
nition.
Definition 2 (Interval Accuracy) Given a trust interval [a, b], we define the interval
accuracy as IA = 3− w, where w = b− a is the width of the interval.
The maximum possible width of a trust interval is 3 (see Definition 1). When the
width is maximum, the interval accuracy is 0 because uncertainty is maximum. On the
other hand, when the width of a trust interval is 0, the interval accuracy is 3 because
uncertainty is minimum.
Next we define a summation operator that aggregates trust intervals.
Definition 3 (Summation Operator) Given two trust intervals [a, b] and [c, d], where
a 6= c or b 6= d, we define the summation operator ⊕ as [a, b]⊕[c, d] = [e, f ] where [e, f ] is
a new trust interval that can be obtained as: e =
IA1a+ IA2c
IA1 + IA2
and f =
IA1b+ IA2d
IA1 + IA2
.
IA1 and IA2 are the interval accuracy of [a, b] and [c, d], respectively. If a = c and
b = d, then [a, b]⊕ [c, d] = [a, b] = [c, d].
The resulting interval after a summation is somewhere in between the two source
intervals. The uncertainty, represented by the interval accuracy, determines how close
e is to a or c, and how close f is to b or d. This is why we weight a, b, c and d by
the interval accuracy. The higher the interval accuracy, the more the values of the
corresponding interval contributes. Note that the operator has an identity element:
[0, 3]. This makes sense as this interval expresses the maximum uncertainty and does
not add any knowledge to the trust value.
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Table 3.4 illustrates some interval summations. Note the last two summations in
the table. In the first one, we have complete confidence that the factor value is 0 in the
first interval and that the factor value is 3 in the second one, therefore the aggregation
yields a value right in the middle. In the last summation, there is complete confidence
in the factor value 3, whereas there is limited confidence in the other value. Therefore
the aggregation yields a value closer to 3.
Table 3.4: Trust Interval Summations
[0, 3] + [2, 3] [2, 3]
[1, 3] + [2, 3] [1.7, 3]
[2, 2.5] + [2.25, 2.5] [2.13, 2.5]
[1, 2] + [1, 2] [1, 2]
[0, 0] + [3, 3] [1.5, 1.5]
[0, 2] + [3, 3] [2.25, 2.75]
In order to present meaningful trust information, we suggest performing three aggre-
gations that correspond to three dimensions or viewpoints: the stakeholders dimension,
the threats dimension and the general dimension. Next subsections explain each of
them.
Stakeholders Dimension This dimension illustrates the level of trust in the cloud
provider according to the stakeholders working in it. This aggregation is performed by
summing all the intervals of all the factors for each stakeholder, and then summing the
resulting intervals for all the stakeholders.
Threats Dimension This dimension shows the amount of trust in the cloud provider
according to the threats defined by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) (see Table 3.3).
For each threat, we aggregate the trust intervals of the direct interaction and 3rd party
referrals factors.
We believe that having independent trust intervals for each threat is convenient,
instead of aggregating all the different threats together, because decision makers can
make more fine-grained decisions. For example, if the trust interval is low for the threat
Data Loss & Leakage, the decision maker can decide not to move the customers data of
the organisation to the cloud provider. However, if trust intervals of the other threats for
the same cloud provider are high, some services or infrastructures could be outsourced
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to that cloud provider. If we aggregated all the threats into a unique trust interval, we
would lose this valuable information.
General Dimension This dimension depicts trust in the cloud provider with regards
to the rest of trust factors that are not threats, including Security, Transparency and
Accountability.
After the trust aggregation step, there are ten trust intervals for a cloud provider:
one for the stakeholders dimension, eight for the threats dimension (i.e. one for each
threat) and one in the general dimension.
3.1.2.5 Trust Information Visualization
The last step consists of plotting the trust intervals for each dimension for comparison
purposes and decision making.
In the Y-axis, we represent possible trust values, whereas in the X-axis we represent
the three dimensions. For each dimension, we draw a line from the lower bound to the
upper bound of its trust intervals. This arrangement allows fast comparison between
providers in each dimension. Likewise, it allows comparing the trust intervals with the
trust thresholds.
This is better illustrated in the next section, where we apply the methodology to an
eHealth scenario.
3.1.3 Application Example: eHealth
In this section we present an application of our methodology to a case study provided by
the EU project Network of Excellence on Engineering Secure Future Internet Software
Services and Systems (NESSoS)4. The scenario concerns managing Electronic Health
Record (EHR)s in clouds. EHRs contain any information created by health care profes-
sionals in the context of the care of a patient. Examples are laboratory reports, X-ray
images, and data from monitoring equipment.
Security concerns in this scenario include:
• Confidentiality of EHRs in communication and storage
• Data separation of EHRs and other data of the eHealth applications
4The NESSoS project: http://www.nessos-project.eu
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• Authentication mechanism to guarantee confidentiality and integrity
• Availability of EHRs
• Availability of network connection
• Data Origin Authentication
Given these security concerns, the CSA threats that become more relevant are the
following: Insecure Interfaces and APIs (Threat 2), because these are essential for se-
curity functionalities like authentication; Malicious Insiders (Threat 3), because they
could steal EHRs and use them for blackmailing or similar criminal activities. Shared
Technology (Threat 4) and, specially, Data Loss & Leakage (Threat 5), can lead to a loss
of confidentiality of EHRs or data separation. Account or Service Hijacking (Threat 6)
leads to bypass authentication controls, including those for data origin authentication;
Unknown Risk Profile (Threat 7) and Unknown Causes (Threat 8)5 can also have a
negative effect on all the security concerns.
For the evaluation, we consider the following cloud vendors: Amazon, Apple, Mi-
crosoft and Google. We lay stakeholders evaluation aside and we focus on evaluating
trust in the threat and general dimensions; retrieving stakeholders information is more
difficult but the process and the aggregation would be similar. Next subsections include
each step in our methodology.
Trust Factor Quantification and Thresholds Definition Threats quantification
is based on a data set from CSA, which mapped 11 491 cloud security incidents to these
threats6.
As explained before, for each trust factor, including the threats, we assign a factor
value and a confidence value. For example, in the case of Threat 1 for Amazon, we as-
signed factor value 0 and confidence value 2. The rationale, which must also be included
as part of the analysis, is that we found three incidents on record and one that had a
significant amount of user accounts affected. As another example, for Security trust
5Note that the original CSA Top Threats are just 7, but the CSA documented cloud security
incident referenced numerous incidents that cannot be categorized because of a lack of information.
This lead us to adding an additional threat.
6Documented Cloud Security Incidents: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/download/cloud-
computing-vulnerability-incidents-a-statistical-overview/
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factor in Microsoft, we assigned factor value 3 and confidence value 2. The rationale
is that Microsoft considers some certifications (e.g. ISO 27001) and complies with the
CSA control matrix and FedRAMP. Applying Definition 1, we obtain the trust interval
[0, 1] for the first example, and [2, 3] for the second example. Table 3.5 shows the whole
quantification for one of the cloud vendors.
In parallel and based on the security requirements of the scenario, we define min-
imum trust values for each trust factor. These thresholds, already aggregated in the
threat and general dimensions, are presented in Table 3.6.
Trust Aggregation We aggregate the trust intervals of every factor for a given cloud
provider. As an example, consider the following: Apple has trust interval [0, 2] for Secu-
rity and [0.33, 2.33] for transparency. We use the operator in Definition 3 to aggregate
these intervals. The resulting interval is [0.17, 2.17]. We would now aggregate this trust
interval with the one corresponding to Accountability and Auditing, and so forth, until
we reach a final trust interval in the general dimension. The resulting trust interval in
the general dimension for each cloud provider is shown in the last column of Table 3.7.
We assume that we have no direct previous experience with the providers. Therefore,
there is no need to aggregate trust intervals in the threat dimension, which this time only
considers information from 3rd party referrals, in this case, from CSA. Trust intervals
for each threat and cloud provider are presented in Table 3.7.
Trust Visualization Figure 3.2 shows the trust intervals of all cloud providers,
whereas Figure 3.3 compares the trust intervals with the trust thresholds.
As a conclusion, we see in Figure 3.3 that no cloud provider upholds all trust thresh-
olds. If we focus on data loss and leakage (Threat 5), we see that none of them fully
upholds it, but Apple and Amazon seem more interesting under this lens. Microsoft
seems to be the best cloud provider according to general properties such as security
or transparency, followed by Google. If we focus on the threats in general, we note
that again, no cloud provider performs well for all threats. However, according to our
analysis, the less bad performers are Microsoft, Apple, Amazon and Google in this
order.
Summing up, if we were analysts, we would either not pursue any cloud provider
for our scenario at this time and repeat the analysis later, or would confront the cloud
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Table 3.6: Trust Thresholds
Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4 Threat 5 Threat 6 Threat 7 Threat 8 General
[1.0,1.0] [0.67,2.67] [0.33,2.33] [2.0,2.0] [2.0,2.0] [0.67,2.67] [0.33,2.33] [0.33,2.33] [0.67,2.67]
Table 3.7: Trust Intervals for Cloud Providers
Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4 Threat 5 Threat 6 Threat 7 Threat 8 General
A
m
az
on
[0,1] [0.67,1.67] [0,3] [0.33,2.33] [1.33,2.33] [0,3] [0.33,2.33] [0,1] [0.34,1.86]
A
p
p
le
[0.67,1.67] [0,1] [0,0] [0.33,2.33] [1.33,2.33] [0.33,2.33] [0.67,1.67] [0.67,2.67] [0.02, 2.02]
M
ic
ro
so
ft
[2,3] [0.33,2.33] [1.33,2.33] [0.67,2.67] [0.67,1.67] [0.67,1.67] [1.33,2.33] [0,1] [0.8, 2.25]
G
oo
gl
e
[1.33,2.33] [0,1] [0.33,2.33] [1.33,2.33] [0,1] [0.33,2.33] [0.33,2.33] [0,1] [0.53, 2.39]
providers with the results and ask for a detailed justifications for their security mecha-
nisms, especially regarding threat 5.
3.1.4 Discussion
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are many trust and reputation engines in the literature
(56). Given that this methodology is aimed at analysts and decision makers, who do not
necessarily have much mathematical background, a requirement for our trust engine was
its simplicity. The engine that we present in this work uses trust intervals to represent
trust information. There are other engines that are easier to use, such as summation or
average engines. However, they present two main problems. First, they usually require
weighting the attributes, and selecting weights is difficult and prone to trial-and-error
mechanics. Second, they lack the capability to represent uncertainty, which is a concept
highly coupled to the notion of trust. We believe that trust intervals present a good
trade-off between simplicity and expressiveness.
Best practices in risk assessment indicate that practitioners should set an even num-
ber of choices since users tend to choose the middle value in odd numbered scales (92).
This is why we quantify each trust factor with 4 possible values (i.e. from 0 to 3). We
think that 2 would give too few flexibility, whereas more than 4 would be confusing.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Trust Intervals for the selected Cloud Providers
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A disadvantage of our methodology is that it relies on data that in many cases may
not be accessible or available. Cloud providers may be reluctant to provide certain infor-
mation and it might not be straightforward to gather knowledge about the stakeholders
of a cloud provider.
Another source of imprecision is subjectivity. By definition, trust is subjective and
therefore some of the information that the methodology requires may have a subjectivity
bias. The results of the trust evaluation may not be completely accurate, but we
advocate that even minimal or partially subjective information is better than blind
decision-making. In order to avoid strong subjectivity bias, it is important to state the
rationale for each factor quantification.
Subjectivity draws a line between trust and trustworthiness. Having a trustworthi-
ness value would help in determining trust. Whereas trust usually depends on subjective
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Figure 3.3: Contrasting Trust Thresholds and Trust Intervals
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Note that the x-Axsis legend abbreviates Threat 1 to Threat 8 with just the values from 1 to 8. General dimension is value 9
information and may change among trustors, trustworthiness is an objective measure
of many different qualities. The ideal situation occurs when trust in a trustee matches
the trustworthiness of that trustee (95). This is the reason why we claim that we are
evaluating trust and not trustworthiness.
3.2 Trust-supported Threats Analysis
As reported by the 2014 CyberSecurity Watch Survey, 28% of cybercrimes were com-
mitted by insiders (120), and 46% of the respondents thought that damage caused by
insider attacks was more severe than damage from outsider attacks. In fact, insider
attacks can cause significant damage to the affected organizations e.g loss of money,
loss of reputation, or loss of customers, among others.
The CERT Insider Threat Center of the Software Engineering Institute (118) de-
fines an insider as “a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who
has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data and in-
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tentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or information
systems”. Insider attacks are more difficult to detect because they come from trusted
employees who have legitimate and often privileged access to critical or valuable assets,
and have knowledge of the organization and its processes. The effective defense from
insider attacks call for preventive measures that detect and assess the risks associate
with insiders, rather than for reactive measures after the attack has been conducted.
In this section, we present an approach to assist security engineers in the detection
of insider threats during the analysis phase of the system development life cycle. Our
approach is complementary to other threats identification approaches that rely on the
analyst level of expertise such as risk assessment (70). With our approach, the security
engineer can identify automatically the insider threats that exist in a given organization
and permission setting and assess the associated risks.
The approach consists of first modelling the actors7 (i.e. the system stakeholders),
their goals, their assets, the security properties (e.g confidentiality, integrity, availability)
that stakeholders want to hold for their assets, the permissions that the stakeholders
have on assets, and delegation and trust of permissions relationships among them.
Trust of permission relationships represent the belief of the grantor of a permission on
an asset that the grantee will not misuse it: an actor can be either trusted with a
permission or distrusted. The level of trust associated with an agent with respect to
a granted permission is crucial to assess the risk of the agent being an insider threat:
the lower the level of trust associated with a permission is, the higher is the likelihood
that the agent will misuse the permission according to the trustor’s perception. For
this modeling, we use the SI* requirements modeling language (77), because it targets
socio-technical systems.
In order to support the automatic detection of insider threats, we extend the SI*
requirements modelling language proposed in (7) with an asset and trust model. The
asset model associates assets with a sensitivity value that represent how valuable the
asset is for the owner. The trust model extends the native binary SI* trust model
(trusted, not trusted) and allows associating different levels of trust (e.g. high, medium
7We use the term actor instead of entity because we are using the nomenclature of SI*. However,
according to our conceptual model presented in Section 2.2, an actor is an entity, which can be a trustor
or a trustee.
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and low trust) with a permission granted to an agent. Based on the sensitivity and trust
levels, we define a set of rules to automatically identify insider threats to an asset and
prioritize them based on the risk associated with the threat. The risk associated with
the insider threat is given by both the likelihood that the threat occurs and the cost
of the permission being misused. The former is quantified by the trust level associated
with the permission granted to the insider agent, whereas the latter is quantified by the
sensitivity of the asset being harmed.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. First, we introduce the SI* framework
and its extensions proposed in (7). Next, we present the asset and the trust model
followed by the process to identify and prioritize insider threats. Finally, we apply the
approach to an eHealth case study of patient monitoring.
3.2.1 The SI* Framework
The SI* modeling language (77) has been proposed to capture security and functional
requirements of socio-technical systems. SI* is founded on the concepts of agent, role,
service, and relations such as And/Or decomposition and means-end.
An agent is an active entity with concrete manifestations and is used to model
humans as well as software agents and organizations. A role is the abstract charac-
terization of the behaviour of an active entity within some context. An actor is the
general way of referring to agents and roles when we do not need to distinguish. The
term service is used to denote a goal, a task and a resource. A goal captures a strategic
interest that is intended to be fulfilled. A task represents a particular course of actions
that produces a desired effect. It can be executed to satisfy a goal. A resource is an
artifact produced/consumed by a goal or a task. And/Or decomposition is used to refine
a goal, while means-end identifies goals that provide means for achieving another goal
or resources produced or consumed by a goal or task.
SI* also captures social relationships (e.g., delegation and trust) for defining the
entitlements, capabilities and objectives of actors. Originally, a delegation marks a for-
mal passage of responsibility (delegation execution) or authority (delegation permission)
from an actor (delegator) to the actor receiving the responsibility/authority (delegatee)
to achieve a goal or to provide a resource.
Trust in SI* comes in two flavours. Trust of execution represents a relation between
two actors representing the expectation of one actor (trustor) about the capabilities of
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the other (trustee). Trust of permission is represented as the expectation of the trustor
about the behaviour of the trusteee with respect to the given permission.
Asnar et al. (7) extends SI* to represent different types of actors’ permissions on
resources (Table 3.8) and different types of relationships between resources (Table 3.9).
Goals and resources are considered as assets that need to be protected because they
bring value to organizations. In order to specify how an asset needs to be protected,
we use the concept of security requirement defining a specific security property, such as
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The permission type granted on a resource
determines the type of actions an actor can perform on a resource, as depicted in Table
3.8. Actors than own a resource has the manage permission type on that resource.
Actors that have the manage permission type on a resource automatically inherit the
modify and access permission types on that resource. Likewise, actors that have the
modify permission type on a resource inherit the access permission type on that resource.
A permission type might yield to the violation of a specific security property if the
actor misuses the actions granted by the permission type. Moreover, a given permission
granted on a resource can be extended to other resources that are related to the resource
by the relations reported in Table 3.9.
Table 3.8: Permissions on Resource
Permission
Type
Description
(Possible)
Affected Sec.
Property
Access
(low-level)
Actor only has the permission to
access/read/use the resource.
Confidentiality
Modify
(medium-level)
Actor can change the content of the resource. Integrity
Manage
(high-level)
Actor has the permission to modify the
resource, delegate permissions to other actors
and modify permissions to other actors.
Availability
In order to allow the formal analysis of SI* models, the semantics of SI* is defined
in the Answer Set Programming (ASP) paradigm, which is a variant of Datalog with
negation as failure and disjunction. This paradigm supports specifications expressed in
terms of facts and Horn clauses, which are evaluated using the stable model semantics.
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Table 3.9: Relationships between Resources
Relationship Description
store_ in
An informational resource is stored in a
physical resource.
part_ of A resource consists of other resources.
require
A resource might require another resource to
function.
Here, SI* models are encoded as sets of facts. Rules (or axioms) are Horn clauses that
define the semantics of SI* concepts. To support the formalization in ASP, the DLV
inference engine (63) is used. Table 3.10 summarizes the predicates to formalize an SI*
model in ASP.
We perform two extensions over SI*: an asset model and a trust model, which are
described in the next sections.
3.2.2 Asset Model
An asset is a service for which the owner specifies the sensitivity and a security property
that expresses the need of protecting the service. We introduce the predicates shown in
Table 3.11.
In our model, we distinguish between two types of assets: direct and indirect as-
sets. Direct assets are services for which a security property and a sensitivity level are
explicitly modeled in the SI* model, while indirect assets are services for which the
security property and the sensitivity level is determined based on the relations with
other services. The identification of indirect assets is based on a set of rules, reported
in Table 3.12, that considers the relations among resources (i.e. stored_ in, part_ of
and require) and the relationship means_ end among the resources and the goals that
requires the resources to be fulfilled. We assume that if an asset is related to a service by
one of these relations, the same security property should hold for the asset and service
(axioms S1-S5) and that the two assets should have the same sensitivity level (axioms
S6-S9). If the direct asset is related to another direct asset only the security property
is propagated to the other asset.
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Table 3.10: Predicates for ASP SI* Formalization
Goal model
service(Service:s)
goal(Goal:g)
resource(Resource:r)
actor(Actor:x)
agent(Agent:a)
role(Role:p)
play(Agent:a,Role:p)
provide(Actor:a, Goal:g)
own(Actor:a, Goal:g)
own(Actor:a, Resource:r)
subgoal(Goal g1, Goal:g)
means_ end(Resource:r, Goal:g)
means_ end(Goal:g, Resource:r)
Resource model
stored_ in(Resource:r, Resource:r1)
part_ of(Resource:r, Resource:r1)
require(Resource:r, Resource:r1)
Permission model
permission(Actor:a, Resource:r, PType:pt)
del_perm(Actor:a, Actor:a1, Resource:r, PType:pt)
trust_perm(Actor:a, Actor:a1, Resource:r)
Security requirements and Threats model
secure_ req(Resource:r, SProperty:sp)
secure_ req(Goal:g, SProperty:sp, Resource:r)
threat(Actor:a, Resource:r, SProperty:sp)
threat(Actor:a, Goal:g, SProperty:sp, Resource:r)
3.2.3 Trust Model
The SI* trust model only supports binary trust values: either an agent is trusted or
is distrusted for a given permission on a resource. However, in real scenarios trust is
not a binary value but an agent can be assigned different levels of trust. As explained
in Chapter 2, a trust relationship holds between two entities: a trustor (the one who
70
3.2 Trust-supported Threats Analysis
Table 3.11: Predicates for the Asset Model
Predicate Meaning
sec_ req(s,sp,p) Security property sp should be preserved
for a service s owned by a role p.
service_ instance(s, a, p) Instance of service s owned by agent a who
plays role p.
sec_ req(service_ instance(s, a, p),sp,a,p) Security property sp should be preserved
for a specific instance of a service s.
sensitivity(s,sl,p) Service s owned by role p has sensitivity
level sl.
sensitivity_ instance(service_ instance(s, a, p),sl,a,p) Associates a sensitivity level sl to an in-
stance of the service s owned by the agent
a playing the role p.
asset(s, p) Service is an asset, where s is a service and
p is the role who owns it.
asset_instance(service_ instance(s, a, p),a,p) Instance of service s is an asset owned by
agent a playing the role p.
places trust) and a trustee (the one performing a given action and to who(m) the trustor
places trust in). The context in which this trust relationships takes place in this case is
a permission that is granted to the trustee on a given asset. The trust level is important
as it indirectly provides information about the likelihood (as perceived by the trustor)
that the trustee will misuse the granted permission to harm the asset.
The trust model that we propose associates a trust level with a trust of permission
relation between two agents. The trust levels are then translated into trust labels that
are used to define insider threats identification rules, which determine if an agent may
misuse a granted permission on an asset and the risk associated to the threat.
We assume that trust levels can be represented in two forms: numbers in the in-
terval [0, 1] and qualitative labels such as Very Good, Good, Neutral, Bad, Very Bad,
as proposed by Agudo, Fernandez-Gago and Lopez (2). We assume that some trust
values are already assigned to trust of permission relationships between agents in the
SI* model and that these values are leveraged by the organization stakeholders in order
to compute trust values for pairs of agents for which such relationships are not explic-
itly modelled. To determine the trust level that an agent A places on another agent B
regarding how B will behave with respect to a granted permission, we leverage the trust
of permission relationships that other agents have with A and B. Therefore, according
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Table 3.12: Axioms for Identifying Indirect Assets
S1
sec_ req(R,SP, P )←
store_ in(R1, R) ∧ sec_ req(R1, SP, P )
S2
sec_ req(R1, SP, P )←
part_ of(R1, R) ∧ sec_ req(R,SP, P )
S3
sec_ req(R,SP, P )←
require(R1, R) ∧ sec_ req(R1, SP, P )
S4
sec_ req(G,SP,R, P )←
secure_ req(R,SP, P ) ∧means_ end(G,R)
S5
sec_ req(G1, SP,R, P )←
subgoal(G1, G) ∧ sec_ req(G,SP,R, P )
S6
sensitivity(R,SL, P )←
store_ in(R1, R) ∧ sensitivity(R1, SL, P )
S7
sensitivity(R,SL, P )←
part_ of(R1, R) ∧ sensitivity(R1, SL, P )
S8
sensitivity(R,SL, P )←
require(R1, R) ∧ sensitivity(R1, SL, P )
S9
sensitivity(G,SL, P )←
means_ end(G,R1) ∧ sensitivity(R1, SL, P )
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to the classification performed in Section 2.2.2, we propose the integration of a trust
propagation model into SI*. As explained in Section 2.2.3, propagation models require
two operators: a concatenator operator and an aggregator operator. Before defining
these operators though, we must introduce the concept of trust statement.
Definition 4 (Trust Statement) A trust statement is an element
(Trustor, T rustee, Context, V alue) ∈ E×E×C×TD, where E is the set of all entities
in the system; C is a set representing a context; and TD is a Trust Domain.
Trust of permission relationships are a particular instance of trust statements where
Context is the permission granted to the trustee on an asset instance and V alue is the
trust level placed by the trustor in the trustee for the permission. To represent trust
statements we introduce the predicate trust_ perm_ instance(A, A1,asset_ instance (ser-
vice_ instance(S,A,P)), PT, TL), which essentially means that agent A trusts agent A1
with a level TL to not misuse service S with permission type TL and owned by A.
Trust statements can form trust chains, and the concatenator and aggregator oper-
ators evaluate trust over these chains, as defined next.
Definition 5 (Concatenator Operator) A concatenator operator is a function,
f :
⋃∞
n=2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
TD × · · · × TD −→ TD, that calculates the trust level associated to a path or
chain of trust statements, such that f(v1, . . . , vn) = 0 if, and only if, vi = 0 for any i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, where vi ∈ TD and TD is a trust domain.
Definition 6 (Aggregator Operator) An agregator operator is function is used to
calculate the trust level associated to a set of paths or chains of trust statements. It is
defined as, g :
⋃∞
n=2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
TD × · · · × TD −→ TD, where TD is a trust domain and
1. g(z1, . . . , zi−1, zi, zi+1, . . . , zn) = g(z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zn) if zi = 0
2. g(z) = z
As a consequence of applying these operators to SI* models, an agent might end up
holding several trust of permission relations with a given agent. However, it would be
optimal if an agent only holds one value for any other agent of the system. Resolution
functions could solve this.
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Definition 7 (Trust Resolution Function) A trust resolution function is a func-
tion, f :
⋃∞
n=2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
TD × · · · × TD −→ TD, such that f(v1, . . . , vn) ≤ max(v1, . . . , vn) and
f(v1, . . . , vn) ≥ min(v1, . . . , vn), where vi ∈ TD and TD is a trust domain.
Basically, given a set of trust values, the resolution function produces one unique
representative trust value that is upper bounded by the maximum and lower bounded
by the minimum of the original trust values. Operators and the resolution function rely
on functions to compute the trust values. For this purpose, different functions could be
used, like the maximum, minimum, arithmetic or geometric means, etc.
Once we obtain the final numeric values for every trust of permission relationship,
transformation rules must be used in order to translate these values, which are in an
interval [a, b] ([0, 1] is the chosen one in this case) into a label in a given set of labels
that forms a trust scale (2).
The next section explains the threat model that we consider in this approach
3.2.4 Threat Model
We assume that an agent A is an insider for a given asset S when two conditions hold:
a) A is granted a permission PT on the asset S that is sufficient to violate the
security property associated with S;
b) The agent who owns the resource S does not fully trust A with permission PT .
We consider that the severity of a threat depends on the sensitivity levels of assets
and the trust levels on the trust of permissions relationships. We introduce a threat
predicate to specify when an agent is an insider for a given instance of an asset and the
risk associated with the insider threat. Figure 3.4 is an example of how the risk level
of a threat can be determined based on sensitivity and trust levels.
The identification of the insider threats and their risk level is based on a set of
axioms reported in Table 3.13, where we list the axioms to detect insider threats to
assets’ confidentiality, integrity and availability with extreme severity level.
The modeling and the reasoning based on the above axioms are supported by the SI*
tool which is an Eclipse plug-in equipped with a DLV engine. The tool interface allows
to draw an SI* model which is automatically translated into ASP specification. The
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Figure 3.4: Threats Severity Levels
The rows of the table represent the trust levels, while the columns represent the sensitivity levels.
Each entry of the matrix specifies the severity level for a given combination of sensitivity and trust
levels. The severity level can assume one of the following values: Low, Moderate, High, Extreme.
How trust and sensitivity relates to each other depends on the organization’s policy and should
not be fixed beforehand. Intuitively, the higher the sensitivity of an asset, the higher the damage
for the organization. Similarly, the higher the trust level, the lower the likelihood that the agent
will misuse the granted permission
tool also allows to input the rules for insider threat identification so that the problem
of identifying insider threats is the same as checking a DLV program that formalize the
SI* model and the axioms.
The next section apply the process to an eHealth monitoring scenario.
3.2.5 Application Example: eHealth
To illustrate our approach, we use a patient monitoring scenario from the eHealth case
study proposed in the NESSoS European project8. The scenario involves five main
actors. Patient is monitored by a smart T-shirt which measures medical data (e.g.,
heartbeat rate, blood pressure, etc.) and transfers them to the Hospital’s computer
system. When the patient’s condition is abnormal, the doctor makes a diagnosis and
produces a prescription. The patient receives his prescription and requests the drug
delivery service to the pharmacy. The Hospital provides medical services to patients.
The hospital monitors patients’ health and manages patients’ data, which are stored
in the hospital’s computer. When the patient has some problems, the hospital assigns
a doctor to diagnose the patient. The Pharmacy is responsible for managing drugs
and provide them to the patients. All the information about drugs is stored in the
pharmacy’s computer. The Pharmacist works for the pharmacy and is responsible for
8http://www.nessos-project.eu/
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Table 3.13: Axioms for Identifying Insider Threats
Insider Threat to Confidentiality
a threat(A1,asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), A, P) , confidentiality,
extreme) ← asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), A, P) ∧
sec_ req_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), confidentiality, A, P) ∧
permission_ instance(A1, service_ instance(S, A, P), access) ∧
sensitivity_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), very high, A, P) ∧
trust_ perm_ instance(A, A1, asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), access,
very bad) ∧ A1 6= A
b threat(A1,asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), A, P) , confidentiality,
extreme) ← asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), A, P) ∧
sec_ req_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), confidentiality, A, P) ∧
permission_ instance(A1, service_ instance(S, A, P), access) ∧
sensitivity_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), very high, A, P) ∧
trust_ perm_ instance(A, A1, asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), access,
bad) ∧ A1 6= A
c threat(A1,asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), A, P) , confidentiality,
extreme) ← asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), A, P) ∧
sec_ req_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), confidentiality, A, P) ∧
permission_ instance(A1, service_ instance(S, A, P), access) ∧
sensitivity_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), very high, A, P) ∧
trust_ perm_ instance(A, A1, asset_ instance(service_ instance(S, A, P), access,
neutral) ∧ A1 6= A
Axioms T1.a - T1.c identify insider threats to confidentiality: the insider has access permission
on the asset being harmed and the owner of the asset places very bad, bad or neutral trust level
in the insider for the granted permission.
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providing drugs to be delivered according to the prescription received from the patient.
The prescription information is stored in the pharmacy’s computer. Finally, the Drug
manager works for the pharmacy and is responsible for managing the drugs. All the
drugs’ information is also stored in the pharmacy’s computer.
Figure 3.5 shows the SI* model for this scenario. The model consists of five roles:
the Hospital, the Patient, the Pharmacy, the Pharmacist, and the Drug Manager. In this
particular example, we assume that Patient (Role) can be played by three agents Bob,
Kate, and Jane. The Patient (Owns) the resources Patient data and Prescription. It
delegates to the Hospital the manage permission on Patient data, and it delegates the
access permission on Prescription to the Pharmacy. The Pharmacy has the intention
(Request) to fulfill the goal Sell drug which is (AND-decomposed) into subgoals Manage
drug and Provide drug: the fulfillment of Manage drug is delegated to the Drug Manager
while the fulfillment of Provide drug is delegated to the Pharmacist. The Pharmacy
(Owns) the resource PComputer. It grants to Drug Manager the manage permission on
PComputer and the access permission on Prescription to the Pharmacist. The Hospital
(Role) has an intention (Request) to fulfill the goal Provide medical service which is
(AND-decomposed) into subgoals Monitor patient, Manage patient data, and Diagnose.
Some goals can produce or consume resources. For example, the goal Diagnose requires
the resource Patient data and produces the resource Prescription. The Hospital (Owns)
the resource Smart T-shirt and delegates to the Patient the manage permission on it.
Table 3.14 depicts a snapshot of the formalization of the model in ASP.
Now we proceed to the identification of critical assets. There are three direct assets
owned by the Patient role: Prescription, Patient Data, and Monitoring Data. The Pa-
tient requires confidentiality to hold for Prescription, availability should hold for Patient
Data, while integrity should be satisfied for Monitoring Data. Smart T-Shirt, HComputer,
PComputer, Diagnose, Manage Patient data, Monitor Patient, and Provide Drug are indi-
rect assets. For example, PComputer is an indirect asset because the asset Prescription
is stored in PComputer and thus the confidentiality of PComputer needs to be preserved.
Similarly, the goal Diagnose is an indirect asset because it is linked to the asset Pre-
scription by a means_ end relation, and thus also the confidentiality of the goal needs to
hold.
Next we determine permissions on assets. This step determines the permissions
that roles are granted on assets. The permissions are assigned to roles based on a
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Figure 3.5: Patient Monitoring Scenario in SI*
The circles denote roles or agents, the ovals denote goals, while the rectangles represent resources.
Dp_a, and Dp_ma represent delegation of permission relation where the permission type is
access and manage respectively. Similarly, Tp_a, and Tp_ma represent trust of permission
relation where the permission type is access and manage. Services that are considered assets are
labeled with the security property that should be satisfied and their sensitivity level.
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Table 3.14: ASP Formalization for SI* Model
role(patient)
role(hospital)
goal(provide_medical_ service)
goal(monitor_patient)
goal(diagnose)
..........
resource(monitoring_data)
resource(patient_data)
resource(prescription)
resource(computer)
resource(smart_ t_ shirt)
..........
means_ end(diagnose,prescription)
resource(smart_ t_ shirt)
del_perm_manage(smart_ t_ shirt,patient)
del_perm_manage(hospital,smart_ t_ shirt)
own(hospital,smart_ t_ shirt)
del_perm_manage(patient_data,hospital)
own(patient,patient_data)
role(pharmacy)
..........
own(pharmacy,pcomputer)
del_perm_manage(pcomputer,drug_manager)
..........
del_perm_access(prescription,pharmacy)
own(patient,prescription)
del_perm_access(pharmacy,prescription)
..........
agent(kate)
agent(bob)
play(kate,patient)
play(bob,patient)
set of axioms that take into account if a role is the owner of a resource and the re-
lations between resources: stored_ in, part_ of and require. The axioms assume the
owner of a resource has the highest permission on a resource (i.e., manage) or that a
role with the manage permission on a resource can delegate any permission type on
the resource to another actor. In addition, if a role has a manage permission on an
resource which stores another resource, s/he then has the manage permission also on
the stored resource. Last, if a role has a permission on a resource, then s/he has the
same permission on each subpart of the resource. For a complete list of the axioms, we
refer the reader to (6). In the example, the Patient has delegated the access permission
to the Pharmacy on Prescription, and thus the Pharmacy has the access permission on
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Table 3.15: ASP Rules for SI* Model Instantiation
Instantiating Assets
A1 sec_ req_ instance(service_ instance(S,A, P ), SP,A, P )← sec_ req(S, SP, P ) ∧ service_ instance(S,A, P ) ∧ instance(A,P )
A2 sensitivity_ instance(service_ instance(S,A, P ), SL,A, P )← service_ instance(S,A, P ) ∧ instance(A,P ) ∧ sensitivity(S, SL, P )
A3 asset_ instance(service_ instance(S,A, P ), A, P )← sec_ req_ instance(service_ instance(S,A, P ), SP,A, P )∧
sensitivity_ instance(service_ instance(S,A, P ), SL,A, P )
Instantiating Permissions
A4 permission_ instance(A, service_ instance(S,A, P )← permission(P, S, PT ) ∧ instance(A,P ) ∧ service_ instance(S,A, P )
A1 states that if a security property holds for a service at organizational level, this property should
hold for each instance of that service. A2 associates a sensitivity level to an asset instance: the
asset instance has the same sensitivity of the asset at organizational level. A3 determines if a
service instance is an asset: a service instance is an asset if there is a security property that holds
for the service instance and the service instance has sensitivity level. A4 states that an agent
playing a role inherits the permissions that the role is granted on assets.
Prescription. Moreover, the Pharmacy has the manage permission on PComputer and
thus it has also the manage permission on Drug Info and Prescription that are stored in
PComputer. The Pharmacist and the Drug Manager are granted by Pharmacy the manage
permission on the PComputer. In addition, the Pharmacist also gains access permission
on the Prescription from the Pharmacy. Since the Drug Manager has manage permission
on the PComputer and Prescription is stored in PComputer, Drug Manager has manage
permission on Prescription.
The next step instantiates the SI* organizational model. We only report the axioms
to instantiate the elements of the SI* model that are relevant for the insider threat
identification. A complete list of the ASP rules to instantiate an SI* model can be
found in (141). In the following, we introduce the rules to instantiate assets, agents’
permissions on assets and the trust of permission relations between agents.
Instantiate Assets Each instance of an asset is identified with its sensitivity level.
The identification is based on the rules given in Table 3.15.
In the example Prescription is an asset owned by the role Patient. The Patient role
is played by the agents Bob, Kate, Jane, thus each of them owns one of the following
instances of Prescription:
• asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription,Bob,Patient), Bob, Patient),
• asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription,Kate,Patient), Kate, Patient),
• asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription,Jane,Patient), Jane, Patient).
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Instantiate Permissions on Assets This step identifies the permissions that agents
have on assets. The Pharmacy role delegates the manage permission on PComputer to
role Drug Manager. Since the Pharmacy is played by the agent Pharmacy San Raffaele,
and the Drug Manager is played by agents Ellen and Mary, Ellen and Mary are granted
the manage permission on the instance of PComputer owned by Pharmacy San Raffaele.
Instantiate Trust of Permissions relation In this step the trust of permission
relationship between agents owning assets and agents having permissions on their as-
sets are identified. This entails determining the level of trust that the owner places in
the other agent for the granted permission: the trust value can be already given or it
can be computed based on trust paths by the trust model proposed in Section 3.2.3.
For example, let us suppose that the agent Bob (playing the Patient role) wants to
determine the level of trust with which he can grant the access permission on its as-
set Prescription to Ellen (playing the Drug Manager role). Since Bob has no direct
trust relationship with Ellen we need to evaluate the trust value that Bob places in
Ellen based on the following trust chain: trust_ perm_ instance(Bob, Pharmacy Saint
Claire, asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription,Bob,Patient), Bob, Patient), ac-
cess, very good) ; trust_ perm_ instance(Pharmacy Saint Claire, Ellen,asset_ instance
(service_ instance (Prescription,Bob,Patient), Bob, Patient), access, good). Note that
Ellen has access to the instance of Prescription owned by Bob because it is stored in
the instance of PComputer owned by Pharmacy Saint Claire on which Ellen has been
granted manage permission with good trust level and having the manage implies the
access permission. Let us assume that the trust scale and the trust evaluation function
are defined as follows:
• Very Good → 1
• Good → 0.8
• Neutral → 0.6
• Bad → 0.4
• Very Bad → 0.2
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This means that values in the range [0, 0.2] are assigned the label Very Bad, the
range (0.2, 0.4] is assigned Bad, (0.4, 0.6] maps to Neutral, (0.6, 0.8] is considered Good,
and (0.8, 1] denotes Very Good.
Let us also assume that in order to compute the trust value that Bob can place
in Ellen for the access permission we use the product as the concatenator operator.
Thus, the trust level for Ellen is 1 * 0.8 = 0.8 which corresponds to label Good. Thus,
we can add to the SI* model formalization the following trust of permission relation-
ship between Bob and Ellen: trust_ perm_ instance (Bob, Ellen, asset_ instance (ser-
vice_ instance(Prescription,Bob,Patient), Bob, Patient), access, good).
For the example, we are interested in determining all the possible insiders for the
instance of Prescription asset owned by the Patient Bob. The reasoning supported by
all the previous formalization steps report the following insiders:
• threat(Dr Stefano,asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient),
Bob, Patient), confidentiality, moderate)
• threat(Dr Alex,asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient), Bob,
Patient), confidentiality, moderate)
• threat(Ellen,asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient), Bob,
Patient), confidentiality, moderate)
• threat(Mary,asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient), Bob,
Patient), confidentiality, high)
• threat(Ellen,asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient), Bob,
Patient), availability, moderate) threat(Mary, asset_ instance(service_ instance
(Prescription, Bob, Patient), Bob, Patient), availability, high)
Dr Stefano and Dr Alex are two insiders who represent a moderate threat to the confi-
dentiality of Prescription instance owned by Bob because they have been granted access
permission on the asset instance and they are trusted good for such permission by Bob.
Ellen and Mary are insiders to both the confidentiality and the availability of Prescription
asset owned by Bob because the following conditions hold:
• the asset instance is stored in the instance of PComputer owned by the Pharmacy
Saint Claire and Pharmacy San Raffaele
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• Pharmacy Saint Claire trusts good Ellen with the manage permission on the instance
of PComputer owned by the Pharmacy San Raffaele
• Pharmacy San Raffaele trusts bad Mary with the manage permission on the instance
of PComputer owned by the Pharmacy San Raffaele
• Ellen and Mary thus have the same permission on the Prescription asset owned by
the Patient Bob stored in the instances of PComputer owned by Pharmacy Saint
Claire and Pharmacy San Raffaele respectively
• having the manage permission on an asset implies to have also the access permis-
sion on an asset
• Ellen and Mary are trusted Bob good and bad with the manage permission on the
instance of Prescription owned by Bob
• manage permission is sufficient to violate the availability of a given asset while the
access permission is sufficient to violate the confidentiality of an asset.
3.2.6 Discussion
Our framework provides security engineers with a reasoning that automatically produces
a list of possible insiders for organizational assets and the risk they may represent to
the organization. The reasoning determines if an agent is an insider for an asset and the
risk the agent brings about, based on the sensitivity of the asset, the security property
specified for it, the permission assigned to the agent on the asset, and the level of trust
the asset owner places in the agent for the granted permission. Once the insider threat
is identified, further measures can be taken by the organization.
There are two scenarios in which using our approach would be beneficial. The first
scenario comprises an existing system onto which we want to analyse potential threats,
thus following a reactive approach. In this case, we can exploit the existing information
about the stakeholders (customers and employees) of the system in order to provide
an accurate SI* model, including existing trust relationships. This would yield a set
of threats that we can tackle by deploying security solutions on top of the system. In
the second scenario, which represents the primary motivation in the context of this
thesis, we apply the approach in a proactive manner when the system is in its early
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stage of development. In this case, given that we still lack information (e.g. about
concrete instances of the different roles), we can generate fake agents, services and
initial relationships automatically, and use our approach to study potential threats that
may originate from these instances. We can repeat the process several times so that
we can extract the most likely potential threats and their cause, which can yield key
information to specify new security requirements or to design new security solutions
during the early phases of the SDLC.
We are aware that our approach has some limitations. First, the validity of the
results of the reasoning strictly depends on the quality and completeness of the SI*
model, which in turn depends on the level of expertise of the requirements engineer.
However, this is not different in more traditional risk assessment processes. Second,
the visual notation of SI* might not scale well for complex application scenarios and
therefore simplifications of the notation should be explored.
We are planning to evaluate the strengths and limitations of our framework by
conducting a controlled experiment where master students and professionals apply the
framework to a real industrial application scenario.
3.3 Eliciting and Representing Trust and Reputation Re-
quirements
This section deals with the representation of trust and reputation information early
in the analysis stage. The idea is to provide requirements engineers with expressive
ways to specify how trust integrates in the system, how it affects the context of the
system, and how it is affected by such context. For this purpose, we integrate trust and
reputation notions into the Problem Frames notation, which considers the context of a
system as a first-class citizen.
First, we give an overview of Problem Frames and its extensions, and we describe
how we can formally reason about and check the consistency of the models. We also
present the application of our work to a smart grid scenario and a final discussion.
3.3.1 Problem Frames
Problem frames are a means to describe software development problems. They were
proposed by Jackson (54), who described them as follows: “A problem frame is a kind
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of pattern. It defines an intuitively identifiable problem class in terms of its context and
the characteristics of its domains, interfaces and requirement.”. It is described by a
frame diagram, which consists of domains, interfaces between them, and a requirement.
In Problem Frames, amachine represents the software to be developed, and a domain
is a part of the world we are interested in. Jackson distinguishes the domain types
CausalDomains that comply with some physical laws, LexicalDomains that are data
representations, and BiddableDomains that are usually people. Domains are connected
by interfaces that consist of shared phenomena, which may be events, operation calls,
messages and the like. Shared phenomena are observable by at least two domains, but
are controled by only one domain, indicated by an exclamation mark.
The task of the developer is to construct a machine based on the problem described
via the problem frame approach that improves the behaviour of the environment where
it is integrated, according to the requirements. Problem frames help analyzing the
problems to be solved by showing which domains have to be considered, and what
knowledge must be described and reasoned about.
Software development with problem frames proceeds as follows: first, the environ-
ment in which the machine will operate is represented by a context diagram. Like a
frame diagram, a context diagram consists of domains and interfaces, but the diagram
does not contain requirements. Domain knowledge diagrams focus on some particular
domains of the context diagram and elicit further domain knowledge about them in
terms of facts and assumptions. Then, the problem is decomposed into subproblems.
Each subproblem is represented by a problem diagram containing its domains, phe-
nomena, interfaces, and their relations to at least one requirement that expresses the
subproblem.
UML Profile for Problem Frames (UML4PF)9 is a UML profile that extends class
diagrams with stereotypes that contain the notions of problem frames (30, 49). The
next section looks further into UML4PF and explains the extensions performed in order
to add trust knowledge.
3.3.2 Trust Extensions to UML4PF
We proceed by extending UML4PF with trust and reputation concepts, as depicted in
Figure 3.6.
9http://www.uml4pf.org.
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Figure 3.6: A Trust Extension of the UML4PF Profile
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scale: String [1]
value: String [1]
format: Format
dimension: Integer
when: ClaimTemp
source: String [1]
consequence: String [1]
engineType: EngineType
<<enumeration>>
TrustRole
trustor
trustee
trustedThirdParty
witness
source
target
factor producer
<<enumeration>>
EngineType
summation
flow
belief
discrete
continuous
fuzzy
<<stereotype>>
Reputation Update Event
<<stereotype>>
Trust Update Event
(uml)
Dependency
<<stereotype>>
refersTo
<<stereotype>>
source
<<stereotype>>
considers
<<stereotype>>
Requirement
<<stereotype>>
securityRequirement
<<stereotype>>
trusts
<<stereotype>>
TrustValue
format: Format
scale: String [1]
value: String [1]
dimension: Integer
<<enumeration>>
Format
discrete
continuous
label
<<stereotype>>
Uncertainty
<<stereotype>>
Time
<<stereotype>>
Trust  Factor
value: String [1]
how: FactorMode
who: String [1]
<<stereotype>>
Objective Factor
<<stereotype>>
Subjective Factor
<<enumeration>>
FactorMode
assigned
monitored
trustDisposition: String [1]
<<enumeration>>
ClaimTemp
after interaction
any moment
<<stereotype>>
target
<<stereotype>>
constrains
The class with the stereotype machine represents the software to be developed. The
classes with some domain stereotypes, e.g., CausalDomain or BiddableDomain represent
problem domains that already exist in the application environment. The stereotype
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causalDomain indicates that the corresponding domain is a causal domain, and the
stereotype biddableDomain indicates that it is a biddable domain. Interfaces among
domains are represented as associations, and the name of the associations contains the
phenomena and the domains controlling the phenomena.
Domain Knowledge consists of Statements about domains, in particular, Facts that
we can prove and Assumptions that we consider during software development. A Re-
quirement is a specific kind of Statement about domains that shall hold after the Ma-
chine has been built. Requirements constrain at least one domain and can referTo
further domains. A securityRequirement is a statement about the confidentiality, in-
tegrity, or availability concerns of domains and complement at least one functional
requirement in this regard.
We use the profile to create context diagrams, domain knowledge diagrams, and
problem diagrams using the elements described in Section 3.3.1. Our trust extensions
for the UML4PF profile are shown in Figure 3.610 in grey, and are underpinned by the
conceptual background provided in Chapter 2.
Trust concepts are represented as stereotypes or attributes of these stereotypes.
These stereotypes are part of a domain. Entity is a domain and Human Entity is a
Biddable Domain. Trust Information and Reputation Information are Lexical Domains.
When adding trust and reputation, the goal is to build a Machine that encapsulates
the behaviour of the trust and reputation mechanics. We specify this by stating that
Computation Engines are Machines, which in turn can be Trust Engines or Reputation
Engines, depending on whether they calculate trust or reputation, respectively.
Trust Engines are in charge of calculating Trust Values for Trust Relationships
among Entit ies. These engines take Trust Factors, associated to Entity as inputs, which
may be Objective Factors or Subjective Factors. Objective factors can be assigned
explicitly or can be obtained by monitoring; in any case, they are responsibility of
an Entity playing the role Factor Producer. Computation Engines can have different
mathematical mechanics, including belief or fuzzy logics. Uncertainty estimates the
reliability/credibility of a trust, reputation or factor value, whereas Time states when
the Trust Information or Reputation Information was generated, or when Factors were
produced.
10Note that for readability purposes we simplified the profile and several elements are not illustrated,
such as display domains and assets.
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An Entity has reputation, plays a TrustRole (e.g. trustor, trustee, witness, etc),
has at least one TrustRelationship and may have several Objective Factors or Subjective
Factors. In addition, a Human Entity may have a trust disposition that states his
propensity towards higher or lower trust values.
A Trust Relationship consists of a trustor, which is the Entity placing trust, a trustee,
which is the Entity on which trust is placed, a TrustValue which is the actual value of
the relationship, and a timestamp to keep track of the temporal factor. A trust value
has a format, which represents the way the trust value is represented. It also has a
scale, a dimension stating whether it is composed of a single value or a tuple of values.
Entit ies playing the role Source can make Claims about other Entit ies with role
Target. This information is aggregated in the form of Reputation Statements, which are
used by Reputation Engines to compute reputation scores. A SourceEntity can make
Claims after an interaction or just asynchronously at any moment.
A Reputation Statement consists of an Entity playing the source role, an Entity
playing the target role, a Claim and a timestamp to keep a record of the temporal
dimension. A Claim is about some feature of the target entity, it has a scale, a format,
which represents the way the claim is represented, a dimension stating whether it con-
sists of a single value or a tuple of values. A Claim also specifies when the claim is
issued, which can be right after an interaction or at any moment.
Finally, Events are circumstances in the system that trigger a trust or reputation up-
date. These events can be visualized by dynamic diagrams, such as sequence diagrams,
and have a source that triggers it, and a consequence.
3.3.3 Formal Checking of Trust
One advantage of using UML is that it enables requirements engineers to query the
models using the Object Constraint Language (OCL). This can be useful to find prob-
able missing information. Table 3.16 lists the expressions that can be formulated in
OCL for both consistency checks and reasoning support. Consistency checks identify
mistakes prone to being made by requirements engineers, whereas reasoning support
expressions encompass issues that may require a detailed discussion among engineers.
Listing 3.1 and 3.2 show the listings of two of the OCL expressions. The interested
reader can check the work by Beckers et al. (13) for the rest of expressions.
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Listing 3.1: IDHE001. List all biddable domains that are not a human entity
1 −− L i s t a l l b iddable domains that are not a human en t i t y
2
3 l e t stereotypeMain : S t r ing =
4 ’ BiddableDomain ’
5 in
6
7 l e t
8 b iddab l e s : Set ( Class ) =
9
10 Class . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )−>s e l e c t (
11 l e t f i r s t : Set ( Stereotype ) =
12 getApp l i edSte reotypes ( )−>asSet ( )
13 in
14 f i r s t −>union ( f i r s t −>c l o s u r e (
15 gene ra l . oclAsType ( Stereotype ) ) )
16 . name−>inc l ud e s ( stereotypeMain ) )
17 in
18
19 l e t stereotypeHumanies : S t r ing = ’Human␣Entity ’ in
20
21 l e t
22 humanies : Set ( Class ) =
23
24 Class . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )−>s e l e c t (
25 l e t f i r s t : Set ( Stereotype ) =
26 getApp l i edSte reotypes ( )−>asSet ( )
27 in
28
29 f i r s t −>union ( f i r s t −>c l o s u r e (
30 gene ra l . oclAsType ( Stereotype ) ) )
31 . name−>inc l ud e s ( stereotypeHumanies ) )
32 in
33
34 b iddab l e s − humanies
Listing 3.2: CCTV001. Check that all dependencies with a trust relationship have a
dependency to a TrustValue
1 Check that a l l dependenc ies with a t r u s t s r e l a t i o n s h i p have a dependency to a
TrustValue
2
3
4 −− Check that a l l dependenc ies with a t r u s t s r e l a t i o n s h i p have a depen− dency
to a TrustValue
5
6
7 −− Get a l l dependenc ies with a t r u s t s s t e r eo type
8
9 l e t
10 s t e r eo type : S t r ing = ’ t r u s t s ’
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11 in
12
13 l e t
14 Trusts : Set (Dependency ) = Dependency . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )−>s e l e c t (
15
16 l e t f i r s t : Set ( Stereotype ) = getApp l i edSte reotypes ( )−>asSet ( )
17 in
18
19 f i r s t −>union ( f i r s t −>c l o s u r e (
20 gene ra l . oclAsType ( Stereotype ) ) )
21 . name−>inc l ud e s ( s t e r eo type ) )
22 in
23
24
25 −− Get a l l Trust Values
26
27
28 l e t stereotypeMain : S t r ing =
29 ’ Trust ␣Value ’
30 in
31
32 l e t
33 TrustValueClasses : Set ( Class ) =
34
35 Class . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )−>s e l e c t (
36 l e t f i r s t : Set ( Stereotype ) =
37 getApp l i edSte reotypes ( )−>asSet ( )
38 in
39
40 f i r s t −>union ( f i r s t −>c l o s u r e (
41 gene ra l . oclAsType ( Stereotype ) ) )
42 . name−>inc l ud e s ( stereotypeMain ) )
43 in
44
45 −− Get a l l Target Dependencies o f t r u s t va lue s
46
47 l e t stereotypeTargetOne : S t r ing = ’ t r u s t s ’ in
48
49 l e t haveTrustValues : Set (Dependency ) = TrustValueClasses−>s e l e c t (
50 c l ientDependency . t a r g e t . ge tApp l i edSte reotypes ( )
51 . name−>inc l ud e s ( stereotypeTargetOne ) )
52 . c l ientDependency . t a r g e t . oclAsType (Dependency )−>asSet ( )
53 in
54
55
56 −− Subtract t r u s t dependenc ies that have t r u s t va lue s
57
58
59 l e t notHaveTrustValues : Set (Dependency ) =
60
61 Trusts−>−(haveTrustValues )
62 in
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63
64 notHaveTrustValues−>isEmpty ( )
3.3.4 Application Example: Smart Grid
Table 3.16: OCL Expressions that support Trust-based Security Reasoning and Consis-
tency Checks
OCL-EXPR-ID
Referenced
Class
Expression Supporting Analysis Questions
Reasoning Support
IDHE001 HumanEntity
- List all biddable domains that are not a
human entity
- Are human entities missing?
IDEN001
Entity,
HumanEntity
- List all domains that are not entities or
human entities
- Are some entities or human entities not
elicited yet?
IDHE002 HumanEntity
- List all human entities that do not have a
trusts relation.
- Are trust relations of HumenEntities missing?
IDEN002 Entity
- List all entities that do not have a trusts
relation.
- Are trust relations of Entities missing?
TRTE001 TrustEngine
- List all machine domains that have a direct
relation to a TrustEngine
- Are Trust Engines missing in the model?
TRRE001
Reputatio-
nEngine
- List all TrustEngines that have a direct
relation to a ReputationEngine
- Are ReputationEngines missing in the model?
TRJE001 TrustFactor
- Check that the how attribute is set and it is
set either to "assigned" or "monitored".
- Are all the trust factors either “assigned” or
“monitored”?
TRCL001 Claims
- Check that claims have set the when attribute
to either to “after interaction” or “any moment”.
- Do all claims specify when they must be
provided.
TROF001 ObjectiveFactor
- List all trust relationships that have no
objective factors.
- Are all objective factors of the entity
considered?
TRSF001 SubjectiveFactor
- List all trust relationships that have no
subjective factors.
- Are all subjective factors of the entity
considered?
Consistency Checks
CCRS001 HumanEntity
- Check that all HumanEntities have the value
trustRole set.
- Are HumanEntities modelled correctly ?
CCRS002 Entity
- Check that all EntitiesEntities have the value
trustRole set.
- Are Entities modelled correctly ?
CCCL001 Claim
- Check that all sources of claims are a Human
Entity
- Are claims modelled correctly ?
CCCL002 Claim
- Check that all targets of claims are an Entity
or Human Entity
- Are claims modelled correctly with respect to
entities?
CCCL003 Claim - Check that all claims have targets and sources - Have claims an origin and a target ?
CCSF001 SubjectiveFactor
-Have subjective factors the who value set and
refer to a trust relationship?
- Are trust relationships modelled considered
subjective factors ?
CCTV001 TrustValue
- Check that all dependencies with a trusts
relationship have a dependency to a TrustValue
- Are trust relationships modelled completely ?
CCLTR001 Trustor, Trustee
- Check that trust relationships have a trustor
and a trustee.
- Are all trust relationships modelled correctly?
CCLTR002 TrustFactor
- Check that All classes with a stereotype trust
factor including the inheriting classes subjective
and objective factor have a dependency to a
trusts relationship or to an entity
- Are all trust factors refer to trust relationship
or to entities?
As an example of our approach, we use the Common Criteria protection profile for
the smart metering gateway (21), which defines security requirements for this element.
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The gateway is a part of the smart grid, which is a commodity network that intelligently
manages the behaviour and actions of its participants. The commodity consists of
electricity, gas, water or heat supply that is distributed via a grid or network. The
benefit of this network is envisioned to be a more economic, sustainable and secure
supply of commodities. Smart metering systems meter the production or consumption
of energy and forward the data to external entities. This data can be used for billing and
steering the energy production. We use the trust and reputation extensions of UML4PF
introduced in Section 3.3.2 in order to integrate trust and reputation requirements.
Likewise, we propose the methodology depicted in Figure 3.7 and we explain and apply
each step next.
Figure 3.7: Methodology Proposed for Engineering Trust and Reputation Requirements
into Systems
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Step 1: Establish the Context Trust relationships are only valid for a specific
context. The software engineer and the domain expert describe the context of the
software development in a context diagram. This diagram describes the machine in
its environment using domains and interfaces between them. A set of textual func-
tional requirements refers to the domains in the context diagram. Afterwards, the trust
engineer11 elicits assets and security requirements for them.
11We use the term trust engineer to refer to both a security engineer and an expert in trust models.
In some cases, these profiles may be covered by the same person. In others though, two different persons
with more specialized profiles may be required.
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Figure 3.8 shows the context diagram that describes the machine to be built in
its environment. The Machine is the SmartMeteringGateway, which serves as a bridge
between the Wide Area Network wan and the Home Area Network han of the Consumer.
The Meter is connected to the machine via a Local Metrological Network lmn. This
is an in-house equipment that can be used for energy management. The Controllable
Local System (CLS) is a device located in the consumer house and which is connected
to the smart grid system; therefore, the energy of the CLS can be controlled by the
system. Some examples include the heater, the oven or the lights over an area of the
house.
As for requirements, the Meter sends meter data to the SmartMeteringGateway,
which can store this data. The Meter can also receive updates from the AuthorizedEx-
ternalEntity forwarded via the SmartMeteringGateway. The AuthorizedExternalEntity
receives meter data in fixed intervals from the SmartMeteringGateway. The Consumer
can retrieve meter data from the SmartMeteringGateway. The Consumer can also con-
figure the SmartMeteringGateway, send commands to the CLS, receive status messages
from the SmartMeteringGateway and store user data in it.
Figure 3.8: Context Diagram for the Smart Metering Gateway
<<Machine>>
SmartMeteringGateway
<<BiddableDomain>>
AuthorizedExternalEntity
<<causalDomain>>
Meter
<<causalDomain>>
CLS
<<BiddableDomain>>
Consumer
1
<<han>>
IF_GW_U
<<lmn>>
IF_GW_M
<<wan>>
IF_GW_WAN
<<han>>
IF_GW_CLS
Step 2: Elicit Trust and Reputation Knowledge The domain expert and the
trust engineer have to work together. The former elicits trust-unaware domain knowl-
edge diagrams, whereas the latter (together with the former) provides an initial trust
domain knowledge, where the high level aspects of the trust and reputation models are
first sketched. These aspects include specifying trust entities, their trust relationships,
claims, and trust factors.
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Once the context is established, trust and reputation information must be elicited.
We show in Figure 3.9 a domain knowledge diagram focusing on the main elements of
one trust relationship between the HumanEntity Consumer and the Entity CLS. The
trust relationship has a TrustValue and there is a SubjectiveFactor associated to the
Consumer.
On the other hand, Figure 3.10 shows relevant information for reputation purposes.
Concretely, we are specifying which entities can make Claims about others, and which
objective factors are considered to yield those claims. In this example, a HumanEntity
AuthorizedExternalEntity can make Claims about the Entity CLS, and the Objective-
Factor UnplannedReparis refers to the CLS.
Figure 3.9: Domain Knowledge Diagram - Analysing the Trust Relationship Consumer-
CLS
<<Entity>>
CLS
<<HumanEntity>>
Consumer
<<SubjectiveFactor>>
ExplicitTrust
<<refersTo>> 
<<trusts>> 
<<TrustValue>>
Consumer-CLS-Trustvaule
<<refersTo>> 
Figure 3.10: Domain Knowledge Diagram - Analysing Reputation Information
<<Entity>>
CLS
<<BiddableDomain,HumanEntity>>
AuthorizedExternalEntity
<<Claim>>
AuthorizedExternalEntity-CLS
<<source>> 
<<target>> 
<<ObjectiveFactor>>
UnplannedRepairs
<<refersTo>> 
Step 3: Trust Refinement and Integration The information in the trust domain
knowledge diagrams is refined in this step by the software and trust engineers. The
final diagrams contain detailed information about trust and reputation relationship, e.g.
roles played by the entities, insight on the claims, the trust values, and objective and
subjective factors. Figure 3.11 shows the refinement of the previous domain knowledge
diagrams.
The Consumer plays a trustor role in the Consumer-CLS-Trust relationship, it uses
the subjective factor ExplicitTrust for this relationship and his trust disposition is neu-
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tral12. The ExplicitTrust subjective factor has 3 as initial value and is assigned by
the Consumer. The Consumer-CLS-Trustvalue is a unidimensional continuous value
between 0 and 5, with threshold value 3. This latter value refers to the threshold
over which we assume that a trustor trusts a trustee. The CLS plays a trustee role
in the Consumer-CLS-Trust relationship, although it also plays the target role with
regard to the AuthorizedExternalEntity-CLS claim. It presents an objective factor,
UnplannedRepairs, which is monitored (in contrast to manually assigned). The Au-
thorizedExternalEntity plays a source role because it can make claims about the CLS
after an interaction with it. Claims are about the past behaviour of the target, and are
represented by a unidimensional discrete number between 0 and 10.
In addition to refining trust and reputation information, the trust engineer and
the software engineer collaborate to analyse how the respective trust and reputation
engines integrate into the system-to-be and their relationship with the system require-
ments and the machine. Figure 3.12 depicts the interactions between the three ma-
12We consider that for this scenario, a neutral trust disposition is reasonable, whereas other scenarios
might require assuming that trust dispositions are lower or higher.
Figure 3.11: Domain Knowledge Diagram - Refinement of Trust and Reputation Infor-
mation
<<BiddableDomain,HumanEntity>>
AuthorizedExternalEntity
<<Claim>>
AuthorizedExternalEntity-CLS
about: past behaviour
scale: 0..10
format: discrete
dimension: 1
when: after interaction
<<source>> <<target>> 
<<ObjectiveFactor>>
UnplannedRepairs
description: It refers the amount of unscheduled 
maintenance activities and bug fixes of the CLS 
how: monitored
<<refersTo>> 
trustRole: Source
<<Entity>>
CLS
<<HumanEntity>>
Consumer
<<SubjectiveFactor>>
ExplicitTrust<<refersTo>> 
<<trusts>> 
Consumer-CLS-Trust 
<<TrustValue>>
Consumer-CLS-Trustvalue
<<refersTo>> 
trustRole: Trustor
subFactor: ExplicitTrust
trustDisposition: neutral
value: 3
how: assigned
who: Consumer
format: continuous
scale: 0…5
value: 3
dimension: 1
trustRole: Trustee, target
objFactor: UnplannedRepairs
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chines of the system: the SmartMeeteringGateway, the CLS-TrustEngine and the CLS-
ReputationEngine. Both computation engines yield continuous values. The trust engine
can retrieve reputation values from the reputation engine in order to compute trust val-
ues13. The SmartMeeteringGateway can retrieve trust information and act accordingly.
Figure 3.12: Problem Diagram - Describing Trust and Reputation Engines
<<Machine,Entity>>
SmartMeteringGateway
<<causalDomain,Entity>>
CLS
<<BiddableDomain,HumanEntity>>
Consumer
<<Machine,TrustEngine>>
CLS-TrustEngine
engineType: continuous
description: "The engine calculates 
a trust value for CLS."
<<Machine,ReputationEngine>>
CLS-ReputationEngine
engineType: continuous
description: "The engine calculates 
a reputation value for CLS."
<<securityRequirement>>
Preventing Data Leackage
<<considers>>
<<Requirement>>
R1
<<complements>>
<<constrains>>
<<BiddableDomain,HumanEntity>>
AuthorizedExternalEntity
<<considers>>
CLS-TE!{getReputationValue}
CLS-TE!{sendTrustValue}
SMG!{sendCLSWarning}
We consider the following functional requirement of the smart metering gateway in
our example: R1 The CLS can receive energy consumption data from the Meter. We
elicit the security requirement Prevent Data Leakage that complements the functional
requirement R1. If the value of the Consumer-CLS-Trustvalue, which is computed by
the trust engine, is above the minimum trust threshold (initially set to 3), no action shall
be taken. Otherwise, communications with the CLS should be blocked by the Smart-
MeeteringGateway. In addition, the claims issued by the AuthorizedExternalEntity (i.e.
AuthorizedExternalEntity-CLS ) are used by the reputation engine to yield a reputation
value, which is fed into the trust engine. Both the trust events and the consequences
of trust decisions can be sketched by means of dynamic diagrams, as depicted in the
example in Figure 3.13.
Step 4: Model Reasoning via OCL We use the OCL expressions in Table 3.16 in
this step. In particular, we illustrate the expression CCCL001 in detail in the following.
13This is the traditional way of relating trust and reputation: reputation is a valuable source of
information for trust computation.
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Figure 3.13: Sequence Diagram - Describing Trust and Reputation Events
<<CausalDomain, 
Entity>
CLS
<<Machine, 
Entity>
SmMeetGateway
<<Machine, 
RepEngine>>
CLS-ReputationEngine
<<Machine, 
TrustEngine>>
CLS-TrustEngine
<<TrustInfo>>
Consumer-CLS
<<ReputationInfo>>
CLS Reputation
Block CLS 
communication
Weekly Checking
<<BiddableDomain, 
HumanEntity>
AuthorizedExEntity
Claim (Negative)
Bad response
Claim
Update reputation
New reputation value
Update trust
New trust value (below threshold)
Everything starts with the AuthorizedExternalEntity performing a weekly check on an CLS. After
such interaction (which we assume is negative), the AuthorizedExternalEntity issues a negative
claim, which is forwarded by the SmartMeeteringGateway to the ReputationEngine, which uses this
claim to recompute a new reputation value. This new reputation value is sent to the TrustEngine,
which recalculates the trust value between the Consumer and the CLS, and this new trust value
(together with some other information such as the the threshold of the relationship) is sent back
to the SmartMeeteringGateway. As a result of the new trust value being lower than the threshold,
the SmartMeeteringGateway blocks the communication with the CLS, because the Consumer no
longer trusts the CLS.
The expression shown in Listing 3.3 collects all classes with the stereotype Claim
(lines 1-8) and all dependencies with the stereotype source (lines 9-15). The expression
filters the dependencies that start at a class with the stereotype Claim and end at a
class with the stereotype HumanEntity (lines 16-21). Finally, the expression subtracts
the classes with the stereotype Claim that are at the end of the previously mentioned
dependencies from all classes with the stereotype Claim (lines 22-24). In our case all
the claims originate from the human entities and the expression returns an empty set.
Otherwise we would get a list of classes for analysis.
Listing 3.3: CCL001. List all sources of claims that are not a Human Entity
1 l e t stereotypeMain : S t r ing = ’Claim ’ in
2 l e t
3 c l a imCla s s e s : Set ( Class ) =
4 Class . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )−>s e l e c t (
5 l e t f i r s t : Set ( Stereotype ) = getApp l i edSte reotypes ( )−>asSet ( ) in
6 f i r s t −>union ( f i r s t −>c l o s u r e ( g ene ra l . oclAsType (
7 Stereotype ) ) ) . name−>inc l ud e s ( stereotypeMain ) )
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8 in
9 l e t s t e r eo type : S t r ing = ’ source ’ in
10 l e t
11 Sources : Set (Dependency ) = Dependency . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )−>s e l e c t (
12 l e t f i r s t : Set ( Stereotype ) = getApp l i edSte reotypes ( )−>asSet ( ) in
13 f i r s t −>union ( f i r s t −>c l o s u r e ( g ene ra l . oclAsType (
14 Stereotype ) ) ) . name−>inc l ud e s ( s t e r eo type ) )
15 in
16 l e t s t e r eo typeSource : S t r ing = ’Claim ’ in
17 l e t s t e r eo typeTarget : S t r ing = ’Human␣Entity ’ in
18 l e t
19 DependencyClaims : Set (Dependency ) =
20 Sources−>s e l e c t ( source . ge tApp l i edSte reotypes ( ) . name −>inc l ud e s (
s t e r eo typeSource ) and ta r g e t . ge tApp l i edSte reotypes ( ) . name −>inc l ud e s (
s t e r eo typeTarget ) )
21 in
22 l e t co r r ec tC la ims : Set ( Class ) =
23 DependencyClaims . source . oclAsType ( Class )−>asSet ( ) in
24 c la imClasse s−cor rec tC la ims
We illustrate our tool support in Figure 3.14, which shows the modelling of a
UML4PF trust model. Figure 3.15 depicts an OCL expression executed on that model
and its results.
3.3.5 Discussion
The proposed methodology uses an extension over the problem frames notation in order
to accommodate trust and reputation concepts and relationships among these concepts.
Intensive context-awareness is an envisioned property of future, complex software sys-
tems, and problem frames fit well due to their focus on describing the context around
the system-to-be. Also, the context becomes of paramount importance when analysing
trust relationships and reputation information, because most of the valuable sources of
information for computing trust and reputation will come from this context.
We discussed the approach with the security practitioners in the ClouDAT project14
in a brainstorming session. We presented the methodology to practitioners in the field
of security engineering that were familiar with the Protection Profile. As a result, we
found that our methodology helped the practitioners distinguish between the concepts
of trust and reputation.
The practitioners mentioned that this structured procedure helps identify trust re-
lationships, supports the identification of reputation claims, helps not forget relevant
14http://ti.uni-due.de/ti/clouddat/en/
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entities and their attributes, and supports the creation of consistent trust and reputation
diagrams.
However, the following concerns towards our methodology were raised:
• The results of the OCL reasoning expression might lead engineers to add random
elements to achieve completeness.
• Reading the output of all expressions might be too time consuming.
• The UML profile and the methodology have to be learned beforehand.
• Our method does not integrate into common security development life cycles such
as the Microsoft SDL15.
The outcome of our methodology is a set of requirement artifacts that represent
functional requirements and trust concerns of the system. Given that these artifacts
are shaped around the problem frames approach, and that this approach encourages the
modularization of the system into domains, the artifacts provide a good starting point
for sketching the architecture of the system. In our methodology, trust and reputation
models are decomposed in their constituent elements, which provide developers with
sufficient information to implement the models and to integrate them into the system
in the next stages of the development life cycle.
15Microsoft Security Lifecycle http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/default.aspx.
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Figure 3.14: Tool-Supported Modelling of Trust-Aware UML4PF
Figure 3.15: Tool-Supported OCL Evaluation
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3.4 Designing Trust and Reputation Solutions
We provide an extension over UML called UMLTRep in order to help requirements
engineers and software designers have a clear understanding of the trust and reputation
requirements of the system, as well as a means to provide an initial specification of the
trust and reputation solutions. We choose UML because it is a de facto standard in
the industry and because other relevant security-oriented profiles exist that could be
potentially integrated with ours.
This approach can be considered complementary to the one presented in Section 3.3,
where we extended the Problem Frames notation and methodology to specify and in-
tegrate trust and reputation requirements into the system. The main difference with
the previous approach is that now we are not so concerned with the context where the
system will operate. Our focus now is on providing a description of trust and reputation
elements that allows an easy implementation in the subsequent phases of the SDLC. We
also provide now two valuable pieces of information that were missing in the Problem
Frames approach: the rationale behind using trust and reputation, that is, the decision-
making process that trust and reputation aim to assist; and an infrastructure view of
the system through deployment diagrams. This, together with the rest of information
conveyed by class diagrams, provide a holistic view of the trust and reputation models
that we want to implement.
Even when we do not extend any behavioural diagram, we consider indispensable
their use (e.g. activity diagrams) in order to show the possible trust events that can
be triggered in the application. We consider that a trust event is something that may
occur in the system so that it triggers an update of trust relationships or reputation.
These diagrams are useful to represent the dynamic aspects of trust and reputation
models, but more importantly, to make clear the glue and interaction patterns between
the trust and business layers of the application. There are three important questions
that these diagrams should answer: who, how and what? Who refers to which actor in
the system can trigger the event, whereas how indicates how the actor actually triggers
the event. The consequences of the event is the answer to what. In Section 3.4.4 we
discuss how this information can be presented in an activity diagram.
The following sections describe the extended diagrams in further detail and explain
how the profile can be used in an eHealth case study, as well as some lines for future
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research.
3.4.1 Use Case Diagram
The goal of use case diagrams in the context of trust is to depict, at a glimpse, the
trust relationships that exist between the different entities in the system. We can also
describe which entities can make a claim about which other entities, thus incorporating
reputation information in the diagram. There is however more interesting information
that we can represent in this diagram: the rationale for the trust or reputation model
and how it affects to the use cases. The extensions performed on the use case diagram
are summarized in Table 3.17.
Table 3.17: Use Case Diagram Extensions
Stereotype Base Class Explanation
Trustor Actor Entity playing the trustor role
Trustee Actor Entity playing the trustee role
Witness Actor Entity playing the witness role
Source Actor Entity capable of making a claim
Target Actor Entity capable of receiving a claim
FactorProducer Actor Entity capable of producing a factor
Trusts Connector Trust relationship
Claims Connector Source makes a claim about a Target
Decides Connector Use case affected by a trust/reputation decision
Trustor, trustee, witness, source, target and FactorProducer are roles that entities
can play in the system. Trust relationships are made explicit by means of the extension
trusts, whereas claims represent that a given source can make a claim about a given
target. As the ultimate goal of trust is aiding in making a decision, we also add the
decides connector, which captures the idea that a use case can be affected by trust or
reputation information. An entity could perform the same use case in different ways
(or even could decide not to perform it at all), and this decision can be influenced by
trust or reputation information.
In addition to the previous UML extensions, we define two adornments: decision
criteria and context. The former is used to annotate the decides relationship between
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an entity and a use case, and it specifies whether the decision is based on trust or
reputation. The latter annotates trusts and claims relationships and specifies their
context. This captures the idea that trust and reputation are context dependent.
3.4.2 Class Diagram
Class diagrams can provide more insight about certain aspects of trust and reputation.
The stereotypes used to extend class diagrams are depicted in Table 3.18. We find
the same stereotypes as in the use case diagram extension regarding the roles of the
entities. Also, we find TrustRelationship, which represent the trust relationship between
a trustor and a trustee, and Claim, which captures the notion of a claim made by
a source entity about a target entity. We add also three important notions for the
evaluation of trust and reputation, namely TrustEngine, ReputationEngine and Factor.
They represent how trust and reputation are computed, and the factors considered for
such computation.
Table 3.18: Class Diagram Extensions
Stereotype Base Class Explanation
Trustor Class Entity playing the trustor role
Trustee Class Entity playing the trustee role
Witness Class Entity playing the witness role
Source Class Entity capable of making a claim
Target Class Entity capable of receiving a claim
FactorProducer Class Entity capable of producing a factor
TrustRelationship Class Trust relationship between trustor and trustee
Claim Class Claim that a source makes about a target
TrustEngine Class Engine in charge of updating a trust relationship
ReputationEngine Class Engine in charge of computing a target’s reputation
Factor Class Factor used by a trust or reputation engine
Tagged values are used in order to define more precisely the aforementioned concepts.
The list of tagged values is shown in Table 3.19. To mention some of them, subjective
factors and objective factors refer to subjective and objective factors of trustors and
trustees. Dimension is the number of components of a trust or reputation value, and
103
3. INCORPORATING TRUST ENGINEERING IN EARLY PHASES OF
THE SDLC
how specifies whether the value of a factor is explicitly assigned (interactively) by the
entity playing the role factorProducer or is monitored by another system.
Table 3.19: Tagged Values for Class Diagrams
Value Class Explanation
type Trustor, Trustee, Witness, Source, Target The type of entity (i.e. human, system)
subFactor Trustor, trustee Subjective factors
objFactor Trustor, trustee Objective factors
context TrustRelationship, Claim Context
dimension TrustRelationship, Claim Dimension of a trust relationship or a claim
scale TrustRelationship, Claim, Factor Upper and lower bounds
default TrustRelationship Default/Bootstrapping value
format TrustRelationship, Claim Quantitative vs. qualitative
display ReputationEngine Visualization by human entities
engine Engine Type of computation engine
factors Engine List of factors used by the engine
attribute Factor Attribute(s) captured by the factor
source Factor System or entity that triggers the factor update
how Factor Assigned vs. monitored
Note that some of these tagged values could be almost directly mapped to attributes
of design classes, whether others are just informative and require further refinement. For
example, attribute represents the attribute(s) captured by a factor. This information
might be useful for aiding designers to keep in mind what the factor actually should
represent, the semantics of the factor, but could hardly be mapped directly to the
attribute of a design class.
3.4.3 Deployment Diagram
Deployment diagrams are useful as they represent the system from the infrastructure
point of view, and trust and reputation must often be considered not only at the ap-
plication level (i.e. trust among entities or among system components), but also at
the infrastructure level (104). Platforms and networks can trust each other and they
can even hold reputation values. This is particularly useful when designing large-scale
distributed systems, where a given processing node (e.g. a mobile phone or a server)
can choose among different nodes in order to collaborate or communicate information.
How trust and reputation information is derived from lower to higher level abstrac-
tion (e.g. from a system component to a system package, or from a system package to
104
3.4 Designing Trust and Reputation Solutions
a processing node) is an interesting field of research but it is out of the scope of this
section. However, we must be consistent. For example, if we specify that a node decides
to use another node due to its reputation, we must consider, in the deployment diagram
itself, where this reputation is going to be stored. This in turn may drive the design of
a new claim that the first platform (source) can make about the second one (target),
which can be further detailed in a class diagram, leading to a new design iteration.
The extensions performed on deployment diagrams are shown in Table 3.20. We
can specify which node acts as reputation manager in a centralized reputation model.
Reputation managers compute reputation, store it, and distribute it (or just publish
it) when necessary. The decides stereotype captures the decision process made by one
entity (processing node) when communicating with other processing nodes. As in the
case of use case diagrams, this stereotype can be adorned in order to make explicit
whether this decision is based on trust or reputation with decision criteria. Finally, we
also add a tagged value entities to specify the reputation of which entities the reputation
manager should store.
Table 3.20: Deployment Diagram Extensions
Stereotype Base Class Explanation
ReputationManager Node Node that acts as reputation manager
decides Connector Trust-based decision
The next section puts all the concepts discussed in this section together by applying
them to an eHealth scenario.
3.4.4 Application Example: eHealth
We present in this section how we can apply UMLTrep to a real scenario. The case study
comes from the NESSoS project16 and belongs to an eHealth scenario as described in a
project deliverable (87).
The case study presents a patient monitoring scenario, which aims to collect health-
related data independently of the location of the patient. This is useful for patients, who
can receive immediate feedback under critical situations and be assisted by physicians
at any moment and place. In order to make this scenario feasible, the patient must
16http://www.nessos-project.eu
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wear a device capable of measuring vital signs (e.g. blood pressure). This device must
be able to send this information to other systems that will show it to physicians for
monitoring purposes.
The goal is to build a web application through which the physician and the patient
can interact in a trusted way17. In this application, the physician can add and remove
a wearable device to the system, start the process to assign the device to a patient,
configure both critical and uncritical alerts, ask patient consent to use his data for
research purposes, create an advice for the patient based on the patient’s data, demand
an immediate reading from the wearable and start the process to change a patient’s
wearable. Patients can configure uncritical alerts, ask for second opinions (to other
physicians), accept or deny consent about their data being used for research, read the
physician’s advices, complete the device assignment process started by the physician
and demand a physician change. These requirements are represented by the use cases
illustrated in Figure 3.16.
Figure 3.16: Use Case Diagram
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Ensuring security in this scenario is very important. On the one hand, it is required
to ensure that data of one patient do not appear in the EHRs of other patients. Confi-
dentiality and integrity of the data, as well as integrity of the wearable is also required.
17As discussed in Section 1.1.3, we assume that basic security mechanisms (e.g. TLS/SSL for Internet
communications) are underpinning the trust and reputation solutions that we will develop.
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Yet even though there are important hard security requirements, the system must also
be trust-aware, in the sense that physicians and patients must trust the information
provided by each other.
A possible trust-aware use case diagram is shown in Figure 3.17. We state that
there is a trust relationship between the patient and the physician. The patient plays
a trustor role and the physician plays a trustee role. In addition, there is a trusts
connector, which is adorned by the context where this trust relationship is set, namely
monitoring. There is another trust relationship between the physician (who therefore
also plays a trustor role) and the wearable. The patient also plays the source role and
can therefore make claims (claims connector) about the physician, who plays in this
case the target role.
Figure 3.17: Trust-aware Use Case Diagram
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Up to now, we have defined the main entities, the trust roles they can play, and
the trust relationships and possible claims that the application considers. We also need
to include for which purpose this information is going to be used, and this is the role
of the decides connector. The patient may decide to ask another physician for second
opinion. In order to decide who this other physician is, he uses reputation information
about the physician (annotation decision criteria). Also, the physician may ask for a
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new wearable if his trust in the actual wearable falls below a certain threshold. Thus,
we are using trust and reputation to help entities make decisions at runtime.
Claims and trust relationships can be further refined in trust-aware class diagrams,
as shown in Figure 3.18, 3.19 and 3.20. Regarding the patient-physician relationship,
we specify the context of this relationship, which should be consistent with the context
in the use case diagram, the dimension and format, which are 1 and numeric in this
case, the scale, which is the interval [0, 1], and the default value, which is 0.5. Thus,
every trust relationship between a patient and a physician could be assigned by default
(i.e. during bootstrapping) the value 0.5 and could take values between 0 and 1 over the
system life. Also, we specify some information regarding the trustor and the trustee.
In this relationship, the trustor is a human entity and has a subjective factor that
influences the trust relationship: capability belief. This means that the belief that the
patient has in the capability of the physician must be considered when assessing the
trust relationship, as stated also by the trust engine that updates the trust relationship.
This engine uses a continuous engine, meaning that it will yield a continuous value by
aggregating continuous factors. The list of factors used by the engine are the reputation
of the trustee, the belief of the trustor, and the trustor’s quality feedback. In this quality
feedback, illustrated in Figure 3.20, there is a reputation engine which provides target
entities with reputation scores. The reputation engine gathers the claims that different
patients make about a given physician and computes a final reputation using an average,
which should be displayed by a 3 stars notation. In addition to the claims, time is also
used to derive this reputation score.
Figure 3.18: Patient-Physician relationship
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Figure 3.19: Data Retrieval Trust Relationship
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Figure 3.20: Quality Feedback Claim
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factors= (qualityFeedback, time),
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For every factor defined in the engine, we can define a new Factor stereotype and
specify some of the important properties of them. Figure 3.18 shows that capability
belief, assigned by the patient, should take a value in the interval [0, 1] and should
capture the attribute trustor’s capability belief. Figure 3.19 illustrates the wearable
reliability factor, which measures the reliability and precision of the wearable in a scale
of [0, 5], being the physician the one that triggers a system that monitors the factor.
Note that from the class diagrams information, especially after identifying the factors
that we need, we can go back to the use case diagram during the second iteration and
add new information as needed. The patient should have means of rating a physician
and to set the physician preferences. This last use case captures the capability belief,
as the preference list will likely be made by the patient in terms of this capability belief
about the physicians. The physician should be able to measure the wearable reliability
and update this factor, therefore he also should play the role factor producer. These
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changes are depicted in Figure 3.21.
Figure 3.21: Trust-aware Use Case Diagram (2nd Iteration)
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How the business and trust layers of the application interact may be a valuable
information for designers. This can be depicted by a behavioural diagram, such as an
activity diagram. The goal is to represent which actor can trigger a trust event and
how, and what are the consequences of that trust event. We propose using swim lanes
in order to separate the responsibilities of actors, the business logic and the trust logic
in the whole application. Figure 3.22 shows the trust event triggered as a consequence
of the patient changing its preference list of physicians, whereas Figure 3.23 depicts the
trust event triggered when the patient asks for a second opinion.
The basic deployment for this application, without considering trust information,
consists of a sensor that communicates with a wearable, which in turn, aggregates the
information and sends it to a front-end server running the application. This front-end
server will send the information to a back-end server that will store it into the patient’s
EHR and that executes a configuration application only available to administrators.
Figure 3.24 shows a trust-aware deployment diagram. The wearable device can decide,
based on the front-end server reputation, to which server to send information. The
same happens between the front-end server and the back-end server. Of course we are
110
3.4 Designing Trust and Reputation Solutions
Figure 3.22: Activity Diagram for Use Case Set Physician Preferences
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Figure 3.23: Activity Diagram for Use Case Ask for Second Opinion
Patient Business Layer Trust Layer 
See	  list	  of	  
physicians	  
Retrieve	  list	  of	  
physicians	  
Retrieve	  
physicians’	  
reputa5on	  
Show	  list	  of	  
physicians	  Choose	  physician	  
<<localPostCondition>>
{The list is ordered by physician's 
reputation}
assuming that the final deployment will consist of, at least, two front-end servers and
two back-end servers. Otherwise, a decision is not possible. We can also make explicit
on which node the reputation values for different entities in the system will be stored
(i.e. assuming a centralized reputation model). In this case, a node is reserved to play
the role of a reputation server that will store the reputation values for physicians, the
front-end servers and back-end servers.
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Figure 3.24: Trust-aware Deployment Diagram
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3.4.5 Discussion
Our goal with this work has been to bridge the gap that prevents trust from being
properly addressed during the initial phases of the SDLC. Nonetheless more work
still remains to be done. First, the profile should be further extended in order to
represent policies, credentials and trusted third parties, which constitute key concepts
of many trust management systems nowadays, as explained in Section 2.1.2. The profile
should also allow representing how trust information can be propagated between entities
in the system. Trust derivation from lower software abstractions (e.g. trust among
components) to higher level abstractions (e.g. trust among processing nodes), if possible
at all, is an interesting field that requires much further exploration. Finally, there is a
need for defining the semantics and constraints of each syntactic element. Tool support
is then required to check compliance with these constraints and to derive design patterns
and code from the specification. In this direction, how to integrate our approach with
existing frameworks (e.g. UMLsec) should be analysed.
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Chapter 4
Enabling Trust and Reputation
during Implementation
This chapter describes the requirements, the architecture and some implementation
guidelines of a trust and reputation development framework that allows software devel-
opers to implement a wide range of trust and reputation models. The framework builds
upon the concepts introduced in Chapter 2, and its goal is supporting the design and
development of trust and reputation models specified by means of the tools explained
in Chapter 3. The focus of this framework is on evaluation models (see Chapter 2), and
therefore decision models are laid aside.
From a high-level point of view, the framework is a middle-tier server that mediates
between the client application and the database tiers, as depicted in Figure 4.1. The
application requests trust and reputation information from the databases, and requests
updates on new trust and reputation information as a response of some events signalling.
The kind of Application Programming Interface (API) that the framework exposes
depends on the implementation details, and could range from remote procedure calls to a
REST- or SOAP-based API. Even though we do not provide a concrete implementation,
some implementation guidelines are outlined.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses the high-level requirements
that the framework must meet. Section 4.2 presents a high-level architecture of the
framework, which is refined into a low-level architecture in Section 4.3. Hints towards
the implementation of the framework are provided in Section 4.4, and a social cloud
application example is presented in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 discusses some
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Figure 4.1: The Framework in Context
Developer
Application Trust Framework
update
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design and implementation aspects of the framework, as well as some challenges and
lines for future research.
4.1 Framework Requirements
This section summarizes the requirements that the framework must meet. The frame-
work has to support the implementation of evaluation models. Pure evaluation models
establish trust relationships between entities, and their main goal is to compute trust
values for these relationships and to help entities decide whether to collaborate or not
with each other. Propagation models also build on trust relationships, and their primary
goal is to disseminate existing trust information in order to derive new trust relation-
ships. Reputation models compute reputation scores for entities, which must be stored
( either centrally or distributively) and entities should be able to access this information
when required.
The following list of requirements describes the coarse-grained functionality with
which the framework should provide developers:
• Entities management: entities hold trust values in other entities. The framework
must be able to give a unique identifier to each entity in the system and to retrieve
trust and/or reputation information from an entity.
• Trust relationships management: trust relationships might change over time. New
trust relationships might be created (e.g. by propagation models), other rela-
tionships might be deleted, and trust values attached to these relationships may
change. Trust relationships can be affected by reputation, but also by objective
and subjective factors of trustors and trustees.
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• Computation engines definition: computation engines are in charge of computing
a trust or reputation score, depending on the model. Although the framework
can provide some default built-in metrics implementations, it is important to let
developers define their own trust metrics, as they are the core concept in evaluation
models.
• Events definition: events that occur in the system trigger the communication
with the framework. It is required to configure the framework to respond to these
events accordingly.
• Claim management: the type and value of a claim may determine a reputation
score. It should be possible to configure claims in order to support application-
specific needs.
• Factors management: a trust metric comprises objective and subjective factors.
It is important to let developers create new factors, which can be used by user-
defined metrics.
• Trust dissemination: trust information can be propagated by means of operators
along trust chains. Developers should be empowered to define their own operators,
or to use some built-in ones.
• Time and uncertainty: these factors may play an important role when computing
a trust or reputation score. The framework should provide the developer with
mechanisms to include them as part of the computation process.
• Trust and reputation separation: the framework should allow developers to con-
sider trust and reputation as different concepts. However, given their strong
relationship, it should be possible to take each other into consideration when
computing a trust/reputation score.
4.2 High-Level Architecture
A high-level architecture of the framework is depicted in Figure 4.2. This architecture
bridges a gap between the conceptual model presented in Chapter 2 and the low-level
architecture and implementation that will be discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Its goal
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is to offer a clean separation of logic units that represent the most important concepts
related to trust and reputation.
Figure 4.2: High-Level Architecture of the Framework
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The architecture follows a layered design, where each layer uses the services provided
by the lower layer. Likewise, the framework follows a grey-box approach, where the
developer can use several functionalities in a black-box fashion as well as define new
functionalities based on his needs. Next, we describe the classes and relationships for
each of the layers.
4.2.1 Model Layer
In this layer we find the models that the developer can implement, namely reputation
models, trust models (i.e. pure evaluation models), and propagation models. Repu-
tationModel, TrustModel and PropagationModel are inherited classes from Evaluation-
Models and as such, they share a context (a string describing the context under which
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the model operates) and a list of entities that take part in the model. EvaluationModel
also provides other methods, and their functionality will be delegated to lower layer
classes, depending on the model type.
A reputation model adds a connector to an external database system to store rep-
utation scores, and it holds the type of reputation model, which might be centralized
or distributed. Moreover, this class exposes the method updateReputation, which com-
putes the reputation score and saves it in the trust database. A trust model contains a
list of trust relationships and exposes methods to retrieve and set these relationships.
Finally, a propagation model, in addition to containing a list of trust relationships, it
also contains concatenator and aggregator operators, and exposes a method to calculate
indirect relationships.
4.2.2 Relational Layer
This layer contains the basic building blocks on which the models of the upper layer
rely: entities and trust relationships.
Entities have a name, an automatically-generated identifier, a database connector
and a trust metric. The fact that each entity holds a database connector enables
distributed reputation systems, where each entity must store the reputation information
regarding another entity in a personal database. Likewise, as each entity holds a trust
metric instance, we allow each entity in the model to use a different trust metric to
compute other entities’ reputation.
Regarding trust relationships, they consist of a tuple that specify which is the entity
that places trust (trustor), the entity on which trust is placed (trustee), the extent to
which the trustor trusts the trustee (value), and the trust metric used to derive this
value.
The decision that both an entity and a trust relationship may define their metrics
supports the implementation of more advanced trust models where the final trust value
that a trustor places on a given trustee might be determined by both, the reputation of
the trustee, and the trust relationship between the trustor and the trustee.
4.2.3 Computation Layer
Evaluation models rely on trust metrics to perform trust values calculations. This is
the layer in charge of such computation.
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TrustMetric is an interface that a developer should implement to override the com-
pute() method, where the trust calculation takes place. Trust metrics use factors,
through the class Factor, which have a name and a value, as well as methods to retrieve
and set these parameters. Operators for propagation models belong also to this layer.
Note that trust metrics contain instances of factors. As entities and trust rela-
tionships hold in turn instances of trust metrics, each entity or relationship might use
different factors, increasing the flexibility of the framework to accommodate complex
models.
4.2.4 User-Defined Layer
This layer is created when users extend the computation layer to accommodate their
own definitions. Users can create new computation engines (implementations of the
TrustMetric interface) and new factors to implement a wide range of models. For
illustration purposes, the architecture includes a summation engine (that basically sums
up the factors that it contains) and a weighted summation engine (that adds a weight
to each factor). The latter requires creating a specialized factor class that adds the
weight to its internal state.
4.3 Low-Level Architecture
In the previous section, we have described the main elements and their relationships from
a logical and layered point of view. This section provides deeper insight and includes
elements that are close to the implementation of pure evaluation and reputation models.
Some considerations for the implementation of propagation models are discussed in
Section 4.6.
The low-level architecture is shown in Figure 4.3. The framework API provides
three interfaces: write event, to explicitly signal that an event has occurred, get trust
information, to retrieve trust-related information, such as the reputation of a given
entity or existing trust relationships. Additionally, the API may provide mechanisms
to configure the trust database attributes and tables.
There are three components that represent queues: the Event Queue, which stores
events, the Reputation Statement Queue, which stores reputation statements and the
Trust Statement Queue, which stores trust statements.
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Figure 4.3: Framework Architecture: Component Diagram
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The Event Handler component is in charge of reading events from the Event Queue,
creating reputation statements according to the event type and writing these events into
the Reputation Statement Queue. The Engine Dispatcher component reads reputation
statements and creates engines that perform computation on these statements, produc-
ing trust statements. The Data Manager component prevents the rest of components
from needing to know the internal details of the database schema and technology used.
It basically transforms queries and write actions into technology-dependent statements
(e.g. Structured Query Language (SQL) statements). The Trust Data Store compo-
nent represents the Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) that provides
persistence to the framework.
Figure 4.4 depicts a coarse-grained sequence diagram that describes the steps trig-
gered by an event signalled by the client application. Note that there are two architec-
tural elements that are not shown in the component diagram, but have been added here
for a clearer understanding. The Reputation Statement entity represents a reputation
statement, that is, a tuple < source, claim, target >. The other entity is Engine Fac-
tory, which is used by the Engine Dispatcher in order to create an appropriate engine
according to the reputation statement type.
The bottom part of Figure 4.4 describes the steps carried out if the target of a
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Figure 4.4: Framework Architecture: Sequence Diagram
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reputation statement is, in turn, a reputation statement. In this case, the original rep-
utation statement is retrieved from the database through the data manager component
and a new reputation statement will be written in the Reputation Statement Queue
for later processing. In a real scenario, this typically happens when a user states that
the information provided by another user (that is, a reputation statement), has been
helpful. In this case, the reputation of the reputation statement would be updated, but
the reputation of the user who provided the information could be updated as well. This
behaviour could be configured by the developer, for instance, by an optional parameter
passed as an argument.
4.3.1 Components Decomposition
The Engine Dispatcher, Event Handler and Data Manager components are decomposed
into modules in Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 respectively.
In the case of the Engine Dispatcher, the Engine Manager module uses the Reputa-
tion Statement Reader module in order to retrieve a reputation statement. It also uses
an Engine Factory, which accesses a Computation Manager in order to figure out how
to make two engines: a Reputation Engine and a Trust Engine. The manager creates a
Trust Statement and uses a Trust Statement Writer that knows to which queue to for-
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Figure 4.5: Engine Dispatcher Component
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ward a trust statement. Finally, the manager allows querying information and writing
reputation statements into queues in order to cover the case in which the target of the
reputation statement is itself a reputation statement.
Figure 4.6: Event Handler Component
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The Event Handler uses an Event Reader in order to retrieve events from an event
queue, and a Claim Factory in order to create a Claim. The factory inspects a Claim
Manager to determine which type of claim to make. The manager creates a Reputation
Statement, which uses a Claim and a Reputation Statement Writer in order to forward
a reputation statement to a queue.
As for the Data Manager, it has an API Translator module that uses the Trust
Statement Reader in order to retrieve a trust statement and translates the native API
call (e.g. Java) into a technology-dependent statement (e.g. SQL) through a database
connector. The API translator may encapsulate information in data structures (e.g
trust relationship) that will be sent back to other components or the client application.
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Figure 4.7: Data Manager Component
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4.3.2 Data Structures
Even though more modules and structures might arise in a further detailed design, there
are four data structures that are specially relevant as they encapsulate crucial informa-
tion that flow between components. If we consider them from an Object-Oriented (OO)
perspective, they could be refined as classes, which are shown in Figure 4.8. For each
of these structures, only the most important attributes and applicable functions (i.e.
methods in OO design) are shown.
The Event structure represents an event by means of a name, a context, a source of
the event, and a target of the event. Several event types can be pre-defined, but new
events can be created.
A Claim represents the assessment made by an entity. The type of event that is
triggered determines the type of claim that is made. A claim has a scale (minimum
and/or maximum boundaries) and a value, which might be numeric or qualitative. A
claim can be normalized (resp. denormalized) from its range scale (resp. interval [0, 1])
to the interval [0, 1] (resp. its range scale).
A trust metric comprises a set of subjective and objective Factors. Two typical
subjective factors are introduced in the next section, but there might be more factors
that the trust metric may require. A factor is identified by a name, a value, a source
entity and a target entity. In some situations a factor may represent a property or
aspect of an entity that is independent of any other entity (e.g. an objective factor
about an entity, such as the number of transactions that the entity has completed), and
therefore the factor will only have a target entity.
A Reputation Statement, as stated previously, contains a source, a claim and a tar-
get. Source and target are entities. In order to allow developers to take time into
122
4.3 Low-Level Architecture
account, a reputation statement holds a time stamp, which indicates when the reputa-
tion statement was made. Also, as a reputation statement is made in a context, the
latter is considered as part of the statement.
A Trust Statement (which is a new notion that has not been mentioned previously)
contains a reputation statement, a reputation value and a trust value. This structure
allows the framework to convey trust and reputation information separately, fostering
the idea that trust and reputation are two different concepts. A trust statement is the
structure that is passed onto the data manager in order to update the different database
tables.
A Trust Relationship represents the trust value that a trustor (the source Entity)
places on a trustee (the target Entity). As in the case of reputation statements, trust
relationships need to consider time and the context under which they make sense.
An Entity represents any object that can be evaluated. It has a unique name,
a type (Human, Non-Human and Reputation Statement), a reputation score and the
context under which the reputation score is assigned. A HumanEntity is an entity
which, additionally to the previous fields, also holds a rating bias and a list of beliefs,
which can be actually represented by factors.
Figure 4.8: Important Data Structures
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4.3.3 Incorporating Trustor’s Subjective Factors
When an entity rates another entity, their trust relationship may change. As explained
in Chapter 2, there are other factors that influence trust beyond reputation, such as
the trustor’s subjective properties. The framework provides developers with support to
include the following properties:
• Rating bias: this property indicates the usual disposition of an entity to high or
low ratings. If the entity has always rated others with the maximum value in the
past, the fact that now the same entity rates a new entity with a high value does
not give much information. However, it would give a lot of information if the
entity rated another entity with a low value. There are different ways to provide
built-in support for this. One way is by using standard deviation of all the claims
made by the entity over a period of time.
• Beliefs: they indicate how much an entity believes in the capability, honesty, etc.
of a target entity. This information could be directly assigned by the entity, or it
could be derived automatically from several events depending on the context. In a
social network application, for example, the number of visits to the target’s profile
or the ratings given to other entities’ claims could provide insightful information
for determining beliefs among entities. Beliefs can be represented as factors data
structures (see previous section) where the source entity holds the belief about
the target entity.
The next section provides further details on possible implementation options.
4.4 Implementation Guidelines
The framework can be deployed as a JavaEE1 application that constitutes a runtime
platform onto which to develop trust-aware applications. The hint of implementing the
framework in Java is two-fold: since Java is a quite popular development language, it
may be easier for developers to familiarize with the framework and with the mechanisms
to adapt it to their needs. Furthermore, we achieve portability, as the framework can
be executed on any platform and operating system.
1http://docs.oracle.com/javaee/7/index.html
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As an example, Figure 4.9 shows the steps that a client application would perform
in order to query trust-related information from the trust database. The client appli-
cation would need to look up an instance of the trust server from the Java Naming and
Directory Interface (JNDI) in order to invoke the query API call, implemented by EJBs
(Enterprise Java Beans) that connect to an SQL server by means of a Java Database
Connectivity (JDBC) connector.
Figure 4.9: Query API Call Sequence Diagram
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In the next sections, we elaborate on some implementation ideas for different archi-
tectural elements and concepts.
4.4.1 Context
As we mentioned in Section 2.2.3, the context is very important in the trust and rep-
utation domains. Every trust relationship and reputation score make sense in a single
context and cannot (usually) be transferred directly to another context. In order to
take into account the context, whenever an event is triggered, the developer introduces
a string that represents this context. It will then be stored together with all the rest of
trust or reputation information, as explained in the next section.
4.4.2 Database Tables
An RDBMS such as SQL can be the implementation choice in order to store persistently
all the trust-related information. The tables design is of paramount importance for the
efficiency and correct behaviour of the framework, as they may support more or less
easily the implementation of the concepts discussed above. As an example, we propose
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Table 4.1, Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. For each one, we explain the main
attributes they should hold and their meaning.
Table 4.1: Entity Table
Attribute Description
ID Unique identifier
Type Human, Non-Human or Reputation Statement
Reputation Reputation score
Context Context where this information applies
Claim Type of the claim that corresponds to this evaluation
Time Indicates when this reputation score was first created
LastTime Indicates the last time this entity’s reputation was changed
Number of evaluations Number of evaluations made on this entity
Table 4.2: Trust Relationship Table
Attribute Description
ID Unique trust relationship identifier
ID Trustor The unique identifier of the entity placing trust
ID Trustee Unique identifier of the entity onto which trust is placed
Trust value Trust value placed by the trustor on the trustee
Context Context where this trust relationship holds
Number of updates Times that the value of this relationship has changed
Time Indicates when this trust relationship was first established
Last Time Indicates when this trust relationship was last updated
Primary keys could be a made up of the ID and the Context, since the same entity
could hold different trust or reputation values for different contexts. Unique identities
could be the foreign keys used in order to relate tables among each other.
The Data Manager component must provide the interface required to set and obtain
most of this information. For this purpose, it uses a JDBC connector in order to
translate from Java method calls to SELECT, INSERT and UPDATE SQL statements.
Given that this can be complex, a suitable, more maintainable design approach would
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Table 4.3: Reputation Statement Table
Attribute Description
ID Unique identifier
Source Source entity’s ID
Target Target entity’s ID
Claim Name of the claim
Claim value The value of the claim
Context Context where the statement is applicable
Time Time when the claim was made
Table 4.4: Beliefs Table
Attribute Description
ID The unique identifier of the belief (e.g. capability, honesty, ...)
Source Source entity’s unique ID
Target Target entity’s unique ID
Value Belief value
Context Context where this belief is applicable
be to create different objects to manage each table. The API translator would be split
into a mediator object that delegates the queries to these specialized objects. Thus, one
object would not need to know how to interact with all the database tables.
Note that these tables support taking the trustor’s subjective factors into account.
In order to compute the rating bias of an entity, the Data Manager would first retrieve
all the claims made by the entity, normalize them (in order to consider different types of
claims with different scales), and then compute the average and the standard deviation.
This can be achieved by looking up the Reputation Statement table (see Table 4.3).
Another implementation choice would be using an Object-Oriented Database Man-
agement System (OODBMS), which provides higher flexibility and avoids the tedious
mapping between two representation models (i.e. from objects to relational tables), as
they allow storing objects directly. This simplifies greatly the implementation of the
Data Manager, which would basically become a direct mediator between an API call
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and the database system, without requiring the translation process. However, RDBMS
are often more efficient, above all when considering simple objects and relationships.
4.4.3 Messaging Infrastructure
The main components of the architecture communicate with each other via asyn-
chronous, optimistic queue-based messaging system, which could be implemented onto
the Java Message Service (JMS). This solution scales well in the presence of many
entities, which can continue their operations in most cases without the need to wait for
results from the framework. Whenever a new event is triggered, the client application
does not wait for a response from the server, but it continues doing other tasks. The
application knows that the trust server will eventually update the trust relationships
and reputation scores, but there is no hard time limit.
The same happens in the case of the Event Handler, Engine Dispatcher and Data
Manager components. They are listening to their specific queues. As soon as a new
piece of information arrives, they take it out from the queue, process it, and place it in
another queue for further processing. This way, the framework can adjust, on-demand,
the number of instances of the same component that is listening to a queue, providing
higher performance and scalability. This is especially true for the Data Manager, which
can receive queries and writes requests from different components: the Trust Statement
Queue, the Engine Dispatcher, the Event Handler, and even from the client application.
Therefore, many instances could be concurrently listening to queries from these sources.
4.4.4 Engines
When an Engine Dispatcher instance reads a reputation statement, it uses an Engine
Factory to create the appropriate Engine to deal with such statement. The Engine
Factory creates an engine by inspecting computation rules, which define which type of
engine to create under which circumstances. This can be implemented as an XML file
that the factory reads. This file includes a set of conditions and an effect, which states
the engine type to build. A simple example is shown in Listing 4.1:
Listing 4.1: Engine Configuration
1 <CompRule RuleId= ‘ ‘CompRule CounterUp ’ ’ Engine= ‘ ‘CounterUp ’ ’>
2 <Context>Film Review</Context>
3 <Claim>Pos i t i v e Vote</Claim>
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4 <Source>
5 <SourceType>Human</SourceType>
6 </Source>
7 <Target>
8 <TargetType>Non−Human</TargetType>
9 </Target>
10 </CompRule>
This file specifies that if the context of the reputation statement is Film Review, the
claim is Positive Vote, the type of the source of the reputation statement is Human,
and the type of the target of the reputation statement is Non-Human, then the engine
to apply is CounterUp. The Engine Factory would read the file (through another XML
reader object), compare the conditions against the reputation statement fields, and
create an instance of this type of engine.
Listing 4.2 shows how the class EngineManager would work.
Listing 4.2: Excerpt of EngineManager
1 public f ina l class EngineManager {
2
3 // . . . more s t u f f
4
5 //A Reputat ion Statement Reader in s tance s i g n a l l e d t ha t a new
repu ta t i on s ta tement has a r r i v ed .
6 public void onNewReputationStatement ( ReputationStatement r s ) {
7 Engine [ ] e = EngineFactory . getEngine ( r s ) ;
8 //e [ 0 ] ho l d s an ins tance o f the r epu ta t i on engine
9 //e [ 1 ] ho l d s an ins tance o f the t r u s t engine
10 i f ( e [ 0 ] != null ) {
11 reputa t i on = e [ 0 ] . compute ( r s ) ;
12 }
13 i f ( e [ 1 ] != null ) {
14 t r u s t = e [ 1 ] . compute ( t s ) ;
15 }
16 // tsw i s an ins tance o f a t r u s t s ta tement wr i t er , a JMS c l i e n t
17 //which a c t u a l l y knows how to send data to which queue
18 tsw . wr i t e (new TrustStatement ( rs , e [ 0 ] , e [ 1 ] ) ) ;
19 }
20 }
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4.4.5 Deployment
The decision on how deployment is done is of paramount importance when pursuing high
performance behaviour in environments with thousands of entities. There are several
choices:
• Everything on the same machine: this is the simplest deployment option. It does
not scale and does not allow for failover capabilities in case of electrical problems.
• The application server on one machine, the trust server and the RDBMS server on
other machine: an intermediate solution where the trust server can be replicated
on-demand, offering a higher scalability.
• Everything on different machines: this is the most flexible choice, although it is
more vulnerable to network and bandwidths problems.
As an example, Figure 4.10 shows the first and the third deployment options dis-
cussed above.
Figure 4.10: Two Deployment Configurations
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The next section ties together all the concepts discussed here by showing how the
framework can be applied in a social cloud scenario.
4.5 Application Example: Social Cloud
This section presents a motivating scenario that would benefit from the use of the
presented framework. We describe the scenario, its trust and reputation requirements
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and how the framework can be used in order to implement these requirements.
4.5.1 Scenario Description
The scenario that will be used as benchmark to validate our framework is the following.
A developer needs to implement a social website for cloud providers. Cloud providers
can register in the site. Once registered, they can publish web services on the site
by posting a full description of the service, including the API calls (e.g. by using Web
Service Description Language (WSDL)). Cloud providers can also look up a web service
according to their needs, and use the service in order to create a larger, composed web
service. When one cloud provider consumes a service from another provider, the latter
can charge the former according to the type or complexity of the service. Thus, the site
acts as a software market between cloud providers, following the software as a service
model. Eventually, each cloud provider will use its own infrastructure to provide the
resulting services to their customers, although this is out of the scope of the scenario.
Figure 4.11 depicts the main elements of the scenario together with trust and repu-
tation considerations that are further explained in the following section.
4.5.2 Trust Requirements
The underlying framework must enforce trust and reputation requirements in order to
prevent risks for the cloud providers and to foster trust in the site.
There are two basic reputable entities in this scenario: cloud providers and web
services. Each of them might have a reputation value that can be derived from the
personal opinions and feedbacks from other providers in the site. For example, if a
provider uses a service and notices that the service is not running appropriately, it could
rate negatively the service, which in turn could negatively affect the service provider’s
reputation.
In addition to reputation, cloud providers can establish trust relationships among
themselves. The way trust and reputation are computed depends on the models im-
plemented, and the developer of the website should be provided with mechanisms to
decide which model to use at design-time.
For a particular instance of this scenario, we focus on a small subset of possible trust
requirements:
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Figure 4.11: Social Cloud Scenario
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1. Cloud providers can rate web services with one, two or three stars. When cloud
providers rate a web service, this affects the reputation of the web service and the
trust relationship between the evaluator and the web service creator.
2. Cloud providers can rate each other by using a I like and I don’t like statement.
When cloud providers rate other providers, this affects only the trust relationship
between them, but not the reputation.
3. Reading a cloud provider profile increases the capability belief of the reader.
4. Reputation scores in the context WebServiceForOffice must be normalized to the
range [0, 1] prior to being written in the trust database, and must be denormalized
to the original range of the model prior to being sent to the application.
The next section discusses how we can implement these requirements by using the
framework.
4.5.3 Implementation
The realization of the first requirement would be as follows. As the framework updates
trust information after an event has occurred, the first step for the developer is deciding
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the name of the event. Then, he must decide the claim type that is associated to this
event. In this case, the chosen event name is WebServiceRating. Listing 4.4 shows how
a new claim type could be created.
Listing 4.3: Creating a Bounded Claim
1 //BoundedClaim i s a c laim tha t i s ( de ) norma l i zab l e accord ing to
2 //a l i n e a r t rans format ion . This c laim would be o f f e r e d by d e f a u l t .
3 public class BoundedClaim extends Claim {
4
5 int value , minimum , maximum;
6 St r ing name ;
7
8 BoundedClaim ( St r ing n , int v , int min , int max) {
9 name = n ;
10 value = v ;
11 minimum = min ;
12 maximum = max ;
13 i sNorma l i zab l e = true ;
14 }
15
16 public f loat normal ize ( ) {
17 //App l i e s a l i n e a r t rans format ion
18 // [minimum ,maximum] −> [0 , 1 ]
19 }
20 public int denormal ize ( ) {
21 //App l i e s a l i n e a r t rans format ion
22 // [ 0 , 1 ] −> [minimum ,maximum]
23 }
24 }
Then, it is required to bind the claim to the event. This can be done by configuring
an XML file as shown in Listing 4.4.
Listing 4.4: Binding Claim Type and Event
1 <EventClaim evId= ‘ ‘EV Example ’ ’ Engine= ‘ ‘CounterUp ’ ’>
2 <Event>
3 <Name>WebServiceRating </Name>
4 </Event>
5 <Claim>
6 <Name>WebServiceRating</Name>
7 <Class>BoundedClaim</Class>
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8 <Min>1<Min>
9 <Max>3<Max>
10 <Value>EVENTVALUE</Value>
11 </Claim>
12 </EventClaim>
The developer is specifying that when an event with name WebServiceRating is
triggered, a BoundedClaim object must be created with the parameters name, minimum,
maximum and value. The value parameter is given by the value parameter in the event
object.
The next step is creating the trust and reputation engines. This is done by extend-
ing the Engine abstract class and implementing the compute() method, as shown in
Listing 4.5. Note the use of Java generics2 to specify the type of the values returned by
the engines.
Listing 4.5: Implementing Trust and Reputation Engines
1 public class RepExampleEngine extends Engine<Float> {
2
3 // I t computes the t a r g e t ’ s r epu ta t i on by mu l t i p l y i n g the
4 // claim va lue by the r epu ta t i on o f the source
5 public Float compute ( ReputationStatement r s ) {
6 return r s . getClaim ( ) . getValue ( ) ∗ r s . getSource ( ) . getReputat ion
( ) ;
7 }
8 }
9
10 public class TrustExampleEngine extends Engine<Str ing> {
11
12 // I t computes the t r u s t va lue between the t r u s t o r and the t r u s t e e
by mu l t i p l y i n g
13 // the t r u s t o r ’ s b e l i e f in the t a r g e t ’ s c a p a b i l i t y by the c laim
va lue .
14 public St r ing compute ( ReputationStatement r s ) {
15 List<Factor> lb = r s . getSource ( ) . g e tB e l i e f s ( ) ;
16 f loat c apBe l i e f = r e t r i e v eFa c t o r ( lb , " c a p ab i l i t y " , t a r g e t ) ;
17 f loat aux = capBe l i e f ∗ r s . getClaim ( ) . getValue ( ) ;
18
19 i f ( aux > THRESHOLD) {
2http://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/java/generics/types.html
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20 return ’TRUSTWORTHY’ ;
21 } else {
22 return ’UNTRUSTWORTHY’ ;
23 }
24 }
25
26 private f loat r e t r i e v e ( Lis t<b e l i e f s > lb , S t r ing name , HumanEntity
t a r g e t ) {
27 //This method r e t r i e v e s the va lue o f the b e l i e f wi th name ’
name ’
28 // about an e n t i t y ’ t a r g e t ’ from the l i s t o f b e l i e f s ’ l b ’
29 }
30 }
Finally, the developer should configure the computation rules by XML, as shown in
Listing 4.7.
Listing 4.6: Configuring Engines
1 <CompRule RuleId= ‘ ‘CompRule Example ’ ’ RepEngine= ‘ ‘RepExampleEngine ’ ’
TrustEngine= ‘ ‘TrustExampleEngine ’ ’>
2 <Context>
3 <Name>any<Name>
4 </Context>
5 <Claim>
6 <Name>WebServiceRating</Name>
7 </Claim>
8 </CompRule>
The developer is specifying that, no matter which the context is, if the name of a
claim is WebServiceRating, then apply RepExampleEngine and TrustExampleEngine as
reputation and trust engines respectively. Once all this is configured, the developer only
needs to retrieve a trust server instance through JNDI and to make the corresponding
API call, where eventName should be WebServiceRating :
Listing 4.7: API Call for Sending the Event
1 public void sendEvent ( S t r ing eventName , S t r ing ctx , S t r ing source ,
S t r ing t a r g e t )
A detailed sequence diagram of this use case is depicted in Figure 4.12 and Fig-
ure 4.13. The server, upon receiving the call, creates the Event and sends it to the
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Figure 4.12: Detailed Sequence Diagram of sendEvent API Call
Client Application API Client
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sendEvent
Event Queue
Event Manager Claim Factory
Claims.XML
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Reputation 
Statement Queue
Reputation 
Statement Reader
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readEvent
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sendReputationStatement
writeReputationStatement
readReputationStatement
to DataManager...
Figure 4.13: Detailed Sequence Diagram of sendEvent API Call (cont.)
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Events Queue. From that moment, the client application can continue its execution.
An Event Manager instance is asynchronously notified by an Event Reader that a new
Event is available for processing, and it creates a Claim according to the rules specified
in the XML file. The Event Manager also retrieves the complete information about
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the entities using a Data Manager instance, and with all this information it creates a
Reputation Statement, which is sent to the Reputation Statement Writer, which in turn
writes it in the Reputation Statement Queue.
The Engine Manager is asynchronously notified by a Reputation Statement Reader
instance that a new Reputation Statement is in the queue ready for processing, and it
creates an Engine using the computation rules codified in the XML file. The values
returned by the reputation and trust engines are encapsulated in a Trust Statement
instance by the Engine Manager, and sent to a Trust Statement Writer instance, which
writes it into the Trust Statement Queue.
Finally, the Data Manager is notified by a Trust Statement Reader instance upon the
arrival of the new Trust Statement. Using the JDBC connector, it translates the Trust
Statement into the appropriate INSERT/UPDATE statements in the Entity, Reputation
Statement and Trust Relationship tables.
An instantiation of this use case could be as follows. Let us assume that a cloud
provider CP1 rates the web service created by another provider CP2 with 3 stars. The
resulting tables after this event occurs are shown in Table 4.5, Table 4.6 and Table 4.7.
Table 4.5: Entity Table Example
Attribute CP1 WebService RepStatement
ID CP1-ID CP2-WebService0123 RepStatementCP1-CP2
Type Human Non-Human RepStatement
Reputation 0,7 2,1 -
Context WebServiceRatingCtx WebServiceRatingCtx WebServiceRatingCtx
Claim AnotherClaim BoundedClaim -
Time 10-05-Mon25Sep2012 14-30-Tue05Dec2011 -
LastTime 10-05-Mon25Sep2012 09-24-Wed24Jan2012 -
Number of eval-
uations
1 5 0
The second requirement is similar to the previous one, therefore the steps are also
similar. However, there are two major differences. The first one is that the value of the
new claim is set to null (there is no value in a I Like or I don’t Like statement) and
therefore it is not possible to normalize it. The second one is that the reputation engine
is set to null in the computation rules XML file, since no reputation update is required.
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Table 4.6: Trust Relationship Table Example
Attribute CP1 - CP2
ID CP1-CP2-RelID
ID Trustor CP1-ID
ID Trustee CP2-ID
Trust value TRUSTWORTHY
Context WebServiceRatingCtx
Number of evaluations 1
Time 09-24-Wed24Jan2012
Last Time 09-24-Wed24Jan2012
Table 4.7: Reputation Statement Table Example
Attribute RepStatement
ID RepStatementCP1-CP2
Source CP1
Target CP2-WebService0123
Claim BoundedClaim
Claim value 3
Context WebServiceRating
Time 09-24-Wed24Jan2012
The developer, upon detecting that a cloud provider has rated another provider, would
call the sendEvent call with the new event name provided by himself.
Regarding the third requirement, updating trust-related information (such as beliefs,
or other types of factors) does not require the developer to trigger an event, but only to
use the API call that requests the Data Manager to update this information. Therefore,
upon detecting that a cloud provider has seen other provider’s profile, it would perform
a call similar to the following:
Listing 4.8: Changing a Belief
1 public void changeBe l i e f ( S t r ing beliefName , S t r ing ctx , S t r ing
source , S t r ing target , f loat i n c r ea seVa lue )
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As for the last requirement, the framework should offer hot spots or hooks in order
to provide developers with extension points for application-specific needs. The methods
of an abstract class InfoFilter can play this role, as depicted in Listing 4.9.
Listing 4.9: Framework Hooks
1 abstract class I n f o F i l t e r {
2
3 //This method i s c a l l e d r i g h t b e f o r e an engine r e c e i v e s a
r epu ta t i on s ta tement
4 public ReputationStatement beforeComputation ( ReputationStatement
r s ) ;
5
6 //This method i s c a l l e d r i g h t a f t e r an engine computes a t r u s t
s ta tement
7 public TrustStatement afterComputation ( TrustStatement t s ) ;
8
9 //This method i s c a l l e d r i g h t a f t e r r e t r i e v i n g some t r u s t
in format ion
10 //and r i g h t b e f o r e sending t h i s in format ion to the c l i e n t
a p p l i c a t i o n
11 public RepValue a f t e rR e t r i e v a l (RepValue rv ) ;
Developers need to extend this class and implement the methods according to their
needs. In the case of the last requirement, a reputation score in the context WebSer-
viceForOffice must be normalized in the range [0, 1], and denormalized to the original
range prior to being sent back to the application. Therefore, the developer would need
to place the normalization code in the afterComputation() method, and denormalization
code in the afterRetrieval() method.
4.6 Discussion
We have presented a trust framework that assists developers to implement applications
that need to take into account trust and reputation requirements. This kind of appli-
cations are steadily emerging, responding to an increasing demand of users eager to
participate in collaborative environments. We have seen this trend with the success of
blogs and social networks.
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In spite of their importance, trust and reputation are often discussed in the literature
from a theoretical perspective: hundreds of trust and reputation models can be found,
but few works address them from a more pragmatic point of view. Moreover, the con-
cepts of trust and reputation are often mixed up, which prevents security engineers from
designing coherent models where trust and reputation support each other. We believe
that counting on this kind of solutions can greatly simplify the task of implementing
successful applications that users can trust and are willing to use.
We are aware that learning a framework may be a daunting task. For this reason, we
have tried to keep a simple, event-based design. We advocate that the work of learning
a new framework can significantly pay off over the burden of hard-coding trust and
reputation solutions from scratch every time, in addition to enabling the maintainability
of the whole system (34).
There are several issues that require further attention. Up to now, the framework
design does not support the implementation of propagation models. Therefore, no
trust information can be transferred between entities. For enabling the implementation
of these models, it is first required to add algorithms that generate trust chains (i.e.
graphs) from the trust relationships stored by the trust server. The developer can define
rules to transfer trust between the entities following the trust paths. These rules can
be implemented by extending base classes, namely Concatenator and Aggregator, and
by implementing their abstract method compute(). The output of the method would be
new trust values, which in turn represent new trust relationships between entities that
had no prior direct encounters.
A relevant, challenging research question arises: Is the trust framework actually
improving the security of the application or improving the decision-making processes?
In systems including trust and reputation models, there are usually human users behind
the decision-making processes and trust/reputation dynamics. Users usually provide
feedback after certain operations and trigger events that update trust relationships
and reputation values. It would be interesting to research how the notions of trust
and reputation can be effectively tailored for system components and physical devices,
without any kind of human interaction. In this direction, we should decide under which
terms a system component can trust another component. Even more interestingly, we
could ask ourselves whether trust and reputation information can be used to make
reconfiguration decisions on the system architecture, or whether system developers can
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be provided with usable tools to achieve this. Next chapter addresses these research
challenges.
141
4. ENABLING TRUST AND REPUTATION DURING
IMPLEMENTATION
142
Chapter 5
Enabling Trust and Reputation at
Runtime
Preceding chapters discuss how to model and implement trust-aware systems, focus-
ing on design-time solutions. However, two important changes are coming to the
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) world that requires looking beyond
design time. On the one hand, the service-oriented vision enables on-the-fly improve-
ments upon the functionality available to users. Applications are more dynamic and
call for rapid adaptation strategies in order to meet new requirements and to respond
to their changing environment. On the other hand, the boundaries between physical
and virtual worlds are vanishing with the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT),
where sensors and actuators are embedded in daily life objects and are linked through
networks capable of producing vast amount of data. The aforementioned reasons blur
boundaries between design and runtime (41) as they prevent designers from envisioning
all possible circumstances that might appear during the execution of an application.
Models@run.time is a model-driven approach that supports the runtime adapta-
tion of distributed, heterogeneous systems. It allows working with abstractions and
self-adaptive software in order to cope with unforeseeable changes. However, frame-
works that accommodate this paradigm have limited support to address security con-
cerns, hindering their usage in real scenarios. We address this challenge by enhancing
models@run.time with the notions of trust and reputation, leading to what we call
trust@run.time.
In this chapter, we take a step ahead and discuss how we can build systems that
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make reconfiguration decisions at runtime based on trust relationships and reputation
values. With this goal in mind, we present a trust and reputation framework that is
integrated into a distributed component-model that implements the models@run.time
paradigm, thus allowing the system to include trust in their reasoning process. The
framework is illustrated in a chat application by implementing several state-of-the-art
trust and reputation models. We show that the framework entails negligible computa-
tional overhead and that it requires a minimal amount of work for developers.
The chapter is structured as follows. An introduction to a models@run.time platform
called Kevoree is given in Section 5.1, whereas Section 5.2 presents the framework and
some details of its implementation. Section 5.3 presents our approach for allowing
trust- and reputation-based reconfigurations of the system. An example scenario that
illustrates the use of the framework in a chat application is described in Section 5.4.
Section 5.5 yields experimental results as for the overhead and the amount of work that
the development of such application requires. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes the chapter
by presenting research challenges that were identified during the implementation of the
framework.
5.1 Kevoree: A Models@run.time Development Platform
Traditionally, the Model-Driven Software Development area has primarily focused on
using models at design, implementation and deployment phases of the SDLC. However,
as systems become more adaptable, reconfigurable and self-managing, they are also
more prone to failures, which demands putting in place appropriate mechanisms for
continuous design and runtime validation and monitoring. Models@run.time (16) aims
to tame the complexity of dynamic adaptations by keeping an abstract model of the
running system, pushing the idea of reflection one step further. The abstract model
is synchronized with the actual system and every change performed on the model is
automatically accommodated by the system.
Kevoree1 is an open-source dynamic component model that relies onmodels@run.time
to properly support the design and dynamic adaptation of distributed systems (36). Six
concepts constitute the basis of the Kevoree component metamodel. A node is an ab-
straction of a device on which system components can be deployed, whereas a group
1http://kevoree.org
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defines a set of nodes that shares the same representation of the reflecting architec-
tural model. A port represents an operation that a component provides or requires.
A binding represents the communication between a port and a channel, which allows
the communication among components. The core library of Kevoree implements these
concepts for several platforms such as Java, Android or Arduino. Figure 5.1 depicts a
snapshot of the aforementioned concepts in the Kevoree Editor, which allows building
systems in a visual environment.
Figure 5.1: Kevoree Architectural Elements
Component ChannelGroup
Binding Provided port Required port
Node
Kevoree adopts the models@run.time paradigm and it boils down the reconfiguration
process to moving from one configuration, represented by the current model, to another
configuration represented by a target model, as shown in Figure 5.2. First, the target
model is checked and validated to ensure a well-formed system configuration. Then,
the target model is compared with the current one and this comparison generates an
adaptation model that contains a set of abstract primitives that allows the transition
from the former to the latter. Finally, the adaptation engine instantiates the primitives
to the current platform (e.g. Java) and executes them. If an action fails, the adaptation
engine roll backs the configuration to ensure consistency between the models@run.time
layer and the running system.
Building an application with Kevoree entails two steps. First, developers create
business components through the framework provided by the Kevoree platform. Second,
components are deployed on nodes and wired together through bindings and channels.
Next sections explain these steps in further detail.
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Figure 5.2: Adaptation Process
5.1.1 Kevoree Development Framework
The framework is based on annotations. Components that run on the Kevoree runtime
are created by annotating them with ComponentType2.
Components can have parameters, which are attributes that are mapped to the
reflection layer and can be changed at runtime via Kevscript, a scripting language
provided by Kevoree, or via the visual editor. Additionally, components provide and
require services through their ports.
Listing 5.1 defines a Console component with one required port, one provided port
and one parameter. The parameter (lines 4-5) determines the appearance of the console
frame and can be changed easily at any time both from the editor and with Kevscript.
The required port (lines 7-8) allows sending text to other consoles, whereas the provided
port (lines 10-14) allows receiving text from other consoles and showing it to the user.
Listing 5.1: Definition of Console in Kevoree
1 @ComponentType
2 public class Console {
3
4 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = " true " )
5 protected Boolean showInTab = true ;
6
7 @Output
8 protected Port textEntered ;
9
2In the same way, there are annotations to create new channels (ChannelType) and nodes (Node-
Type). For the purpose of this chapter, however, we only need to create new components.
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10 @Input
11 public void showText ( Object t ex t )
12 {
13 //Show rec e i v ed t e x t
14 }
15 }
The services offered by the Kevoree runtime can be accessed by components through
services injected at runtime. Requesting these services entail adding an attribute of
the correspondent service type, and annotate such attribute with @KevoreeInject. For
example, by using the ModelService type, developers gain access to the system model
and can query it programmatically. Listing 5.2 shows how to find the name of all
component instances of a given component type componentType running in a node with
name nodeName3.
Listing 5.2: Querying the model@runtime layer
1 stat ic List<Str ing> getComponentInstanceName ( ContainerRoot model ,
S t r ing componentType , S t r ing nodeName)
2 {
3 List<Str ing> components = new ArrayList<Str ing >() ;
4 for ( ContainerNode node : model . getNodes ( ) ) {
5 i f ( node . getName ( ) . equa l s (nodeName) ) {
6 for ( ComponentInstance component : node . getComponents ( ) ) {
7 i f ( component . ge tTypeDe f in i t i on ( ) . getName ( ) . equa l s (
componentType ) ) {
8 components . add ( component . getName ( ) ) ;
9 }
10 }
11 }
12 }
13 return components ;
14 }
First, a list of the existing nodes in the model is retrieved (line 4), and for each
of these nodes, we check its name with the searched name. If they are equal, all the
components running on the node are retrieved (lines 5-6). For each component, if
3Kevoree elements can also be queried using the Kevoree Modeling Framework (http://kevoree.
org/kmf/), which provides a less verbose and more efficient query language.
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the name of the component type matches the searched one, the instance name of the
component is added to the result list (lines 7-8), which is finally returned (line 13).
5.1.2 Deployment in Kevoree
Once business components are developed, they can be deployed in nodes and connected
through ports. This deployment phase can be realised through the Kevoree editor or
by Kevscript.
The editor provides a set of basic, built-in libraries (e.g. nodes, basic components
and channels) and allows loading custom libraries (i.e. custom business components,
customized nodes, channels, etc). It provides drag and drop functionality and a visual
representation of the system architecture, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. The models can
be converted to Kevscript instructions, being possible to save the model as a .kevs file
containing these instructions.
As the complexity of the system increases, the editor may end up overloaded with
too much information. In these cases, it is possible to deploy the system by manually
specifying Kevscript instructions. Figure 5.4 shows an excerpt of this scripting lan-
guage. In this example, a Java node is added and started, and a component of type
CentralReputationAwareConsole is deployed on this node and started. The component
parameters showInTab, trustContext and group are set.
Kevoree platform does not support reasoning about security concerns, therefore any
architectural element such as a node or a software component can join the system
without further checks. Also, there is no cross-cutting criteria to guide the runtime
changes. Our goal is to provide components with trust and reputation capabilities,
which in turn can guide some reconfiguration decisions.
5.2 Integrating Trust and Reputation in Models@Run.time
In this section we explain how we integrate the notions of trust and reputation into the
Kevoree component model described in Section 5.1. Developers can use this framework
in order to build trust and reputation models for self-adaptive systems. Trust and
reputation information that these models generate can be used to make reconfiguration
decisions, as further discussed in Section 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Kevoree editor with three nodes
Three components are deployed in node0 and two in node1 and node2. Components communicate
through channels (orange circles) that bind their ports. Parameters can be set for each component
(bottom-right grey dialog).
Figure 5.4: Kevscript Instructions
The framework consists of an API for developers with some base components that
can be extended, some methods that can be overridden, and configuration files. The rest
of this section describes the most important aspects of the framework implementation
and its integration in the Kevoree component model.
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5.2.1 Trust and Reputation Metamodels
We use the Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF)4 to create metamodels for trust and
reputation. These metamodels gather a set of concepts and relationships among these
concepts that abstract away from the particularities of different trust models, in such
a way that different metamodels instantiations yield different models. Figures 5.5 and
5.6 show the trust and reputation metamodels, respectively.
Figure 5.5: Trust Metamodel
The trust metamodel includes the concept of TrustRelationship, which is a tuple
of a Trustor, Trustee and TrustValue. Trustors use Metrics to evaluate their trust in
Trustees. Metrics use a set of Factors, which in turn have a FactorValue. Different trust
models are created by instantiating the entities that play the trustor and trustee roles,
the factors that are considered and the way these factors are combined in a metric.
The core concept of a reputation metamodel is a ReputationStatement, which is a
tuple containing a Source entity, a Target entity and a Claim, which has a ClaimValue.
A ReputationMetric is used in order to aggregate Claims. Reputation models are created
by instantiating the entities that play the source and target roles, the way claims are
generated and their type, and the way the metric combines the claims.
Note that these metamodels gather many of the concepts explained in Section 2.2.3.
In both metamodels, other important concepts from the conceptual framework are in-
4http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/
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Figure 5.6: Reputation Metamodel
cluded as attributes, like Context and Time. Other concepts from the conceptual frame-
work that are not presented explicitly in the metamodel are included implicitly in the
implementation. For example, factors can be objective and subjective, but the differ-
ence is only made at the implementation level with methods available to entities, such
as addSubjectiveFactor. Engines are concrete implementations of Metrics.
Another example concerns centralized and distributed reputation models. As we will
see in the next section, centralized reputation models include entities that must send
their claims to a component that stores them and which compute reputation, whereas
distributed reputation models comprise entities that store their own claims and which
compute reputation themselves. In summary, metamodels provide a basic skeleton of
relevant concepts, which are enriched during implementation to accommodate more
concepts discussed in the conceptual model.
From these metamodels, the EMF generates code that constitutes an API to man-
age these metamodels. This code does not need to be visible to developers, who can
be oblivious about how trust models are instantiated and managed internally by the
framework. We use this code as an internal API that acts as an interface between
the trust and reputation components offered to developers and the underlying trust or
reputation model.
The following sections describe the trust and reputation components, respectively,
that constitute the framework.
151
5. ENABLING TRUST AND REPUTATION AT RUNTIME
5.2.2 Trust Framework
This section describes how the trust part of the framework is implemented. As men-
tioned earlier, this implementation is hidden from developers, as they do not need to
know the implementation details in order to use the framework.
One of the main components in the trust framework is TrustEntity, which describes
an entity capable of participating in a trust relationship. That is, each business compo-
nent that we want to include in the trust dynamics must inherit from this component.
Listing 5.3 shows an excerpt of the implementation.
Listing 5.3: TrustEntity Component
1 @ComponentType
2 public class TrustEntity<T, F>
3 {
4 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = "both" )
5 private St r ing r o l e ;
6
7 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = "MyContext" )
8 private St r ing trustContext ;
9
10 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = "MyGroup" )
11 private St r ing group ;
12
13 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = "0" )
14 private St r ing bootstrappingTrustValue ;
15
16 @Param
17 private St r ing sub j e c t i v eFac to r sF i l ePa th ;
18
19 @Output
20 private Port requestTrustUpdate ;
21
22 @Output
23 private Port i n i tT ru s tRe l a t i o n sh i p s ;
24
25 @Output
26 private Port addFactor ;
27
28 @KevoreeInject
29 private Context context ;
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30
31 private St r ing uid ;
32
33 @Start
34 protected f ina l void s t a r t ( )
35 {
36 uid = context . getInstanceName ( ) + "@" + context . getNodeName
( ) ;
37 i n i t i a l i z eT r u s tR e l a t i o n s h i p s ( ) ;
38 s t o r eSub j e c t i v eFac t o r s ( ) ;
39 }
40 }
We use Java generics5 in order to allow developers to set the types for the trust
values and the factor values, respectively. We define several parameters. The role
parameter states whether the entity plays a trustor role, a trustee role, or both roles.
The entity can also specify a trust context where its relationships are framed. Entities
can belong to groups and their relationships are to be initialized according to the value
of bootstrappingTrustValue parameter. The last parameter denotes the name of a file
containing subjective factors information during initialization.
A trust entity requires services in order to update a trust relationship through the
port requestTrustUpdate, to initialize its trust relationships through initTrustRelation-
ships, and to add factors through addFactor. In the start() method, which will be called
by the Kevoree framework at start-up, a unique identifier for the component is gener-
ated by the context service of Kevoree, which provides some basic context information
such as the name of the instance and the node where the instance is running. Then,
a request to initialize trust relationships is sent to a TrustManager component, and
finally subjective factors are stored in the model.
Subjective factors are initialized by means of a file that the developer can configure
for each trust entity. The format of the file is:
FactorName FactorValue <TargetEntity>
The last parameter is optional and denotes the entity to which the subjective factor
applies. For instance, if an entity A thinks that another entity B is competent, the file
with A’s subjective factors would include:
5http://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/java/generics/
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PerceivedCompetence High B
The most important methods offered by this component are changeSubjectiveFac-
tor(), requestTrustUpdate(), and trustRelationshipUpdated(). The former allows trust
entities to increment or decrement an existing subjective factor or to create a new one.
The second one requests an update of a trust relationships with a trustee, and the latter
is called by the framework when the update is done. Clients can invoke the first two
methods and can override the last one in order to make business-level decisions based
on trust values. By default, when the client calls requestTrustUpdate(), reconfigura-
tion of the system might occur, although developers can inhibit this reconfiguration by
invoking an overloaded version of the method. Trust entities also can access recently
computed trust values through the method getLastTrustValue(), which acts like a cache,
saving network resources.
As mentioned above, trust relationships are initialized in the method initializeTrustRe-
lationships(), which is depicted in Listing 5.4. This method calls the static method get-
TrusteesInstanceName(), provided by the GetHelper class, which is a utility class that
allows querying and retrieving information from the reflection layer. We consider that
an entity is trustee with respect to another entity if it plays the role trustee and it has
the same context as the latter. Once we have all the trustees of the entity, we create a
trust relationship structure with the context of the relationship, the trustor, the trustee,
the initial value of the relationship and a time stamp, and send this structure to the
TrustModel component. These two components, the TrustEntity and TrustModel, will
be eventually connected through their ports during the deployment phase, as explained
in Section 5.1.
Listing 5.4: Trust Entities Initialization
1 HashMap<Str ing , L i s t<Str ing>> trusteesAndNodes = GetHelper .
getTrusteesInstanceName ( model . getCurrentModel ( ) . getModel ( ) ,
trustContext , trustorInstanceName ) ;
2
3 t r u s t e e s = new ArrayList<Str ing >() ;
4
5 //For every node in the model . . .
6 for ( S t r ing nodeName : trusteesAndNodes . keySet ( ) ) {
7 // . . . g e t the l i s t o f t r u s t e e s running on t ha t node
8 for ( S t r ing compName : trusteesAndNodes . get (nodeName) ) {
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9 //The uid o f a component i s o f the form :
compInstance@nodeWhereRunning
10 t r u s t e e s . add (compName + "@" + nodeName) ;
11 }
12 }
13
14 for ( S t r ing t r u s t e e : t r u s t e e s )
15 {
16 long t s = Calendar . g e t In s tance ( ) . getTime ( ) . getTime ( ) ;
17 Trus tRe la t i on In fo t r i = new Trus tRe la t i on In fo ( trustContext , uid ,
t ru s t e e , bootstrappingTrustValue , t s ) ;
18 i n i tT ru s tRe l a t i o n sh i p s . send ( t r i ) ;
19 }
The TrustModel component manages the trust metamodel and is in charge of com-
puting trust values. Listing 5.5 shows how the component adds the trust relationship
to the metamodel, for which the EMF API (see Section 5.2.1) is used.
Listing 5.5: Adding Trust Relationships with the EMF API
1 private void addTrustRelat ionsh ip ( S t r ing context , S t r ing idTrustor ,
S t r ing idTrustee , S t r ing i n i t i a lVa l u e , long timeStamp )
2 {
3
4 Trustee t r u s t e e = trustModel . f indTrusteesByID ( idTrustee ) ;
5 i f ( t r u s t e e == null )
6 {
7 t r u s t e e = fa c t o ry . c r ea t eTrus t e e ( ) ;
8 t r u s t e e . s e t IdTrus t ee ( idTrustee ) ;
9 trustModel . addTrustees ( t r u s t e e ) ;
10 }
11
12 //Creat ion o f the r e s t o f t r u s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s e lements
13 }
Clients of TrustModel can invoke several methods in order to retrieve factor infor-
mation, and can override two methods, compute() and computeThreshold(). This is
illustrated in Listing 5.6. Retrieving factor values is essential in order to implement the
trust engines, which need these values to compute trust. Trust engines are implemented
by overriding the compute() method, and optionally, the computeThreshold() method.
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The last important component of the trust framework is the FactorProducer6. This
type of entity adds objective factors about other entities by using low-level platform
services that provide information about the components and their communications.
This is a key component to QoS-based trust models, as it allows the model to easily
take into account information about the response times, number of failures, uptime
percentage of services, and so on.
Listing 5.6: TrustModel Component
1 protected f ina l St r ing getFactorValue ( S t r ing context , S t r ing name ,
S t r ing uidTarget )
2 {
3 for ( Factor f : trustModel . ge tFactor s ( ) )
4 {
5 i f ( context . equa l s ( f . getContext ( ) ) && name . equa l s ( f . getName ( ) )
&& uidTarget . equa l s ( f . get IdTarget ( ) ) )
6 {
7 return f . getValue ( ) . getValue ( ) ;
8 }
9 }
10 return null ;
11 }
12
13 public T compute ( St r ing context , S t r ing idTrustee , S t r ing idTrustor )
14 {
15 return null ;
16 }
17
18 protected T computeThreshold ( S t r ing context , S t r ing idTrustee ,
S t r ing idTrustor )
19 {
20 return null ;
21 }
Clients of this component must set the instance identifier of the target entity and
override the method doEvaluation(). This component can work in two ways: by assign-
ing a value at initialization time, and by monitoring the target at a regular interval that
developers can also specify in another parameter. The value returned by the method is
6In the scope of this dissertation, we are interested in the social notions of trust and reputation,
therefore the chosen models in Section 5.4 do not use this component.
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automatically included as a factor in the method, and engines can retrieve the factor
during the computation.
The next section revises the most important implementation details of the reputation
framework.
5.2.3 Reputation Framework
The reputation framework allows the implementation of centralized and distributed
reputation models by means of CentralReputableEntity and DistReputableEntity com-
ponents, respectively. The former requires the communication with a ReputationMan-
ager component in order to send to it the claims and retrieve reputation information,
whereas the latter requires a ReputationEngine that will be in charge of computing
reputation for the component.
An excerpt of the CentralReputableEntity implementation is presented in Listing 5.7.
Again, reputation takes place in a trust context, and entities may belong to a group and
need a unique identifier uid. These entities also require a port through which to send
their claims and request reputation information. Two important methods offered to
clients are makeClaim() and requestReputation(), which allow sending claims to and
retrieving reputation information from the ReputationManager. Another important
method that client code can override is reputationReceived(), as depicted in Listing 5.7.
This method is called by the framework when a new reputation value of an entity is
computed. When a reputation update is requested, the default behaviour is reconfig-
uring the system in case it is required, although the client can explicitly disable the
reconfiguration by setting the corresponding parameter to false. CentralReputableEn-
tity also caches the last computed reputation values in order to provide fast access,
through the method getLastReputation(), to the reputation of an entity with which it
interacted in the past.
Listing 5.7: CentralReputableEntity Component
1 @ComponentType
2 public class CentralReputableEntity<T> implements IClaimSource {
3
4 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = "MyContext" )
5 private St r ing trustContext ;
6
7 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = "MyGroup" )
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8 private St r ing group ;
9
10 @Output
11 private Port sendClaim ;
12
13 @Output
14 private Port requestReputat ion ;
15
16 private St r ing uid ;
17
18 protected void reputat ionRece ived ( St r ing target , T newVal ) { }
19 }
The other important component of a centralized reputation model is the Reputa-
tionManager, which interacts with the reputation metamodel and offers methods to
retrieve claims information. It also provides the method compute(), which clients must
implement for their reputation engines. An excerpt of the implementation is depicted
in Listing 5.8. As an example, the method getClaimValues() retrieve the values of all
the claims that are issued in a specific context, with a specific name and for a concrete
target entity. Clients can inherit from this class and override the method compute().
Listing 5.8: ReputationManager Component
1 @ComponentType
2 public class ReputationManager<T> implements IComputationEngine
3 {
4 // . . .
5
6 protected f ina l List<Str ing> getClaimsValues ( S t r ing context ,
S t r ing name , S t r ing t a r g e t ) {
7 Lis t<Str ing> c la ims = new ArrayList<Str ing >() ;
8 for ( ReputationStatement r s : repRoot . getStatements ( ) )
9 {
10 i f ( r s . getContext ( ) . equa l s ( context ) && rs . getTarget ( ) .
get IdTarget ( ) . equa l s ( t a r g e t ) )
11 {
12 for ( Claim cla im : r s . getClaim ( ) )
13 {
14 i f ( c la im . getName ( ) . equa l s (name) )
15 {
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16 c la ims . add ( c la im . getClaimValue ( ) . getValue ( )
) ;
17 }
18 }
19 }
20 }
21 return c la ims ;
22 }
23
24 public T compute ( S t r ing context , S t r ing idTarget , S t r ing
idSource )
25 {
26 return null ;
27 }
28
29 // . . .
30 }
The other type of reputation model, namely distributed reputation models, are
built around two components: DistReputableEntity and ReputationEngine. The former
represents an entity capable of issuing claims (such as CentralReputableEntity), but
which is responsible to store its own claims and to send them to other entities that may
request them. The latter is a reputation engine that belongs to a distributed entity. A
reputation engine is bound to an entity at start-up, as illustrated in Listing 5.9. As
in the case of the CentralReputableEntity, this component provides several methods to
issue claims and to request reputation updates. Clients can also override methods to
react when a new reputation value arrives.
Listing 5.9: DistReputableEntity Component and Reputation Engine Initialization
1 public class DistReputableEntity<T> implements IClaimSource {
2
3 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = "MyContext" )
4 private St r ing trustContext ;
5
6 @Param( de fau l tVa lue = "MyValue" )
7 private St r ing group ;
8
9 @KevoreeInject
10 private Context ctx ;
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11
12 @Output
13 private Port requestCla im ;
14
15 private St r ing uid ;
16 private ReputationEngine<T> reputat ionEngine ;
17
18 @Start
19 public void s t a r t ( ReputationEngine repEngine )
20 {
21 uid = ctx . getInstanceName ( ) + "@" + ctx . getNodeName ( ) ;
22 reputat ionEngine = repEngine ;
23
24 // . . .
25
26 }
27
28 // . . .
29 }
Listing 5.10: ReputationEngine Class
1 protected f ina l List<ReputationStatementInfo> getClaimsFromSource (
S t r ing name , S t r ing idSource )
2 {
3 List<ReputationStatementInfo> c la ims=new ArrayList ( ) ;
4 for ( Reputat ionStatementInfo c In f o : reputat ionStatements )
5 {
6 i f ( name . equa l s ( c In f o . getClaim ( ) . getName ( ) ) && cIn f o .
getSource ( ) . equa l s ( idSource ) )
7 {
8 c la ims . add ( c In f o ) ;
9 }
10 }
11 return c la ims ;
12 }
Clients using ReputationEngine must implement the method compute() and can
gain access to the claims in the system by methods like the one shown in Listing 5.10,
which retrieves all the claims made by an entity about a particular subject, represented
by the name of the claim. In order to have access to all the claims, the entities send
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them all to their engines right before the computation.
Next section discusses how the framework provides trust-based self-adaptation.
5.3 Trust-based Self-Adaptation
The interesting advantage of implementing the framework on top of a self-adaptive
platform is that developers can use trust and reputation information to change the
system at runtime. Regardless of the implemented model, the output of the model (i.e.
the trust or reputation value) can be used to make reconfiguration decisions.
5.3.1 Policy-based Reconfiguration
The framework supports this reconfiguration process by means of policies in the form of
simple rules. In the case of reputation-based reconfiguration, rules are in the following
form:
ComponentType BooleanCondition Action Arguments
where ComponentType is the type of the component for which the reputation is to be
used in the BooleanCondition. If it is true, then Action is executed with the required
Arguments. Trust-based reconfiguration rules are similar:
ComponentType ComponentType BooleanCondition|“threshold” Action Arguments
where the first ComponentType is the type of the trustor and the second one is the type
of the trustee. Either the trust value is compared according to the BooleanCondition or
the model threshold is used to determine whether the Action should be executed with
the required Arguments.
The actions currently implemented in the framework are remove and substitute. The
former does not require arguments and tells the runtime system to remove the compo-
nent if the boolean condition is met. The latter requires at least one argument, which
is another component type, and tells the system to substitute the current component
for another component of the new type if the condition is fulfilled.
Let us illustrate with a couple of examples. Consider the following reputation-based
reconfiguration policy file:
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CentralReputationAwareConsole <1 substitute FilteredCentralReputationAwareConsole
FilteredCentralReputationAwareConsole <0 remove
This policy is specifying the following: “if the reputation of any instance of type
CentralReputationAwareConsole is less than 1, then substitute it for another component
instance of type FilteredCentralReputationAwareConsole. Likewise, if the reputation of
any instance of type FilteredCentralReputationAwareConsole is less than 0, then remove
it”.
Consider now the following trust-based reconfiguration policy file:
TrustAwareConsole TrustAwareConsole threshold substitute TrustAwareConsole
TrustAwareConsole TrustAwareConsole <0 remove
The policy is specifying the following: “if a trustor of type TrustAwareConsole does
not trust a trustee of type TrustAwareConsole over a threshold (defined by the model),
then substitute the trustee for a new component of type TrustAwareConsole. Like-
wise, if the trust that a trustor of type TrustAwareConsole places in a trustee of type
TrustAwareConsole is less than 0, then remove the trustee”.
In addition to the new component type, the substitute action can have an undefined
number of parameters that represent attributes of the new instances and their values.
If no parameters are found, it is assumed that new instances should replicate the same
values of the attributes of the instances removed.
As an example, consider the following:
Console <1 substitute FilteredConsole group A
FilteredConsole >5 substitute Console
This policy is specifying the following: “if the reputation of any instance of type
Console is less than 1, then substitute it for another component instance of type Fil-
teredConsole and set its parameter group to the value A. Likewise, if the reputation of
any instance of type FilteredConsole is more than 5, then substitute it for a component
instance of type Console and set all the parameters that have the same name to the
same values that the previous instance had”.
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5.3.2 Implementation
In this section, we explain some details of the implementation. The main class is
ScriptEngine, which encapsulates the actions and generates the Kevscript instructions.
The reputation framework provides the class ReputationRulesEngine, which processes
the policy file and calls the script engine to generate the adaptation script. Likewise,
the trust framework uses the class TrustRulesEngine for the same purpose. Listing 5.11
shows the initialization of DistReputableEntity. Note that instances of ScriptEngine and
ReputationRulesEngine are created, and that the former is passed as an argument to the
latter, together with the name of the policy file (RepRules.policy by default). The listing
also shows an internal method of the framework which calls the compute() method of
the reputation engine and which determines whether the user wants to reconfigure the
system, in which case the method executeRules() of the ReputationRulesEngine class is
called. In turn, this method reads the file and executes, via the instance of ScriptEngine,
the rules for which the boolean conditions are met.
Listing 5.11: Reconfiguration Rules Processing
1 @ComponentType
2 public class DistReputableEntity<T> implements IClaimSource {
3
4 @Start
5 public void s t a r t ( ReputationEngine repEngine , S t r ing f i leName )
6 {
7 se = new Scr iptEng ine ( model ) ;
8 r r e = new ReputationRulesEngine ( f i leName , se ) ;
9 }
10
11 private void computeReputation ( St r ing idTarget , boolean
r e con f i gu r e , L i s t<ReputationStatementInfo> r s I n f o )
12 {
13 T r e s = reputat ionEngine . compute ( model , trustContext ,
idTarget , uid , r s In f o , this ) ;
14
15 i f ( r e c on f i g u r e )
16 {
17 r r e . executeRules ( model , idTarget , r e s . t oS t r i ng ( ) ) ;
18 }
19
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20 // . . .
21 }
22 }
As an example of how ScriptEngine executes Kevscript instructions, Listing 5.12
shows the implementation of the action remove. Once the name of the instance in
the reflection layer is obtained (by trimming the node name where it is executing), the
script is executed by means of the ModelService variable model, which allows submitting
scripts as a String and checking the results in a callback.
Listing 5.12: ScriptEngine: Remove Component
1 private void removeComponent ( S t r ing idComponent )
2 {
3 Str ingToken ize r s t = new Str ingToken ize r ( idComponent , "@" ) ;
4 S t r ing in s t anc e = s t . nextToken ( ) ;
5 S t r ing node = s t . nextToken ( ) ;
6
7 St r ing s c r i p t = "remove␣" + node + " . " + in s t ance ;
8 model . submitScr ipt ( s c r i p t , new UpdateCallback ( ) {
9 @Override
10 public void run ( Boolean app l i ed ) {
11 // check i f a pp l i e d = true
12 }
13 }) ;
14 }
Substituting a component entails more work, as a new component must be created
and must be ensured that it will be able to continue its communication with the rest
of components. Given that the code is much longer, we simply enumerate the steps
required for this action7:
1. Obtain information (if necessary) about the attributes of the instance to be re-
moved.
2. Obtain information about the bindings and channels of the component to be
removed.
7The interested reader can check the Javadoc and source code in https://www.nics.uma.es/
development/trust-and-reputation-framework-modelsruntime
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3. Remove component.
4. Create new instance name of the type specified in the policy file.
5. Add the component and link it to the channels via new bindings.
6. Add new attributes (which could be the same as the attributes of the just removed
instance).
5.4 Application Example: A Trust-Aware Distributed Chat
In this section, we explain how we can implement several well-known trust and reputa-
tion models. First, we provide a brief description of each model followed by high-level
steps required to implement them. We also show the most relevant code for each model8.
The chosen scenario is a distributed chat application, because it is a simple scenario
that allows illustrating the use of trust and reputation models easily. The mechanics are
similar for every model: a console receives a message from another console and inspects
the contents of the message. Depending on these contents (e.g. if it detects a swear
word), it provides a stimuli to the trust or reputation model. This stimuli may come in
the form of claims or changes in factors, as it will be illustrated in each model.
5.4.1 eBay Model
In the eBay reputation model, after a transaction finishes, both the seller and the buyer
can rate each other by a positive (−1), neutral (0) or negative feedback (1). The
reputation for an individual is then calculated by summing up the distinct ratings for
such individual (108). The model is centralized, in such a way that all the feedbacks
are sent to a central system that computes the reputation, and each user can query and
see this reputation in the form of an html page.
This model is mapped to our example in the following way. Once a console receives
a message from another console, it looks for offensive words contained in the message,
which are previously configured by the user. If any offensive word is included, then
a negative feedback about the sender is issued (−1); otherwise, a positive feedback is
submitted (1).
8We omit some error checking and boiler plate code for the sake of better understandability.
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The implementation of this model in the framework requires the following coarse-
grained steps:
• Consoles must inherit from CentralReputableEntity,
• Consoles invoke the method makeClaim with the appropriate value upon receiving
a message.
• Reputation engine inherits from ReputationManager and overrides the method
compute().
Further details are provided in Listing 5.13. In the former, a console component
inheriting from a central reputable entity is created. The generic type is instantiated
to Integer because that is the format in which we want to represent the reputation
value. Then, upon receiving a message through the input port showText, it retrieves
the identity of the sender and the text itself (provided by the console or by the mid-
dleware itself), and if any offensive word is found, it issues a negative claim with name
CleanWords; otherwise, it issues a positive one. The message is temporarily stored in
lastMessageReceived (if there are no offensive words) and an update of the reputation
of the sender is requested, which will call the reputation engine. In turn, the reputa-
tion engine will automatically call the method reputationReceived() with the identity
of the entity and the new reputation value, and we could perform additional checks to
determine whether the console should print the message or not.
Listing 5.13: Console in the Ebay Reputation Model
1 @ComponentType
2 public class CentralReputationAwareConsole extends
CentralReputableEntity<Integer> {
3
4 // I t s t o r e s the l a s t message r e c e i v e
5 private St r ing lastMessageRece ived ;
6
7 @Input
8 public void showText ( Object t ex t )
9 {
10 i f ( t ex t != null ) {
11 St r ing msg = text . t oS t r i ng ( ) ;
12 Str ingToken ize r s t = new Str ingToken ize r ( msg , " . " ) ;
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13 St r ing idTarget = s t . nextToken ( ) ;
14 St r ing message = s t . nextToken ( ) ;
15 i f ( badWordsInMessage ( message ) )
16 {
17 lastMessageRece ived = "" ;
18 makeClaim ( "CleanWords" , "−1" , idTarget ) ;
19 }
20 else
21 {
22 lastMessageRece ived = message ;
23 makeClaim ( "CleanWords" , "1" , idTarget ) ;
24 }
25 requestReputat ion ( idTarget ) ;
26 }
27 }
28
29 @Override
30 public void reputat ionRece ived ( St r ing target , I n t eg e r newVal )
31 {
32 //We cou ld check i f the r epu ta t i on i s above a g iven t h r e s h o l d
p r i o r to showing the message
33 th i sConso l e . appendIncomming ( "−>" + lastMessageRece ived ) ;
34 }
35
36 }
The reputation model, depicted in Listing 5.14, implements the Ebay reputation
engine. First, it retrieves all the claims named CleanWords about the target idTarget.
If there are no claims about the target, then a default value is returned, otherwise, the
reputation value is computed by summing up all the claim values.
Listing 5.14: Ebay Reputation Engine
1 @ComponentType
2 public f ina l class EBayReputationModel extends ReputationManager<
Integer> {
3
4 @Override
5 public I n t eg e r compute ( S t r ing context , S t r ing idTarget , S t r ing
idSource ) {
6
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7 List<Str ing> c la ims = getClaimsValues ( context , "CleanWords"
, idTarget ) ;
8 int r e s = 0 ;
9 i f ( c la ims != null )
10 {
11 //By d e f a u l t r epu ta t i on
12 i f ( c la ims . s i z e ( ) == 0 )
13 {
14 return 1 ; // I n i t i a l r epu ta t i on
15 }
16 for ( S t r ing c : c la ims )
17 {
18 r e s += Int eg e r . valueOf ( c ) ;
19 }
20 }
21 return r e s ;
22 }
23 }
5.4.2 Marsh’s Trust Model
Marsh was one of the first authors that formalised trust in a computational setting (75).
His model considers the following factors:
• Utility (Ux): this factor measures the utility that entities would obtain from a
successful collaboration.
• Basic trust or trust disposition (Tx): this subjective factor indicates what is the
attitude of an entity towards higher or lower values of trust.
• Importance (Ix): this subjective factor indicates how important a situation is for
an entity.
• Perceived Competence: this subjective factor states how competent the trustor
thinks that the trustee is for the task in play.
• Perceived Risk: this subjective factor denotes how risky the entity thinks the
situation is.
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• General trust (Tx(y)): this refers to the trust that the trustor places in the trustee
as a consequence of the history of interactions.
The model uses the aforementioned factors to calculate the so-called situational
trust, which according to the author is the most important when considering trust in
cooperative situations. In particular, situational trust is defined as:
Tx(y, α) = Ux(α)× Ix(α)× T̂x(y)
where x is the trustor, y is the trustee, and α is the situation9. Marsh also models what
he calls a cooperation threshold :
CTx(α) =
PerceivedRiskx(α)
PerceivedCompetencex(y, α) + T̂x(y)
× Ix(α)
The model states that an agent engages in a collaboration with another agent if the
situational trust is greater than the cooperation threshold. In order to implement the
model in the framework, the following steps must be performed:
• Consoles inherit from TrustEntity.
• Consoles add their subjective factors.
• Consoles change their factors in response to the received messages.
• Trust engines inherit from TrustModel and overrides the methods compute() and
computeThreshold().
In order to initialize their subjective factors, we create a simple text file with a list
of factor value < target >, where factor represents the factor name, value denotes
the value of the factor and target, which is an optional parameter, the name of the
component instance to which the factor refers. An example of this file for one of the
consoles in Marsh’s is illustrated in Table 5.1. The name of this file is assigned in
Kevscript or from the editor for each console. Right after the trust relationships of the
console have been initialized, the file is read and the factors are stored.
Listing 5.15 shows the console implementation. First, it inherits from TrustEntity,
the generics of which are instantiated to String and Float, because this is the format
9The situation for Marsh is what we call context.
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Table 5.1: Trust Factors for Marsh’s Model
Factor Value Target
utility 1.0 -
trustDisposition 0.8 -
importance 0.4 -
perceivedRisk 0.2 -
perceivedCompetence 0.9 console234@node0
we are computing the trust values and the trust factors, respectively. When a console
receives a new message and after retrieving metadata (e.g. sender, which is the trustee
of the relationship), it stores the message and looks for offensive words in the text.
If any offensive word is found, it invokes the method changeSubjectiveFactor(). The
arguments tell that the factor perceivedCompetence that refers to the trustee entity
should be decreased by 0.1, and in case this factor does not exist, it should be initialized
to 0.510. Finally, the console requests a trust update about its trustee.
When the trust update is completed by the trust engine, the method trustRelation-
shipUpdated() is called, which indicates the trustee to which it refers, and a list with
two potential values. The first value represents the actual new trust value, whereas the
second value is the threshold value11. Depending on their relationship, the message is
finally printed or not.
Listing 5.15: Console in Marsh Trust Model
1 @ComponentType
2 public class TrustAwareConsole extends TrustEntity<Str ing , Float>
3
4 // . . .
5
6 @Input
7 public void showText ( Object t ex t )
8 {
9 i f ( t ex t != null ) {
10 St r ing msg = text . t oS t r i ng ( ) ;
10The factor may not exist if a reconfiguration has taken place and a new component has been added
for which there is not such factor.
11We say potentially because not all trust models include a trust threshold computation and there-
fore, in that case, it would be up to the developer to hard-code a reasonable threshold.
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11 Str ingToken ize r s t = new Str ingToken ize r ( msg , " . " ) ;
12 St r ing t r u s t e e = s t . nextToken ( ) ;
13 St r ing group = s t . nextToken ( ) ;
14 St r ing message = s t . nextToken ( ) ;
15 lastMessageRece ived . put ( t ru s t e e , message ) ;
16
17 i f ( badWordsInMessage ( message ) )
18 {
19 changeSubject iveFactor ( "perceivedCompetence " , −0.1 f ,
0 . 5 f , t r u s t e e ) ;
20 }
21 requestTrustUpdate ( t r u s t e e ) ;
22 }
23 }
24
25 @Override
26 protected void t rustRe lat ionsh ipUpdated ( f ina l St r ing t ru s t e e ,
L i s t<Str ing> newVal ) {
27
28 f loat t rustVa lue = Float . valueOf ( newVal . get (0 ) ) ;
29 f loat th r e sho ld = Float . valueOf ( newVal . get (1 ) ) ;
30
31 i f ( t rustVa lue >= thre sho ld )
32 {
33 th i sConso l e . appendIncomming ( lastMessageRece ived . get (
t r u s t e e ) ) ;
34 }
35 }
36 }
The trust engine is shown in Listing 5.16. First, it inherits from TrustModel and
instantiates the generics to String and Float, which again are the formats of the trust
values and trust factors. Developers must implement the methods compute() and in-
crementFactor() and can implement the method computeThreshold(). The former com-
putes a trust value from the trust factors as discussed earlier in the description of the
model. The second method determines how an increment/decrement should be per-
formed depending on the concrete generics instantiation. The latter allows computing
a threshold from the trust factors as discussed earlier in the description of the model.
Listing 5.16 shows an excerpt of the implementation, in particular the compute() and
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the incrementFactor() methods.
Listing 5.16: Trust Engine for Marsh’s Model
1 @ComponentType
2 public class MarshModel extends TrustModel<Str ing , Float>
3 {
4 @Override
5 public St r ing compute ( S t r ing context , S t r ing idTrustee , S t r ing
idTrustor )
6 {
7 f loat u t i l i t y = Float . valueOf ( getFactorValue ( context , "
u t i l i t y " , idTrustor ) ) ;
8 f loat importance = Float . valueOf ( getFactorValue ( context , "
importance " , idTrustor ) ) ;
9 S t r ing gene ra lTrus tS t r ing = getFactorValue ( context , "
genera lTrust " , idTrustor , idTrustee ) ;
10 f loat genera lTrust = Float . valueOf ( getFactorValue ( context ,
" genera lTrust " , idTrustor , idTrustee ) ) ;
11
12 f loat s i t u a t i o na lT ru s t = u t i l i t y ∗ importance ∗
13 genera lTrust ;
14
15 return St r ing . valueOf ( s i t u a t i o n a lT ru s t ) ;
16 }
17
18 // . . . Compute t h r e s ho l d in a s im i l a r way . . .
19
20 @Override
21 protected St r ing incrementFactor ( S t r ing currentValue , S t r ing
increment ) {
22 return St r ing . valueOf ( Float . valueOf ( currentValue ) + Float
. valueOf ( increment ) ) ;
23 }
24 }
5.4.3 PeerTrust
Xiong and Liu (137) propose PeerTrust, a distributed reputation model oriented towards
Peer-to-Peer scenarios. This model, as in the case of most reputation models, builds a
reputation score upon feedbacks that peers yield after their collaboration. In addition
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to the feedbacks, the model proposes using the following factors:
• Number of transactions that a peer has had with another peer.
• Credibility of the feedback; feedbacks from more trustworthy peers should weight
more in the calculation.
• Transaction context, which refers to metadata about the context where the trans-
action or collaboration is taking place.
• Community context, which relates to incentives for providing feedbacks.
The general trust metric is the following:
T (u) = α ·
I(u)∑
i=1
S(u, i) · Cr(p(u, i)) · TF (u, i) + β · CF (u)
where I(u) is the total number of transactions that peer u had with the rest of peers,
p(u, i) denotes the other participating peer in peer u’s ith transaction, S(u, i) is the
satisfaction peer u receives from p(u, i), Cr(v) denotes the credibility of the feedback
submitted by v, TF (u, i) is the transaction context factor for u’s ith transaction, and
CF (u) denotes the community context factor for peer u. α and β are weights for the
collective evaluation and the community context factor.
In our example, we identify each transaction with a message sent and received by two
communicating consoles. We lay the community context aside (i.e. β = 0) and focus
entirely on the collective evaluation (i.e. α = 1). The authors of the model provide
hints about how to calculate the credibility and the context factor. In particular, the
credibility can be calculated using the following formula:
Cr(u) =
T (p(u, i))
I(u)∑
i=1
T (p(u, i))
which uses the ratio between the current reputation of the peer that sent the feedback
and the total reputation of all peers that previously had a collaboration with u.
Regarding the context factor, the authors mention that a time-stamp of the trans-
action can be used in order to give more relevance to more recent transactions. One
way to model this is by the following formula:
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TF (u, i) =
TS(u, i)
CurrentT ime
where TS(u, i) is the time when the ith transaction took place.
Once we have this, we can implement the model in the framework following these
high-level steps:
• Consoles must inherit from DistReputableEntity,
• Consoles invoke the method makeClaim upon receiving a message.
• Reputation engine inherits from ReputationEngine and overrides the method com-
pute.
• Console is assigned the reputation engine created.
The console code is similar to the one shown in Listing 5.13. The difference is
that in this case we are dealing with a distributed reputation model, therefore consoles
must inherit from DistKevReputableEntity and each console is responsible to compute
reputation values, instead of delegating this task to a reputation manager. Thus, in the
start method of the console, we need to specify which reputation engine the console will
use, as depicted in Listing 5.17.
Listing 5.17: Binding Reputation Engine and Console
1 @ComponentType
2 public class DistReputationAwareConsole extends
DistKevReputableEntity<Float>
3
4 @Start
5 public void s t a r tConso l e ( )
6 {
7 super . s t a r t ( new PeerTrustModel ( ) ) ;
8
9 //More conso le−s p e c i f i c i n i t i a l i z a t i o n s t u f f
10 }
11 }
The code for the reputation engine is illustrated in Listing 5.18, which implements
the formula described earlier for PeerTrust. Note that the method calculateTotalRepu-
tation() is not part of the framework, but a way to modularize the compute method.
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Listing 5.18: Reputation Engine for PeerTrust
1 public class PeerTrustModel extends ReputationEngine<Float>
2 {
3 @Override
4 public Float compute ( S t r ing context , S t r ing idTarget , S t r ing
idSource )
5 {
6 List<ReputationStatementInfo> al lStatementsAboutTarget =
getClaimsAboutTarget ( "CleanWords" , idTarget ) ;
7 f loat to ta lReputat ion = ca l cu la t eTota lReputa t i on ( idTarget ) ;
8 double currentTime = (double ) Calendar . g e t In s tance ( ) . getTime
( ) . getTime ( ) ;
9 f loat targetReputat ion = 0 .0 f ;
10 for ( Reputat ionStatementInfo r s : a l lStatementsAboutTarget )
11 {
12 St r ing source = r s . getSource ( ) ;
13 f loat sourceReputat ion = Float . valueOf (
getLastReputat ion ( source ) ) ;
14 f loat c r e d i b i l i t y = sourceReputat ion / tota lReputat ion ;
15 targetReputat ion += Float . valueOf ( r s . getClaim ( ) .
getValue ( ) ) ∗ c r e d i b i l i t y ∗ Double . valueOf ( r s .
getTimeStamp ( ) ) / currentTime ;
16 }
17 return targetReputat ion ;
18 }
19
20 private f loat ca l cu la t eTota lReputa t i on ( St r ing idTarget )
21 {
22 List<ReputationStatementInfo> al lStatementsAboutTarget =
getClaimsAboutTarget ( "CleanWords" , idTarget ) ;
23 Set<Str ing> con s i d e r e dEn t i t i e s = new HashSet ( ) ;
24 f loat tota lRep = 0 .0 f ;
25 for ( Reputat ionStatementInfo r s : a l lStatementsAboutTarget )
26 {
27 St r ing sourceEnt i ty = r s . getSource ( ) ;
28 St r ing sourceReputat ionStr ing = getLastReputat ion (
sourceEnt i ty ) ;
29 f loat sourceReputat ion = Float . valueOf (
getLastReputat ion ( sourceEnt i ty ) ) ;
30 c on s i d e r edEn t i t i e s . add ( sourceEnt i ty ) ;
31 tota lRep += sourceReputat ion ;
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32 }
33 f loat targetReputat ion = Float . valueOf ( getLastReputat ion (
idTarget ) ) ;
34 tota lRep += targetReputat ion ;
35 return tota lRep ;
36 }
37 }
5.4.4 REGRET
REGRET (114) is a trust model that considers three reputation values, one for each
considered dimension: an individual dimension, a social dimension and an ontological
dimension. The three reputation values are calculated from a set of impressions gathered
by the entities. These impressions are about a subject and a target, and map to what
we call claims.
The individual dimension calculates a so-called subjective reputation value by using
impressions of an agent about another target agent, as follows:
Ra→b(subject) =
∑
ρ(t, ti) ·Wi
where a is the source entity, b is the target entity, Wi is the claim value in the range
[−1, 1], and ρ is a function that gives recent impressions a higher weight.
For the social dimension, the model considers that agents belong to groups, de-
noted by A, B, etc, and calculates the reputation at the group level, considering the
impressions about each agent of the group. In particular, the model considers:
Ra→B(subject) =
∑
bi∈Bw ·Ra→bi(subject)
RA→b(subject) =
∑
ai∈Aw ·Rai→b(subject)
RA→B(subject) =
∑
ai∈Aw ·Rai→B(subject)
where w are weights that must sum up 1. The final reputation value consists of a
weighted sum of all the previous values.
The model also considers an ontological dimension, where a subject (or context)
might be decomposed into other subjects, which allows generalizing a reputation value
for a new subject from weighting the contributing existing subjects.
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In order to implement this model in our framework, we make some slight simplifi-
cations. The most important one is that we do not consider the ontological dimension,
because contexts relationships are not supported in the framework. Also, in order to
simplify calculations and show a clearer code, we assume a uniform distribution of
weights across impressions and we do not consider reliability of the reputation values.
The coarse-grained steps we must follow for the implementation of this model are
the following:
• Inheriting from DistKevReputableEntity, invoking the method makeClaim upon
receiving a message, which simulates the impressions.
• Set the group to which each entity belongs.
• The reputation engine must retrieve the impressions of all entities to compute the
different reputation values, and the groups to which each entity belongs.
The code for the console is the same as the one depicted in Listing 5.17, except
that we need to bind the console to another reputation engine in the start method.
The reputation engine simply implements the formula described previously, as shown
in Listing 5.19.
Listing 5.19: Reputation Engine for REGRET
1 public class RegretReputationModel extends ReputationEngine<Float>
2 {
3 @Override
4 public Float compute ( S t r ing context , S t r ing idTarget , S t r ing
idSource ) {
5
6 //1) Ca l cu l a t e s u b j e c t i v e r epu ta t i on
7 List<ReputationStatementInfo> c la ims = getClaims ( "
CleanWords" , idSource , idTarget ) ;
8 f loat sub j e c t i veReputa t i on = 0 .0 f ;
9 f loat to ta lC la ims = c la ims . s i z e ( ) ;
10 double currentTime = (double ) Calendar . g e t In s tance ( ) . getTime
( ) . getTime ( ) ;
11 for ( Reputat ionStatementInfo r s : c la ims )
12 {
13 f loat claimVal = Float . valueOf ( r s . getClaim ( ) . getValue ( )
) ;
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14 double claimTimeStamp = (double ) r s . getTimeStamp ( ) ;
15 sub j ec t i veReputa t i on += ( claimVal / to ta lC la ims ) ∗ (
claimTimeStamp / currentTime ) ;
16 }
17
18 //2) Now, r e t r i e v e a l l the c la ims t ha t idSource made about
any e n t i t y in the same group as idTarge t
19 St r ing groupTarget = getParam ( idTarget , "group" ) ;
20 Lis t<ReputationStatementInfo> targetGroupClaims =
getClaimsFromSource ( "CleanWords" , idSource ) ;
21 f loat targetGroupReputation = 0 .0 f ;
22 currentTime = Calendar . g e t In s tance ( ) . getTime ( ) . getTime ( ) ;
23 for ( Reputat ionStatementInfo r s : targetGroupClaims )
24 {
25 //We don ’ t want to cons ider c la ims about the t a r g e t
i t s e l f
26 i f ( ! idTarget . equa l s ( r s . getTarget ( ) ) )
27 {
28 St r ing g = getParam ( r s . getTarget ( ) , "group" ) ;
29 i f ( groupTarget . equa l s ( g ) ) {
30 f loat claimVal = Float . valueOf ( r s . getClaim ( ) .
getValue ( ) ) ;
31 double claimTimeStamp = (double ) r s . getTimeStamp
( ) ;
32 targetGroupReputation += ( claimVal / to ta lC la ims
) ∗ ( claimTimeStamp / currentTime ) ;
33 }
34 }
35 }
36
37 //3) Now, r e t r i e v e a l l the c la ims t ha t any e n t i t y in the
same group as idSource made about idTarge t
38 St r ing groupSource = getParam ( idSource , "group" ) ;
39 Lis t<ReputationStatementInfo> sourceGroupClaims =
getClaimsAboutTarget ( "CleanWords" , idTarget ) ;
40 f loat sourceGroupReputation = 0 .0 f ;
41 currentTime = Calendar . g e t In s tance ( ) . getTime ( ) . getTime ( ) ;
42 for ( Reputat ionStatementInfo r s : sourceGroupClaims )
43 {
44 //We don ’ t want to cons ider c la ims from the source
i t s e l f
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45 i f ( ! idSource . equa l s ( r s . getSource ( ) ) )
46 {
47 St r ing g = getParam ( r s . getSource ( ) , "group" ) ;
48 i f ( groupSource . equa l s ( g ) ) {
49 f loat claimVal = Float . valueOf ( r s . getClaim ( ) .
getValue ( ) ) ;
50 double claimTimeStamp = (double ) r s . getTimeStamp
( ) ;
51 sourceGroupReputation += ( claimVal / to ta lC la ims
) ∗ ( claimTimeStamp / currentTime ) ;
52 }
53 }
54 }
55
56 return new Float ( sub j e c t i veReputa t i on +
targetGroupReputation + sourceGroupReputation ) ;
57 }
5.5 Experimenal Results
This section explains the experiment that we carry out in order to measure the per-
formance overhead that the framework entails, as well as the amount of work that
developers need to invest during the implementation of the models.
The application used for the experiment is the one explained in Section 5.4. In order
to ignore network latency, both consoles are executed on the same platform, which is a
2010 Macbook Pro Intel Core 2 Duo, with 4GB 1067 MHz DDR3 RAM.
The experiment is as follows. First, we measure the time elapsed between the time
the first console sends a message and the second console shows it, without any trust or
reputation involved. Then, for each trust or reputation model considered in Section 5.4,
we measure this same time. In order to account for the computation engines, the receiver
console shows the text only after it has received an update of the trust or reputation of
the sender console. Each measure is actually an average of 100 individual measures to
provide more statistically meaningful results, which are depicted in Figure 5.7.
As the figure depicts, there is a small overhead when using the framewok, although
this overhead comes in terms of microseconds. The least overhead comes from Marsh’s
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Figure 5.7: Execution Time (measured in microseconds)
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model, whereas the greatest comes from REGRET, something expected given its more
complex computation engine.
The amount of work that takes for developers to implement the models is similar
for all the models, as depicted in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Amount of Framework-related Activities
eBay Marsh’s PeerTrust REGRET
#inheritance 2 2 2 2
#invocations 3 4 4 6
#overriding 2 3 2 2
#configFiles 1 2 1 1
#compDeployed 3 3 2 2
As explained in Section 5.4, each model requires inheriting from two framework
classes, the class that determines the type of the entity, and the class that implements
the model or the engine. The number of method invocations go hand in hand with
the complexity of the model. Thus, REGRET requires up to 6 method calls whereas
eBay only requires 3. The number of methods that need to be overridden is similar in
all the models, although it is higher in Marh’s model because it needs to implement
the threshold value. All models require at least one configuration file with the self-
adaptation policy, whereas Marsh’s requires another one for setting the initial subjective
factors of the entities. The deployment changes slightly, as in the case of centralized
models (trust models like Marsh’s and centralized reputation models like eBay’s), three
components must be deployed, whereas in distributed reputation models only two are
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required12.
As a conclusion, the framework entails negligible overhead (in the order of microsec-
onds) and does not require a lot of work to implement well-known existing models.
This means that the benefits of adopting the framework are quite high considering the
work that the implementation requires (see Table 5.2) or even in terms of execution
time, as shown in Figure 5.7. We advocate that these results make the adoption of the
framework appealing.
5.6 Discussion
In this chapter we have developed a trust and reputation framework that allows imple-
menting a wide range of trust and reputation models. The framework is implemented
on top of a self-adaptive platform, which enables the use of trust and reputation infor-
mation in order to make reconfiguration decisions. We have shown that the framework
barely entails overhead and that the small amount of extra work for developers pays off
given the interesting opportunities that the use of the framework brings.
Despite the huge amount of trust and reputation models proposed in the literature,
we have found that by using only some core concepts (embodied in trust and reputation
metamodels), it is possible to represent a wide range of them. This happens because
the differences among models are often due to the application context where the models
are proposed, rather than in their dynamics, which turn out to be similar in most cases.
We have learned that this kind of integration must overcome several challenges.
In our view, one primary challenge is building a robust identity management system
in order to uniquely identify trust and reputation entities, and to allow access at any
moment to these identities. In our current implementation, we build upon the reflection
layer of Kevoree so as to provide such identities. However, it would be desirable to keep
track of entities that disappear and re-appear again in dynamic environments, which is
something we do not tackle at the moment.
Second, more research on declarative reconfiguration policies is required. Current
models@run.time platforms lack a usable mechanism to specify reconfiguration policies.
12In practice, three components should be deployed in order to test the reputation engines of
PeerTrust and REGRET due to their consideration for groups and credibility.
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Kevoree offers Kevscript instructions, which become cumbersome for advanced recon-
figurations. We have provided a basic format to represent these policies, but this format
may fall short of expressiveness as the complexity of scenarios increases.
We also find that models@run.time platforms should provide a great deal of usable
low-level services in order to monitor certain aspects of the system, like the consumed
resources by each component, the latency of communications, or the response times,
because this information might be key to building robust trust and reputation models.
Factor producer entities could use these services to monitor different aspects of the
entities and feed the trust or reputation engines.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have proposed a set of methodologies, guidelines and tools for the
engineering of trust and reputation into software systems. We have empowered sys-
tems engineers and developers with capabilities to support the inclusion of trust in the
different activities of the SDLC.
We advocate that one of the reasons why there has been very little attention to trust
by the security and software engineering communities is that there is a lack of insight
on this concept, especially when applied in the computing domain. In order to remedy
this, we have shed light on trust by gathering concepts that are related to it and by
relating these concepts in a conceptual model.
The conceptual model elicits three sets of concepts. The first set corresponds to
concepts that are common to every trust model, and includes concepts such as context,
trust factors, trust purpose or the roles played by entities. The second and third sets
refer to the two classes of models that we identify, namely decision and evaluation
models. The former refers to those models that control access to resources by means
of credentials and policies. The outcome of the model is typically a binary decision:
access granted or access denied. Evaluation models focus on examining more closely
the trust relationships among entities, determining to which extent the factors influence
these relationships and analyzing the sources of information for a more informed trust
evaluation. The outcome of these models is a trust value that is tagged to the trust
relationships.
In addition to providing insight on trust and trust models, the conceptual model
yields a framework for comparing different classes of trust models under a common basis.
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We use this framework for comparing a wide spectrum of different classes of trust and
reputation models: Marsh’s model (75), PolicyMaker (18), Jøsang’s belief model (55),
REGRET (114), TrustBuilder (136), eBay reputation model (107), Falcone et al. (33),
Trust−X (15), PeerTrust (137) and Agudo et al. (1).
The concepts gathered in the model serves us as a basis for the rest of the contri-
butions of this thesis, as these concepts are used in the methodologies that we have
proposed and the tools we have built for each phase of the SDLC.
As for the planning phase, we have proposed a methodology for evaluating trust in
cloud providers, which is fundamental to making informed cloud sourcing decisions. The
methodology allows the explicit representation of uncertainty and subjectivity, which
were highlighted as key concepts related to trust, by means of confidence intervals
and an operator for the aggregation of trust intervals that maintains the uncertainty
along operations. Other important concepts identified in the conceptual model, such
as sources of information and trust factors, are intensively used in order to gather
knowledge about cloud providers and to evaluate trust in them. The outcome of the
methodology consists of nine confidence intervals: one in the stakeholders dimensions
(which measures trust in the staff and other stakeholders of the cloud provider); one in
a general dimension (which measures general factors like transparency of the provider);
and seven in the threats dimensions, one for each threat identified by the CSA. In order
to validate the methodology, we have evaluated four popular cloud vendors: Amazon,
Apple, Microsoft and Google. The context of the cloud sourcing is the management
of EHRs, which contain private information about patients created by health care pro-
fessionals. The results of applying the methodology have shown that no cloud vendor
meet our trust expectations, although Microsoft was closer than the rest, followed by
Apple, Amazon and Google.
The next phase of the SDLC, security analysis, comprises two main activities: secu-
rity requirements elicitation and threats analysis. For the first activity, we have proposed
a methodology and notation in order to capture and represent trust and reputation re-
quirements and integrate these requirements with other functional and non-functional
ones. The notation is an extension over problem frames, which focuses on represent-
ing the system in its context. In particular, we have extended UML4PF with many
of the trust and reputation notions highlighted in the conceptual model. As part of
the methodology, we have included support for OCL queries, which allows detecting
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syntactic and semantic inconsistencies in the models. For example, every trust relation-
ship must have a trustor and a trustee. If the engineer misses one of these roles, an
OCL expression can detect and help fix this. In order to validate the methodology, we
have used the protection profile defined by the Common Criteria for the home gateway
in a smart grid setting. Discussions with security professionals have shown that our
methodology is useful and can help in engineering trust-based security solutions.
As for the threat analysis, we have proposed a methodology and a tool for the
identification of insider threats in socio-technical systems. The methodology includes a
trust model, an asset model and a threat model. The former consists of a propagation
model which, assuming that we have some pre-established trust relationships in the
system, allows deriving the rest of trust relationships among entities. The model in-
cludes support for translating the numeric values into trust labels that are more easily
interpreted by the security expert. The semantics of the trust relationships refer to
the trust of permission over a resource owned by the trustor. Therefore when entity
A trusts another entity B with regards to resource R, it means that A believes that
B will not misuse his permissions in order to violate some of the security properties
held by R. The asset model measures the criticality of resources by assigning them
a sensitivity value, whereas the threat model ties both the trust and asset models to-
gether. Concretely, a threat is deduced to occur if an entity is granted a permission
on an asset that is sufficient to violate the security property associated to the asset,
and if this entity is not trusted by the owner of the asset with that permission. The
severity of the threat is calculated taking the sensitivity level of the asset into account.
The methodology has been validated in the context of an eHealth system that spans
across hospitals and pharmacies, and which includes several roles including patients,
physicians, and pharmacists.
For the secure design phase, we have proposed an extension over UML that describes
trust and reputation models and its integration in the system. This UML extension
builds upon many of the concepts identified in the conceptual model in order to extend
three diagrams. Use case diagrams are intended to represent trust relationships and
basic reputation information at a glimpse. We have also embedded information that
allows making the purpose of trust more explicit at the use case level. Class diagrams
are extended in order to provide more insight on the model, including the way trust and
reputation are updated, the factors that are used for such update, and the way they
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are to be represented in the system. The extensions over deployment diagrams allow
representing trust at the infrastructure level and to determine where certain trust-
related information (e.g. reputation scores) are to be stored in the system. Even
when we do not provide extensions of behavioural diagrams, we suggest the use of
activity diagrams and their swim lanes representation in order to clarify the interaction
patterns between the system and its trust and reputation models. We have validated this
approach in an eHealth scenario of patient monitoring, in which patients wear devices
capable of measuring their vital signs and of sending them to the hospital servers,
thanks to which physicians can monitor their patients remotely. We have defined the
trust relationships between patients and physicians, between the physicians and the
wearable devices, and how patients can rate physicians to yield reputation scores for
the latter.
Once we have provided enough details about the trust or reputation model, this in-
formation can be fed to the secure implementation phase, for which we have described a
development framework that can be used in order to implement a wide variety of trust
and reputation models. Again, this framework builds upon the notions discussed in
the conceptual model. First, we have enumerated a set of requirements that a trust or
reputation framework should support and then we have described both a high-level and
a low-level architectures that support the requirements. After providing guidelines for
implementing the different components of the architecture, we have validated the frame-
work in a social cloud scenario. In this scenario, cloud providers participate in a market
of web services in which each provider can produce new services or consume services
from others. Trust relationships among providers as well as the providers’ reputation
must be updated according to the actions of the providers, who can rate the services
they consume. Traditionally, developers would feel unarmed when faced with the devel-
opment of such scenario, but our framework supports the smooth implementation and
integration of these trust functionalities.
Once a system is deployed with built-in trust and reputation capabilities, we can
exploit the trust information to drive the evolution of the system at runtime. This
corresponds to the last phase of the SDLC, and we have accomplished this by build-
ing a trust and reputation framework on top of Kevoree, a self-adaptive platform that
implements the models@run.time paradigm. This paradigm represents a synchronized
model of the the running system, in such a way that any change in the model translates
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in an automatic change of the system. Our trust and reputation framework provides
developers with the mechanisms to implement trust-aware systems, where system com-
ponents can establish trust relationships with others. These components can also hold
reputation values and provide feedback after the interaction with other components in
order to update the trust relationships or the reputation scores. The fact that this trust-
related information is available within the models@run.time paradigm implies that it
can be used for driving self-adaptation decisions. Therefore, if a given trust relationship
between two system components, or the reputation value of a component, falls bellow
a specified threshold, corrective actions can be executed, such as the runtime removal
of the component or its substitution for another one. We provide a simple policy lan-
guage where developers can specify this kind of actions and the conditions under which
they are triggered. In order to validate the framework, we implement several trust and
reputation models on top of a distributed chat application. The implemented models
are eBay (108), Marsh’s (75), PeerTrust (137) and REGRET (114). We prove that the
framework entails negligible overhead for every implemented model, in the order of mi-
croseconds, and that it does not require a lot of work to implement well-known models.
In particular, all it is needed in most cases is inheriting from a couple of classes, and
using or overriding two or three methods.
We identify several research questions that remain open for further study. Some of
them were mentioned in their corresponding chapters, but are summarized here for the
reader’s convenience.
Integrated model-driven methodology for trust engineering Model-driven en-
gineering has brought lots of benefits to the software engineering community, smoothing
the construction process through abstractions that make it easier for developers to rea-
son about the software and minimizing the need to write boiler plate code. Along this
thesis, we have dealt with models at different phases of the life cycle, covering design
time and runtime models of the system. In order to ensure that the running trust
and reputation models adhere to the specification of the initial models, we need to fill
the gaps among phases, defining transformations that preserve the properties and the
semantics of the models. This would simplify greatly the building process and at the
same time it would ensure the correctness of the trust solutions by construction.
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High-level reasoning in self-adaptation policies Current models@run.time plat-
forms lack a usable mechanism to specify reconfiguration policies. Kevoree, the platform
on top of which we implement the trust and reputation framework, provides Kevscript
instructions, which become cumbersome for advanced reconfigurations.
We have provided a basic format to represent these policies, but this format may
fall short of expressiveness as the complexity of scenarios increases. In particular, these
policies refer to very concrete situations, which is not adequate for more complex and
dynamic environments where conditions cannot be so easily anticipated. In particular,
there is a need for more general policies that allow reasoning about the environment at
higher level of abstractions. For example, instead of a rule that states the following:
“if the reputation of a console component falls below 2, then substitute it for a secure
console component”, there should be a rule that states that: “if a console behaviour
seems suspicious, then secure the consoles with which it is talking”. The framework
should be able to reason what it takes to consider the behaviour of a console strange,
and to identify the mechanisms that it can apply in order to protect the rest of consoles
from the suspicious one. Research on intrusion detection systems, anomaly detection
and artificial intelligence can provide the required know-how for solving these issues.
Integration of trust and reputation requirements and design methodologies
into well-established practices There are well-established methodologies and nota-
tions for eliciting security requirements and for building security artifacts in the context
of the system. These include methodologies like Secure Tropos, the Microsoft Security
Development Life cycle and notations like UMLSec or SecureUML. Instead of providing
yet another methodology or notation, it would be more interesting to investigate how
new practices for including trust and reputation could integrate into existing solutions.
This would remove the burden of having to learn new methodologies and would mini-
mize the friction of trying to reconcile the traditional system design with a trust-aware
system design.
Extensions and integration of the UMLTrep profile The UML profile that we
present in order to specify initial trust and reputation solutions focuses on evaluation
models, and therefore it captures some of the most relevant trust and reputation con-
cepts that are found in such models. However, decision models and propagation models
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entail other notions that should be captured. In the first case, we should encompass the
concepts of policies, credentials, compliance checker, or trusted third parties. For the
latter, it should be possible to describe how trust is to be transferred among entities,
defining the operators that are to be used along trust chains and in different trust paths.
Given the close relationship between trust and security, it would be optimal if our
profile was integrated with another profile that captured the specification of security
solutions, such as UMLSec. This would provide a better overall picture of the security
and trust of the system, and would allow specifying explicitly the relationship among
trust and security and how they affect each other.
Configuration and visual support for trust and reputation implementation
There is a trend towards configuration-based implementation libraries and frameworks
because it boosts the productivity by reducing the need to write boiler plate code and
by allowing developers to focus on the core functionality of the software. Visual tools
also can be quite effective at improving the developers’ productivity as it minimizes the
need for writing code, which is always subject to compilation and runtime errors.
Although we struggle to provide fast to learn and easy to use trust and reputation
frameworks, they are still code intensive. Therefore, we consider that one of the first
improvements should go in the aforementioned direction. This would be especially
effective if the frameworks were integrated in a higher-order model-driven workflow
that allowed the automatic derivation of implementation entities from design artifacts,
as discussed in the first point.
Some degree of decoupling of expertise from requirements elicitation and de-
sign In general, requirements elicitation, threats and risks analysis frameworks largely
depend on the level of expertise of the engineers. This means that two systems that are
meant to have the same set of requirements and which will operate in the same context
under the same conditions may end up having different levels of security just because
different engineers worked on them.
One logical way to minimize this human dependency is by having more engineers
revising others’ contributions and by forcing the statement of the rationale for the
presence of each requirement and for every design decision. However, it is easy to make
implicit assumptions that do not end up documented and that are eventually lost.
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Another way is by providing tool-supported structured methodologies that are simple
and intuitive enough. However, we think that some level of expertise is required and
cannot be fully removed.
Reasoning engines for supporting software and security engineers on elicit-
ing trust requirements Some of the concerns raised when we presented our trust
requirements elicitation methodology referred to the difficulty in and time required for
reading and understanding the output of the OCL expressions. One way to mitigate this
problem is by implementing reasoning engines that support the software and security
engineers during the requirements stage. Upon execution of an OCL expression, the
reasoning engine can read and interpret the output, and if any error occurs, mitigation
actions can be recommended to the engineers. In order for the reasoning engine to be
the most effective, it should be designed in such a way that it can be tailored to the
domain of the software that it is to be built. Semantic technologies such as ontologies
can be used for such purpose.
Repositories of public information about cloud vendors There is a difficulty
in finding information about cloud vendors, probably due to marketing interests and to
an initial lack of transparency in the cloud environment. However, in order to evaluate
trust in cloud vendors, it is required gathering as much information as possible about
them, about how they operate, about their staff and stakeholders, about their policies
and, in general, about the general satisfaction of other customers. In the approach that
we propose in this thesis for the evaluation of trust in cloud providers, we assume that
much of the information can be elicited, but in many cases this proves to be difficult,
especially when evaluating the stakeholders dimension. Cloud providers may be also
reluctant to reveal the security incidents suffered by other customers, therefore it would
be necessary to count on a public reputation repository where customers could rate
their experience with the providers. This would raise other challenges, as the need for
ensuring fair ratings and avoiding collusions from competitors.
There are other research questions that, even though not so closely related to our
work, they still may provide relevant inputs as well as general insight on trust engineer-
ing. Robust identity management systems must be in place in dynamic environments
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to ensure that entities cannot change their identities in order to delete their bad repu-
tation and pervert the trust models. It would be also interesting to evaluate how each
trust relationship at the inner levels (e.g. among two system components) impacts and
contributes to the trust relationships at the highest level (i.e. between the end-users
and the system). It remains an open problem to define metrics that evaluate to which
extent a trust model can improve the security of the system. This is also a tough prob-
lem because measuring security is itself an open problem currently. Finally, it would
be desirable to be capable of measuring to which extent the quality of experience of
end-users improve as a consequence of engineering trust and reputation solutions into
systems. This would provide companies with a well-founded justification for budget al-
location in this task along the SDLC, provided that we could find a positive correlation
between the final users satisfaction and trust engineering practices.
191
6. CONCLUSIONS
192
Appendix A
Resumen en español
En este capítulo se presenta un resumen de las contribuciones de la tesis en español. Las
dos primeras secciones introducen el tema de investigación y esbozan las contribuciones
en el marco de dicho tema. El resto de secciones resume cada una de las principales
contribuciones.
A.1 Marco de la tesis y objetivos
El campo de estudio en el que se enmarca la tesis es el de ingeniería de sistemas se-
guros (SSE en sus siglas en inglés). Esta disciplina combina dos campos de estudio: la
seguridad y la ingeniería del software. El objetivo es cambiar el enfoque tradicional del
tratamiento de la seguridad, el cual se basa en aplicar medidas correctivas cuando se
detectan problemas. Por el contrario, el enfoque de la SSE es proactivo, en el sentido
de que se busca considerar e integrar medidas de seguridad a lo largo de todo el ciclo de
vida de un sistema (SDLC, de sus siglas en inglés), el cual se representa en la figura A.1.
La idea es minimizar la superficie de ataque del sistema y así minimizar el número de
incidentes de seguridad que pueden ocasionarse una vez el sistema esté en uso.
Típicamente, en cada fase se realizan un conjunto de actividades. Durante la primera
fase, planificación, se estudia la viabilidad del sistema y se toman algunas decisiones
preliminares sobre su futuro desarrollo. En la fase de análisis de seguridad, se estudian
posibles amenazas al sistema y se definen los objetivos de seguridad de los distintos
grupos interesados en el mismo1. A continuación se definen artefactos de diseño y la
1A partir de ahora nos referiremos a estos grupos con su denominación inglesa: stakeholders
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Figure A.1: Ciclo de vida del desarrollo de sistemas seguros
Ges$ón	  de	  
riesgos	  
Garan.as	  de	  
seguridad	  
Planiﬁcación	  
Análisis	  de	  
seguridad	  
Diseño	  seguro	  
Implementación	  
segura	  
Veriﬁcación	  en	  
ejecución	  
arquitectura que da soporte a los servicios de seguridad que previenen las amenazas y que
cubren los requisitos identificados en la fase anterior. Durante la fase de implementación,
se utilizan guías y buenas prácticas de programación segura y se utilizan plataformas de
ejecución seguras. La última fase consiste en la monitorización del sistema en tiempo de
ejecución para garantizar que se están cumpliendo los requisitos y políticas de seguridad.
De manera transversal al ciclo y controlando el flujo de las distintas actividades, se
realizan operaciones de gestión de riesgos y de garantías de seguridad. Las primeras
identifican y cuantifican riesgos que pueden poner en peligro el desarrollo del sistema,
mientras que las últimas se encargan de garantizar que los objetivos y requisitos de
seguridad se mantengan a lo largo del ciclo.
En la presente tesis se discute sobre ingeniería de confianza en lugar de ingeniería de
seguridad. Esto significa que en lugar de considerar seguridad en las distintas fases del
ciclo de vida, vamos a considerar aspectos de confianza a través de modelos de confianza
y reputación. El concepto de confianza es más amplio que el de seguridad, y la relación
entre ambos puede resumirse en los siguientes puntos:
• La presencia de seguridad no implica la de confianza. Sin embargo, el hecho de
que los usuarios de un sistema crean que el mismo es seguro, en la mayoría de los
casos aumentará su confianza.
• La presencia de confianza no implica la de seguridad. Los usuarios pueden confiar
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en el sistema debido a otras propiedades: buena usabilidad, experiencias pasadas
satisfactorias, etc.
• La seguridad es una propiedad objetiva, mientras que la confianza es subjetiva.
Dos sistemas pueden ser igual de seguros y aún así ser confiados de forma diferente
por un mismo grupo de usuarios.
En el dominio computacional, la confianza se construye a partir de modelos de
confianza y reputación. Así pues, el objetivo fundamental de la presente tesis es el de-
sarrollo de herramientas y metodologías que permitan el uso y la integración de modelos
de confianza y reputación a lo largo del ciclo de vida de un sistema.
A.2 Resumen de contribuciones
Dado que el objetivo es la integración de confianza en las distintas fases del ciclo de
vida, gran parte de las contribuciones de la tesis están alineadas con dichas fases, como
se observa en la figura A.2
Figure A.2: Contribuciones
Planiﬁcación	  
Análisis	  de	  
seguridad	  
Diseño	  seguro	  Implementación	  segura	  
Veriﬁcación	  en	  
ejecución	  
Ges<ón	  de	  
riesgos	  
Garan=as	  de	  
seguridad	  
- Análisis de amenazas 
apoyado por confianza 
- Identificación de  
requisitos de confianza 
- Perfil UML para la especificación 
de confianza y reputación 
- Marco de trabajo para el  
desarrollo de modelos de 
confianza y reputación 
- Marco de trabajo para 
confianza en tiempo 
de ejecución 
- Evaluación de proveedores de cloud 
Más concretamente, las contribuciones se listan a continuación:
• Estudio exhaustivo de la literatura existente en la integración de confianza en las
distintas fases del SDLC.
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• Análisis sistemático de múltiples definiciones de confianza para remarcar los com-
ponentes que las constituyen.
• Marco de trabajo conceptual que recoge conceptos relacionados con modelos de
confianza y la relación entre dichos conceptos. Esto a su vez proporciona una
base conceptual para comparar un amplio abanico de modelos de confianza y
reputación.
• Metodología para incorporar un razonamiento guiado por la confianza durante la
fase de planificación en el contexto de la evaluación de proveedores de cloud.
• Soporte metodológico y de herramientas para la identificación y análisis de ame-
nazas en sistemas y organizaciones basados en el análisis de relaciones de confianza.
• Metodología y notación para la recogida de requisitos de confianza y reputación
y para su integración con otros requisitos funcionales y no funcionales, incluidos
los de seguridad.
• Notación que permite la especificación de modelos de confianza y reputación en
el sistema.
• Marco de trabajo que permite la implementación de un amplio abanico de modelos
de confianza y reputación.
• Marco de trabajo que permite construir sistemas que evolucionan en tiempo de
ejecución de acuerdo a los valores de confianza y reputación de sus componentes.
Cada contribución se describe con más detalles en las siguientes secciones.
A.3 Marco de trabajo conceptual de confianza
Previo a la integración de confianza y reputación en las distintas fases del SDLC, es
preciso sistematizar el conocimiento de estos conceptos. Para ello, primero analizamos
un conjunto de definiciones de confianza que distintos autores han dado en los últimos
años. A partir de las múltiples definiciones de confianza, construimos un mapa de con-
ceptos utilizando Wordle2 (véase la figura 2.1). El análisis revela que el concepto más
2http://www.wordle.net/
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importante es el de entidad, lo cual es obvio dado que la confianza no tiene sentido
(al menos de forma práctica) si no hay entidades que confían ni en las que se con-
fían. El contexto es otro concepto clave dado que la confianza depende mucho de éste.
Otros conceptos importantes connotan cierta incertidumbre, como subjetivo, creencia,
disposición o expectación, mostrando que la confianza implica incertidumbre sobre el
comportamiento de una entidad. Es important remarcar que aunque el concepto de
riesgo no está presente de forma explícita en las definiciones, una lectura atenta revela
que está de forma implícita en casi todas ellas. Por ejemplo, McKnight (80) afirma
que “. . . consecuencias negativas son posibles”, mientras que Mayer (78) estipula que la
confianza implica disposición de vulnerabilidad.
A modo de resumen, el concepto de confianza está presente cuando hay incertidum-
bre y riesgo en la interacción entre dos o más entidades que necesitan colaborar en un
contexto determinado. Si la entidad que deposita confianza conoce de antemano el re-
sultado de la interacción sin ninguna duda, o si dicho resultado no supone riesgo alguno
para la entidad, la confianza no es precisa. Dado que no hay ninguna definición que
cubra todos los conceptos que creemos más importantes, nuestra definición de confianza
es la siguiente: la confianza es la expectación personal, única y temporal que una entidad
deposita en otra en cuanto al resultado de una interacción entre ellos que afecta a la
primera entidad.
Una vez analizado el concepto de confianza, revisamos un conjunto de artículos de
estudio de distintos modelos de confianza, así como modelos de confianza y reputación
ampliamente conocidos. De esta forma podemos identificar conceptos que son transver-
sales a todos ellos y que nos permiten abstraernos de sus particularidades, lo que nos
lleva a un marco de trabajo conceptual que permite comparar distintos modelos de
confianza y reputación. A continuación exponemos un resumen de los conceptos más
importantes y sus relaciones, el cual queda reflejado en las figuras 2.2, 2.3 y 2.4.
La confianza la calculan los modelos de confianza, los cuales han de tener al menos
dos entidades que han de interactuar. Las entidades juegan un rol, o varios roles. En
los casos más generales, estos roles son trustor (la entidad que deposita la confianza),
y trustee (la entidad sobre la que la confianza es depositada). Otros roles posibles
son testigos, que son entidades que dan su opinión sobre otras entidades en función de
observaciones o experiencias personales. Una vez que tenemos un trustor y un trustee,
decimos que hay una relación de confianza.
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Establecer una relación de confianza persigue un propósito, como el acceso, la pro-
visión o la identificación de entidades. Los factores que afectan a la confianza son el
contexto, las propiedades subjetivas del trustor y del trustee, como la honestidad, creen-
cias o los sentimientos, y las propiedades objetivas del trustor y del trustee, como el
comportamiento o la seguridad.
Un modelo de confianza puede asumir determinados comportamientos, como que
las entidades sólo emitirán evaluaciones justas de otras entidades, o que existe una serie
de valores iniciales. Un modelo también puede seguir distintos enfoques de modelado,
como matemáticos, lingüísticos y gráficos.
Podemos distinguir dos clases de modelos de confianza: los modelos de decisión y los
de evaluación. Los modelos de decisión usan políticas, que especifican condiciones bajo
las cuales se concede acceso a un recurso. Las políticas están escritas en un lenguaje
de políticas, el cual puede considerar la resolución de conflictos entre políticas. Las
condiciones de acceso se expresan en función de credenciales, las cuales son afirma-
ciones sobre alguna característica de una entidad (su identidad, si es miembro de un
grupo, etc). Las credenciales pueden tener distintos formatos, como certificados X.509
o XML. El chequeador de conformidad es el componente que une las credenciales y las
políticas al encargarse de verificar qué credenciales satisfacen qué políticas. Algunos
modelos de decisión también permiten la búsqueda de credenciales a través de cadenas
de credenciales, así como la verificación de su validez.
Los modelos de negociación son una especialización de los modelos de decisión que
añaden una estrategia de negociación para permitir que las entidades revelen sus políti-
cas y credenciales poco a poco, hasta llegar a un punto de confianza válida. Algunos
usan tipos de evidencias, que representan información sobre el proceso de negociación
y que permiten la optimización de éste.
El otro tipo de modelos, los modelos de evaluación, suelen seguir un ciclo de vida
de dos etapas. Primero, una fase de inicio es necesaria para asignar valores iniciales
a las entidades del sistema. La tendencia de confianza se refiere a la propensión del
modelo hacia valores más altos o más bajos en esta primera fase. La segunda fase se
corresponde a un proceso de evaluación que asigna valores de confianza de acuerdo a
determinados factores. Este proceso require la monitorización para proporcionar datos
precisos sobre estos factores.
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Las relaciones de confianza se etiquetan con valores de confianza que indican cuánto
un trustor confía en un trustee. Este valor tiene una dimensión, que indica si es un único
valor o es una tupla de valores. Los valores también tienen una semántica asociada, que
viene determinada por dos dimensiones: objetividad y ámbito. La primera se refiere a si
la medida de confianza proviene de un juicio subjetivo de una entidad o de la evaluación
de la entidad siguiendo un criterio formal. La segunda hace referencia al número de
factores que se tienen en cuenta para la medida de confianza.
En muchos casos, el modelo también incluye el proceso para definir un umbral de
confianza, incorporando la decisión de confianza en el propio modelo. Si el valor es
mayor que el umbral, se asume que el trustor confía en el trustee y que la interacción
puede proseguir.
En los modelos de evaluación, el proceso de cálculo de confianza, y todos los concep-
tos asociados a éste son los más importantes, porque en cierta medida se convierten en
una firma del modelo que la hacen diferente del resto. El proceso de evaluación utiliza
métricas de confianza, las cuales a su vez usan factores como el riesgo o la experiencia
pasada y los combinan para dar lugar a un valor final. Las métricas de confianza usan
motores de computación, que determinan la forma en que los factores se combinan, y
que van desde sumas y medias, hasta motores de lógica difusa o bayesiana.
Las fuentes de información que proporcionan valores para los factores incluyen la
experiencia directa con la entidad, factores sociológicos y psicológicos y opiniones de
terceras partes. Los modelos de reputación utilizan información pública de confianza
de otras entidades para dar lugar a un valor de reputación. Estos modelos pueden ser
centralizados, en los que una entidad se encarga de recoger y distribuir información
de reputación, o distribuidos, en los que cada entidad es responsable de mantener un
registro de valores de confianza en otras entidades, y mandar esta información al resto
de entidades. Los modelos de evaluación suelen tener en cuenta la credibilidad de la
información y su frescura, esto es, cómo de reciente es dicha información.
Los modelos de propagación son una subclase de los modelos de evaluación y asumen
que existen un conjunto de relaciones de confianza. Su objetivo es calcular nuevas
relaciones de confianza entre entidades que no han tendio una experiencia directa. Para
ello, algunos modelos asumen que la confianza es transitiva y explotan esta propiedad.
Los nuevos valores de confianza se calculan mediante dos operadores: un concatenador
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y un agregador. El primero calcula la confianza a través de una cadena, mientras que
el segundo agrega los valores de todas las cadenas que llegan hasta la entidad objetivo.
Los modelos de reputación tienen su propia terminología, y basamos dicha termi-
nología en los sistemas de reputación web. El concepto central es el de declaración de
reputación, que es una tupla con un origen, una afirmación y un objetivo. Un origen es
una entidad en el sistema que puede emitir afirmaciones sobre otra entidad del mismo, a
la que se denomina objetivo. Los modelos de reputación utilizan motores de reputación
que toman como entrada declaraciones de reputación sobre un objetivo y que producen
un valor de reputación para dicho objetivo.
Finalmente, todos los conceptos discutidos hasta el momento los podemos utilizar
para catalogar y comparar distintos modelos de confianza y reputación, como puede
verse en las tablas de la sección 2.2.4.
A.4 Evaluación de confianza de proveedores de cloud
Una consideración muy importante que hay que hacer cuando se diseñan sistemas ICT
hoy en día es si el sistema, o una parte de él, debe moverse al Cloud, actividad que se
conoce como subcontratación cloud (del inglés, cloud sourcing). Esta actividad conlleva
una pérdida de control del sistema y, por consiguiente, aumentan las preocupaciones
sobre la seguridad así como las amenazas a las que está expuesto. En este contexto,
la primera decisión importante es qué proveedor de cloud utilizar. Para tal propósito,
proponemos una metodología que pueda ayudar a los responsables a cuantificar su
confianza en distintos proveedores y elegir aquél que mejor cumpla sus expectativas.
Nuestra metodología se construye sobre el conocimiento de trabajos previos y busca
abordar las necesidades que actualmente no están cubiertas. En particular, aunque la
confianza ya se ha incorporado en la evaluación de clouds, en la mayoría de los casos, el
propósito de esta evaluación es la selección de servicios y no la de proveedores. Por otro
lado, la mayoría de las contribuciones se centran en métricas en lugar de una metodología
concreta. Por último, la incertidumbre y la subjetividad, que son intrínsecas al concepto
de confianza, no suelen tenerse en cuenta.
El primer paso consiste en obtener información sobre el proveedor. Luego, se reco-
gen y se cuantifican factores de confianza sobre los stakeholders del proveedor y sobre el
200
A.4 Evaluación de confianza de proveedores de cloud
proveedor como un todo. En paralelo, especificamos umbrales de confianza que depen-
den de los requisitos del escenario. Estos umbrales son los valores mínimos de confianza
que se esperan obtener para un escenario concreto. En el siguiente paso, los factores se
agregan en tres dimensiones diferentes: una dimensión de stakeholders, una dimensión
de amenazas y una dimensión general. Dicha agregación se realiza mediante un operador
de suma que definimos. Finalmente, la información se representa gráficamente.
Para cada dimensión, se utilizan unas plantillas en las que hay que evaluar distintos
factores. Por ejemplo, en la dimensión de stakeholders, se puede comprobar cuántos
años de experiencia lleva acumulados cada stakeholder, mientras que para la dimensión
general, que se refiere al proveedor en su conjunto, se puede evaluar la transparencia de
éste comprobando su página web y sus informes de incidentes, siempre y cuando esto
sea posible. En la dimensión de amenazas, consideramos las amenazas enumeradas por
el CSA (véase Tabla 3.3).
A la hora de cuantificar estos factores, utilizamos dos valores: el valor del factor, y
un valor de credibilidad. Este último hace referencia a cómo de seguros estamos de que
el valor del factor es preciso. De esta forma, estamos haciendo explícita la incertidumbre
que se genera como consecuencia de tener información parcial y subjetiva. En particular,
para ambos valores usamos números enteros entre 0 y 3, a partir de los cuáles formamos
un intervalo de confianza TI = [
vc
3
,
vc
3
+ (3 − c)] en donde v es el valor del factor y c
el valor de credibilidad.
Para reducir el número de intervalos y así poder procesar mejor la información,
definimos un operador de suma de intervalos de confianza (ver Definición 3), según el
cual el intervalo resultante de una suma está a medio camino entre los dos sumandos.
Asimismo, el intervalo [0, 3] representa la identidad del operador, lo cual es lógico dado
que este intervalo representa la máxima incertidumbre y no añade nuevo conocimiento.
La metodología la hemos aplicado para la evaluación de los siguientes proveedores:
Google, Amazon, Apple y Microsoft. El contexto de aplicación es el de un sistema de
eHealth, en particular de EHRs, los cuales queremos mover al proveedor. Los resultados
después de nuestro análisis muestran que no hay ningún proveedor que cumpla nuestras
expectativas, aunque Microsoft sale mejor parado que sus competidores, especialmente
en la dimensión de amenazas y en la dimensión general.
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A.5 Uso de confianza durante la fase de análisis de seguri-
dad
En la fase de análisis de seguridad se realizan fundamentalmente dos actividades: identi-
ficación de amenazas y análisis de requisitos. En cuanto a la primera, muchas amenazas,
y especialmente aquéllas que resultan en los incidentes más graves, surgen a raíz de su-
posiciones falsas o implícitas sobre las relaciones de confianza en la organización donde
el sistema se despliega. Por tanto, en esta tesis se propone una metodología que explíci-
tamente muestra y analiza estas relaciones de confianza, a partir de las cuales es posible
detectar posibles amenazas a distintas propiedades de seguridad de los recursos del sis-
tema, como confidencialidad, integridad y disponibilidad (Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Availability (CIA) de sus siglas en inglés).
Respecto a la captura de requisitos, mientras que la comunidad investigadora se
ha centrado en desarrollar herramientas y notaciones para identificar los requisitos de
seguridad tradicionales, poco se ha avanzado en la captura de requisitos de confianza
y reputación. Para ello, proponemos una metodología y una extensión del enfoque de
marcos de problemas (problem frames), el cual permite dar una representación de alto
nivel del sistema en su contexto.
Las siguientes secciones profundizan más en cada una de estas contribuciones.
A.5.1 Identificación de amenazas internas guiada por relaciones de
confianza
La metodología que proponemos permite a los ingenieros de seguridad identificar ame-
nazas internas3. El enfoque consiste en primero modelar a los stakeholders del sis-
tema, sus objetivos, los activos, las propiedades de seguridad (CIA) que los stakeholders
quieren que se cumplan para sus activos, los permisos que los stakeholders tienen sobre
sus activos, y las relaciones de confianza y los permisos entre ellos. Una relación de
confianza de permisos repesenta la creencia que el otorgante tiene en que el receptor no
dará mal uso a los permisos concedidos. El nivel de confianza asignado a un agente en
relación a un permiso concedido es muy importante de cara a evaluar el riesgo de que
dicho agente sea una amenaza interna: cuanto más baja sea la confianza, más probable
3Llamamos amenazas internas, del inglés insider, a las amenazas potenciales causadas por un
trabajador de la organización que tiene información privilegiada sobre la misma.
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es que el agente abuse de los permisos de acuerdo a la percepción del otorgante de los
permisos.
Para apoyar la detección automática de amenazas internas, extendemos el lenguaje
de modelado de requisitos SI* con un modelo de activos y un modelo de confianza.
El modelo de activos asocia cada activo con un valor de sensibilidad que representa el
valor del activo para el dueño. El modelo de confianza extiende el modelo de confianza
binario de SI* (confiar, no confiar) y permite asociar diferentes niveles de confianza
con un permiso concedido a un agente. En función de los niveles de sensibilidad y
confianza, definimos un conjunto de reglas que permiten identificar automáticamente
amenazas internas a un activo y priorizarlos basándonos en el riesgo asociado a cada
amenaza. El riesgo asociado a una amenaza interna viene dado por la probabilidad de
que la amenaza ocurra y por el coste de que se abuse del permiso.
En el modelo de confianza que proponemos, los niveles de confianza se pueden
representar de dos formas: como números en el intervalo [0, 1] y como etiquetas (por
ejemplo, Bien, Neutral y Mal). Asumimos que algunos valores de confianza ya se
han asignado a relaciones de confianza de permisos entre agentes en el modelo SI*.
Estos valores son utilizados por el ingeniero de requisitos para calcular nuevos valores
de confianza entre pares de agentes para los que no existe relación de confianza. En
concreto, el nivel de confianza que el agente A deposita en otro agente B en relación a los
permisos que le concede, se calcula a través de relaciones de confianza de permisos que
otros agentes tienen con A y B. Así pues, de acuerdo a lo explicado en la sección A.3,
lo que proponemos es la integración de un modelo de propagación en SI*, y por lo
tanto, definimos un operador de concatenación y un operador de agregación. Una vez
obtenemos un valor final para cada relación de confianza de permisos, usamos reglas
de transformación para traducir estos valores desde el intervalo [0, 1] a una etiqueta en
una escala de confianza.
El modelo de amenaza que definimos considera que un agente A es una amenaza
interna para un recurso S cuando se cumplen las siguientes condiciones:
• A A se le concede un permiso PT sobre el recurso S que es suficiente para violar
alguna de sus propiedades de seguridad.
• El agente que es dueño del recurso S no confía en A con el permiso PT .
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La gravedad de la amenaza depende de los niveles de sensibilidad de los activos y
de los niveles de confianza de las relaciones de confianza de permisos.
Todo el proceso se apoya sobre una herramienta de SI* que está desarrollada como
una extensión de Eclipse y que consta del motor de inferencia DLV. El interfaz de la
herramienta permite dibujar un modelo SI* que es traducido automáticamente en una
especifación ASP. La herramienta permite introducir las reglas para la identificación
de amenazas internas.
A.5.2 Recogida de requisitos de confianza y reputación
Los marcos de problemas son un enfoque y notación para describir problemas de desar-
rollo del software. En los marcos de problemas, una máquina representa el software a
desarrollar, mientras que un dominio es parte del mundo donde la máquina se instalará.
Hay distintos tipos de dominios que representan a personas, datos y leyes físicas. La
tarea de un ingeniero es construir la máquina descrita a través del enfoque del marco de
problemas que mejore el comportamiento del entorno en el que se integra, de acuerdo a
unos requisitos. Los marcos de problemas ayudan al ingeniero a entender qué problemas
hay que resolver, qué dominios deben considerarse y qué conocimiento debe describirse
para analizar el problema en profundidad.
El desarrollo de software con marcos de problemas se desarrolla de la siguiente
manera. Primero, el entorno en el que la máquina operará se representa mediante
un diagrama de contexto, que consiste en dominios e interfaces, pero que no incluye
requisitos. Los diagramas de conocimiento de dominio se centran en un dominio en
particular del diagrama de contexto e identifican más conocimiento sobre el dominio
en términos de hechos y suposiciones. A continuación, el problema se descompone en
subproblemas, cada uno de los cuales se representa con un diagrama de problema que
contiene dominios, fenómenos, interfaces y sus relaciones con al menos un requisito.
UML4PF4 es un perfil UML que extiende los diagramas de clase con estereotipos
que representan los conceptos de los marcos de problemas. Nuestro trabajo consiste
en extender UML4PF con nociones de confianza y reputación (véase la Figura 3.6), así
como proponer una metodología que permita identificar cómo los requisitos de confi-
anza y reputación encajan en el sistema y cómo se relacionan con sus requisitos (véase la
4http://www.uml4pf.org.
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figura 3.7). Una ventaja de usar UML es que permite a los ingenieros de requisitos con-
sultar los modelos mediante OCL, lo cual puede resultar útil para detectar información
errónea o simplemente falta de información.
La metodología consiste en una serie de actividades secuenciales. En primer lugar,
el ingeniero del software y el experto del domino describen el contexto del desarrollo del
software mediante un diagrama de contexto, el cual describe la máquina en su entorno
usando dominios e interfaces entre ellos. Un conjunto de requisitos funcionales textuales
se refiere a los dominios, y el ingeniero de seguridad identifica activos y requisitos de
seguridad para ellos. A continuación, el experto del dominio y el experto en confianza
tienen que trabajar juntos. El primero identifica diagramas de dominio sin contar con
confianza, mientras que el segundo proporciona un diagrama de confianza inicial, en el
cual se esbozan los aspectos de más alto nivel de confianza y reputación. Estos aspectos
incluyen las entidades de confianza, sus relaciones de confianza, las afirmaciones y los
factores de confianza. En el siguiente paso, los ingenieros del software y de confianza
refinan la información en el diagrama de confianza. Los diagramas finales contienen
información detallada sobre las relaciones de confianza y los aspectos de reputación,
como los roles que juegan las distintas entidades, más información sobre las afirmaciones,
los valores de confianza y los factores objetivos y subjetivos. Además, en esta fase se
analiza cómo los motores de confianza y reputación se integran en el sistema y su
relación con los requisitos. Finalmente, el modelo se consulta mediante OCL para
buscar problemas o inconsistencias, como por ejemplo la falta de la entidad con el rol
trustee5 en una relación de confianza.
La notación y la metodología la hemos aplicado para el perfil de protección que
el Common Criteria6 define para la puerta de enlace del medidor inteligente en un
escenario de smart grid.
A.6 Especificación de modelos de confianza y reputación
De cara a que los ingenieros de requisitos comprendan mejor los requisitos de confianza
y reputación y que los diseñadores puedan especificar soluciones basadas en ellos, defini-
mos un perfil UML, el cual complementa la contribución anterior al extender diagramas
5El rol de las entidades que son confiadas por otras entidades.
6https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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de casos de uso, diagramas de clase, y diagramas de despliegue con conceptos de confi-
anza y reputación. Asimismo, mediante diagramas de actividad, es posible representar
cómo se comunica el sistema con los modelos de confianza y reputación definidos.
El objetivo de la extensión realizada sobre los diagramas de casos de uso es señalar
de un vistazo las relaciones de confianza que existen entre las distintas entidades del
sistema, así como las entidades que pueden emitir afirmaciones sobre otras, incluyendo
de esta forma información de reputación. También se definen explícitamente el contexto
de la confianza y qué casos de uso se ven afectados por la misma. Esto último permite
reflexionar sobre las decisiones en las que influyen la confianza y la reputación.
Las extensiones sobre los diagramas de clase permiten profundizar en distintos as-
pectos de confianza y reputación, especialmente en cuanto a los motores de confianza
y de reputación y los factores que dichos motores utilizan. Los factores pueden ser
objetivos o subjetivos, se puede especificar la dimensión de un valor de confianza o rep-
utación (es decir, el número de componentes de los que consta), y si el valor proviene
de un proceso de monitorización o es directamente asignado por alguna entidad.
Los diagramas de despliegue se extienden para poder representar información de
confianza y reputación a nivel de infraestructura. Por un lado, las plataformas y las
redes pueden establecer relaciones de confianza entre ellas e incluso pueden tener un
valor de reputación, lo cual es especialmente útil en entornos abiertos y distribuidos,
donde un nodo de procesamiento (por ejemplo, un móvil o un servidor) puede elegir entre
distintos nodos para pasarle cierta información. En los diagramas de despliegue también
es importante especificar qué componente del sistema se encargará de almacenar los
valores de reputación en modelos centralizados.
Como se ha mencionado anteriormente, los diagramas de actividad permiten especi-
ficar cómo interactúa el sistema con los modelos de confianza y reputación. Esto hace
posible que los diseñadores se centren en los patrones de interacción y por tanto tengan
que tomar decisiones sobre estos mecanismos de comunicación. En particular, consider-
amos que una representación basada en carriles7 permite definir bien la responsabilidad
de cada parte del sistema.
Todo lo anterior lo aplicamos a un escenario de eHealth en el que el objetivo es poder
recoger datos de los pacientes independientemente de su localización. De esta forma, los
pacientes pueden recibir opiniones de inmediato ante una situación crítica y pueden ser
7Del inglés swim lanes.
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atendidos por los médicos en cualquier momento y lugar. Para ello, los pacientes llevan
puesto algún dispositivo que mide sus constantes vitales y que envía esta información a
los servidores de los hospitales. En este escenario, es importante definir las relaciones
de confianza entre pacientes y médicos, entre los médicos y los dispositivos de medición,
y es posible evaluar la reputación de los médicos en función del trato a los pacientes.
Estos valores de confianza y reputación permiten iniciar procesos para el cambio de
médico o el cambio de dispositivo, entre otros.
A.7 Marco de trabajo para la implementación de modelos
de confianza y reputación
A pesar de que se han propuesto numerosos modelos de confianza y reputación, se
han destinado pocos esfuerzos a ofrecer herramientas que faciliten a los desarrolladores
la implementación de estos modelos. En particular, los modelos propuestos suelen
presentarse bajo unas suposiciones y contextos muy concretos, por lo que no es fácil
adaptarlos a entornos más generales.
Para solucionar este problema, proponemos un marco de trabajo que funciona como
un servidor que media entre una aplicación cliente y un sistema de bases de datos, de
forma que la aplicación solicita información de confianza y reputación de estas bases de
datos, y permite actualizarlas con nuevos valores.
El marco de trabajo cumple los siguientes requisitos:
• Gestión de entidades: las entidades mantienen valores de confianza con otras en-
tidades. El marco de trabajo debe asignar identificadores únicos a estas entidades
y debe poder recuperar información de confianza y reputación de una entidad.
• Gestión de relaciones de confianza: las relaciones de confianza cambian a lo largo
del tiempo. Nuevas relaciones de confianza pueden aparecer, mientras que otras
pueden eliminarse, y los valores de confianza que se asocian a las relaciones van
cambiando.
• Definición de motores de computación: los motores de computación se encargan
de calcular valores de confianza y reputación de acuerdo al modelo. Es importante
que los desarrolladores puedan definir sus propias métricas.
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• Definición de eventos: los eventos que ocurren en la aplicación activan la comuni-
cación con el marco de trabajo, por lo que es preciso que el desarrollador pueda
definir eventos y la forma en la que el marco de trabajo se comporta cuando los
recibe.
• Gestión de afirmaciones: el tipo y el valor de una afirmación determina el valor
de reputación. Debe ser posible configurar afirmaciones que satisfagan las necesi-
dades específicas de la aplicación.
• Gestión de factores: las métricas se componen de factores, por lo que de cara a
definir métricas nuevas es preciso que los desarrolladores puedan definir nuevos
factores.
• Tiempo e incertidumbre: estos factores juegan un papel muy importante a la hora
de calcular la confianza y la reputación, por lo que el marco de trabajo debería
ofrecer mecanismos a los desarrolladores para incluirlos como parte del proceso de
computación.
• Separación de confianza y reputación: el marco de trabajo debe permitir a los de-
sarrolladores tratar la confianza y la reputación como conceptos diferentes, aunque
dada su fuerte relación, debe permitir también que la una se valga de la otra.
A partir de los requisitos y tomando como base los conceptos desarrollados en la
sección A.3, definimos una arquitectura de alto nivel y otra de bajo nivel, las cuales
pueden verse en las figuras 4.2 y 4.3, respectivamente. La primera se organiza en capas
lógicas, donde cada capa usa servicios proporcionados por la capa inferior. Las capas
definidas son una capa de modelo, que captura la información básica de los modelos que
el desarrollador puede implementar, una capa relacional, que se centra en el modelado
de las entidades y relaciones de confianza, una capa de computación, que captura las
métricas, y una capa de definición por el usuario, a partir de la cual se pueden definir
nuevas métricas y factores para éstas.
La arquitectura de bajo nivel comprende los componentes y las estructuras de datos
que dan lugar a una implementación inmediata del marco de trabajo. Incluyen conceptos
de más bajo nivel, como eventos, afirmaciones de reputación y de confianza, así como
elementos arquitecturales de comunicación como colas, que permiten ofrecer un sistema
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asíncrono. De esta forma, cuando la aplicación cliente envía un evento, el marco de
trabajo lo encola y permite que la aplicación cliente continúe, avisándolo cuando el
resultado esté disponible.
Por último, ofrecemos guías de implementación del marco de trabajo. En concreto,
proponemos su implementación mediante JavaEE8. Esta decisión ofrece dos ventajas:
por un lado, facilita el desarrollo al ser Java un lenguaje ampliamente utilizado y cono-
cido por desarrolladores, y en segundo lugar portabilidad, ya que el marco de trabajo
puede ejecutarse sobre cualquier plataforma y sistema operativo.
El escenario utilizado para la validación del marco de trabajo es el de un desarrol-
lador que tiene que implementar un sitio web social para proveedores de cloud. Éstos
pueden registrarse en el sitio, y una vez registrados, pueden publicar servicios web en el
sitio así como una descripción completa del mismo, por ejemplo mediante WSDL. Los
proveedores pueden buscar un servicio web de acuerdo a sus necesidades, y usar el servi-
cio para componer servicios más complejos. Cuando un proveedor consume un servicio
de otro proveedor, el último puede cobrar al primero en función del tipo o complejidad
del servicio. Así, el sitio actúa como un mercado de software entre proveedores.
De cara a ofrecer confianza en el sitio web y minimizar riesgos para los proveedores,
se puede identificar una serie de requisitos de confianza y reputación. Para empezar,
hay que señalar que hay dos tipos de entidades en este escenario: proveedores de cloud
y servicios web. Ambos pueden tener valores de reputación derivados de opiniones
de otros proveedores. Por ejemplo, si un proveedor usa un servicio y percibe que el
servicio no se ejecuta como debería, podría valorar negativamente el servicio, lo que a
su vez afectaría negativamente a la reputación del proveedor. Además de reputación,
los proveedores pueden establecer relaciones de confianza entre ellos. Como ejemplos
más concretos de posibles requisitos de confianza que el marco de trabajo permite
implementar, consideramos los siguientes:
• Los proveedores pueden evaluar servicios web con una, dos o tres estrellas. Cuando
un proveedor evalúa un servicio web, afecta a la reputación del servicio web y a
la relación de confianza entre el evaluador y el creador del servicio web.
8http://docs.oracle.com/javaee/7/index.html
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• Los proveedores pueden evaluarse entre sí usando una afirmación de tipo Me gusta
y No me gusta. Cuando los proveedores evalúan otros proveedores, sólo afecta a
su relación de confianza, pero no a la reputación.
• Leer completamente el perfil de un proveedor incrementa la creencia del lector en
la aptitud de dicho proveedor.
• Los valores de reputación en el contexto WebServiceForOffice deben normalizarse
al intervalo [0, 1] antes de enviarse a la base de datos de confianza, y deben de-
normalizarse al intervalo original del modelo antes de enviarse a la aplicación.
A.8 Marco de trabajo para la implementación de sistemas
autoadaptativos en función de valores de confianza y
reputación
Las contribuciones anteriores tratan con el modelado y la implementación de sistemas
que utilizan modelos de confianza y reputación, en tiempo de diseño. Sin embargo, dos
cambios importantes están llegando al mundo de las ICT que precisan de una perspectiva
que vaya más allá del diseño. Por un lado, la visión de orientación a servicios permite las
mejoras de la funcionalidad al instante, por lo que las aplicaciones son más dinámicas
y requieren estrategias de adaptación rápidas que cumplan con nuevos requisitos y que
se adapten a entornos cambiantes. Por otro lado, las fronteras entre el mundo virtual
y el físico están desapareciendo con la llegada del Internet de los Objetos, donde los
sensores y actuadores se integran en objetos de la vida diaria y se conectan mediante
redes capaces de producir una gran cantidad da datos. Todo esto hace más borrosa la
frontera entre el tiempo de diseño y el de ejecución ya que se vuelve muy difícil para
los desarrolladores predecir todas las posibles circunstancias que rodean a un sistema
durante su ejecución.
Los modelos en tiempo de ejecución9 constituyen un enfoque de construcción de
software dirigido por modelos que permite la adaptación en tiempo de ejecución de
sistemas distribuidos y heterogéneos. Permite trabajar con abstracciones para tratar
con cambios imprevistos. Sin embargo, los marcos de trabajo que siguen este paradigma
9Models@run.time
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ofrecen un soporte muy limitado para aspectos de seguridad, lo que entorpece su uso
en escenarios reales.
Para superar este obstáculo, proponemos un marco de trabajo que permite construir
sistemas que toman decisiones de reconfiguración en tiempo de ejecución basándose en
relaciones de confianza y valores de reputación. Dicho marco de trabajo se integra
en Kevoree10, un modelo de componentes distribuido que implementa el paradigma de
modelos en tiempo de ejecución, permitiendo así a los componentes del sistema incluir
confianza en sus tomas de decisiones.
Kevoree ofrece su propio marco de trabajo que permite a los desarrolladores imple-
mentar sistemas autoadaptativos en Java. Para ello, Kevoree ofrece anotaciones que
los desarrolladores pueden utilizar para crear nuevos componentes de Kevoree y nuevos
parámetros para estos componentes. Los parámetros son atributos que pueden cam-
biarse fácilmente en tiempo de ejecución. El despliegue de sistemas Kevoree se puede
realizar de dos maneras: a través de un editor visual, donde el desarrollador puede de-
splegar los nodos (es decir, el hardware) y los componentes que se ejecutan en éstos; y
a través de Kevscript, un lenguaje de scripting que permite reflexionar sobre el sistema,
tal como añadir o eliminar nodos y componentes, y cambiar el valor de parámetros. Este
lenguaje de scripting también se utiliza para cambiar el sistema durante su ejecución.
El proceso que seguimos para el desarrollo de nuestro marco de trabajo de confi-
anza y reputación es el siguiente. En primer lugar, definimos dos metamodelos, uno
de confianza y otro de reputación, en EMF11. Estos metamodelos constituyen el es-
queleto básico de los conceptos necesarios para expresar confianza y reputación en los
componentes. A partir de estos metamodelos, se genera una API interna, invisible a los
desarrolladores, a través de la cual gestionamos la información de los modelos de confi-
anza y reputación. Para los desarrolladores, definimos dos APIs más fáciles de utilizar,
una para el desarrollo de modelos de confianza y otra para el de modelos de reputación.
Típicas tareas que los desarrolladores tienen que realizar para la implementación de
modelos es la herencia de distintas clases y la implementación de métodos abstractos.
De cara a controlar la evolución del sistema en función de la confianza y la rep-
utación, ofrecemos un lenguaje de políticas básico que permite establecer las condiciones
10http://kevoree.org
11http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/
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bajo las que el sistema ha de reconfigurarse. En el caso de querer usar la reputación,
los políticas siguen el siguiente esquema:
TipoComponente Condición Acción Argumentos
el cual implica que si la condición para el tipo de componente TipoComponente se
cumple, la acción con argumentos debe ejecutarse.
Por otro lado, para la confianza, se utiliza el siguiente esquema de políticas:
TipoComponente1 TipoComponente2 Condición|Umbral Acción Argumentos
el cual significa que si la confianza que TipoComponente1 deposita en TipoComponente2
cumple la condición o no llega al umbral, la acción con argumentos debe ejecutarse.
Muchos modelos de confianza definen el umbral por encima del cual la confianza se
garantiza, y por tanto, en lugar de utilizar una condición establecida por el desarrollador,
la condición viene dada por el propio umbral del modelo.
En cuanto a las acciones, ofrecemos dos: eliminar y sustituir, lo que permite eliminar
el componente que cumple la condición (o el umbral) o sustituirlo por otro que venga
especificado en los argumentos de la política.
Para validar el marco de trabajo, utilizamos una aplicación de chat distribuido,
donde el funcionamiento es similar para todos los modelos: una consola recibe un men-
saje de otra consola e inspecciona sus contenidos. Dependiendo de estos contenidos (por
ejemplo, si detecta una palabra malsonante), proporciona un estímulo para el modelo de
confianza o reputación, el cual puede venir dado en forma de afirmaciones o cambios en
factores. Demostramos que es posible implementar distintos tipo de modelos de forma
fácil y que la sobrecarga que conlleva su uso en términos de esfuerzo y rendimiento es
mínima, como muestran la figura 5.7 y la tabla 5.2.
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